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1. INTRODUCTION 
Cognitive linguistics focuses on the interrelation between language and 
thought processes: cognitive structures of language play an important role in the 
approaches subsumed under this discipline of linguistics. It aims at 
understanding how conceptualization is reflected in linguistic expressions and 
how both influence each other (Langacker 1987, Lakoff 1987, Croft & Cruse 
2004, Cruse 2006, Evans & Green 2006). 
Figurative language offers a complex area for investigation and many 
cognitive theories concentrate on these semantic phenomena to describe the 
underlying cognitive mechanisms and their relations. The fields of emotions, 
personality traits and similar abstract concepts of our psychological world 
constitute an important topic (Kövecses 2000, Evans & Green 2006). In these 
universal concepts, embodiment and cultural models as relevant underlying 
cognitive mechanisms are combined in a particular way and reflect their 
interrelations in linguistic realizations. 
Body part terms and their inclusion in figurative expressions of emotion in 
the Beaver (Athapascan) language are the topic of the present work. It is a 
contribution to the description of the Beaver language. It also contributes to the 
discussion about conceptual networks of polysemous lexical items, especially 
about concepts of body part terms. The Theory of Conceptual Metaphor 
(Lakoff & Johnson 1980, Lakoff 2006[1993], Kövecses 2007, 2010) is applied 
with modifications and in combination with other frameworks (Evans 2006, 
Glucksberg et al. 1997). Research on these topics is often conducted on well-
known languages, so the Beaver data will provide additional material for further 
theoretical examination. It is the first investigation of semantic and conceptual 
networks and structures in the Beaver mental lexicon. 
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The data presented are taken from the Beaver corpus1 compiled as part of 
the DoBeS documentation project funded by the VW foundation. The whole 
documentation collection is archived and accessible at the MPI in Nijmegen 
(Netherlands). 
1.1. AIMS OF THE THESIS 
This thesis contemplates linguistic and conceptual structures of 
semantically complex networks of body part terms in the Beaver mental lexicon. 
In accordance with the cognitive linguistics approach, it will concentrate on non-
literal and figurative usages of the lexical items, and on access to the relations 
between literal and intended figurative meanings. Especially, the underlying 
concepts and conceptual aspects highlighted in the different senses in 
semantically and conceptually complex meanings will be investigated. 
The aims and goals of the investigations of concepts in relation to lexical 
items are defined as following:  
“[...] conceptual approach to word meaning takes seriously the goal of 
explaining speakers’ behavior, and so it attempts to define the knowledge 
(mental representation) that underlies the significance of words and 
sentences” (Murphy 2005: 269). 
But how can concepts as mental phenomena be accessed, by linguists as 
well as by speakers? How can they be described without any direct point of 
contact? Cognitive linguistics provides some accounts of how to investigate and 
how to deal with concepts. Although no ubiquitous methodology has been 
established so far, there is common consent concerning empirically based 
                                               
1 I am grateful to all speakers who shared their knowledge of the Beaver language with us. 
For further information on this project and full acknowledgements see 
www.mpi.nl/dobes/projects/beaver. See also Jung et al. 2004-present. 
  9 
evidence: linguistic data is needed to support theoretical assumptions and 
findings – not only from well-known Indo-European languages, but from as 
many language families as available. 
As a contribution, Beaver figurative expressions of emotion containing 
specific body part terms are investigated here: constructions like sadzé̲éʼ xaats ̲ʼat 
“I am angry (lit. my heart falls out)” and sįįdyííʼ natlǫ “I worry (lit. my minds are 
lots)” constitute linguistic and conceptual forms focused on. The domains of 
body parts as well as of emotions and personality traits as related mental 
phenomena are chosen as main topics for several reasons. First, body parts 
constitute a basic semantic domain. The individual body part (and organ) terms 
described here show complex, experientially and socio-culturally influenced 
networks including several otherwise unrelated semantic frames. Second, the 
abstract domain of emotions and personality traits is a highly relevant topic in 
cognitive linguistics. Standardized accounts and methodology for description 
and analysis are further elaborated (Dirven & Pörings 2003, Kövecses 1986, 
1988, 2000; Kövecses & Csábi 2009). Finally, both domains – body parts and 
emotions2 – are directly linked via linguistic inclusion of body part terms in 
expressions of emotion. The underlying conceptualization patterns and the 
polysemous networks of the linguistic material reveal complex interrelations and 
correspondences of conceptual parts found in both domains. 
The aims of the examination are twofold: first, the underlying 
conceptualizations of the body part terms (for example, -dzé̲é “heart” and -tsí̱í 
“head”) are investigated. This is done in order to describe the relations between 
the basic meanings and the non-literal and figurative senses. Second, the 
meanings and conceptual build-up of the complex emotion constructions are 
examined with respect to the conceptual aspects of the attributed characteristics 
                                               
2 In the remainder of this thesis, the term “emotion” will be used for short to also comprise 
and mean personality traits and related psychological states and characteristics. 
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focused on. Forms with intransitive stative verbs like sadzé̲éʼ nakǫįl “I am sad, I 
worry (lit. my heart is heavy)” or with motion verbs like madzé̲éʼ dahʼatlʼis “be 
excited / scared (lit. his/her heart is dancing)” constitute the type of data 
analyzed here. The interaction between embodied experiences and cultural 
models plays a relevant role. As causing structures for the conceptualizations of 
the body parts and of the intended emotions and personality traits, both 
phenomena – embodiment and culture – constitute the reason and substructure 
for conceptual and finally linguistic patterns. Furthermore, cultural models are 
linked to language and thought via bidirectional relations: they determine 
conceptualizations and lexicalizations, but are also influenced by linguistic 
patterns and existing concepts (Wierzbicka 1997).  
Conceptualizations of figurative forms are not directly accessible, so that 
inferences have to be made on the basis of linguistic structure. Here, it becomes 
apparent that the relationships between linguistic and conceptual structure is not 
a one-to-one relationship. Rather, one linguistic construction pattern can result 
from different underlying cognitive configurations. Therefore, the usage of 
linguistic evidence is accompanied by giving consideration to several alternative 
theoretical models of conceptualization and to the notions of lexicalization, 
conventionalization and economy of language.  
Furthermore, metalinguistic statements are included as additional 
validation when available. Native speakers are able to realize conceptual and 
linguistic patterns to some extent which at least partially determine their way of 
talking about the world. On the other hand, they are not immediately and 
automatically aware of every figurative form conventionalized in their language. 
The expressions of emotion containing body part terms reveal that 
conventionalized linguistic patterns for meaning creation, but also established 
socio-cultural aspects, obscure and complicate access to figurativity (Holland & 
Quinn 1987). Conceptual patterns and mechanisms like polysemy, metonymy 
and metaphor are not directly or consciously available either, especially in natural 
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language use and communication. Relationships between literal and intended 
meanings, as well as between concepts and their linguistic manifestations 
partially allow for realization and discussion. Being informed and aware of 
idiosyncratic figurative phrases in one’s own native language, speakers use their 
intuitions and knowledge about their language and parts of the underlying 
models to understand and explain how such linguistic realizations of emotion 
concepts work. These metalinguistic statements constitute important indications 
of linguistic and conceptual forms. Therefore, they are included in the analysis 
of the parts of the Beaver corpus dealing with the meanings and usages of the 
body part terms. 
1.2. METHODOLOGY & STRUCTURE 
A set of selected body part terms constitutes the main data in this work. 
These lexical forms are presented in their semantic and conceptual networks, 
reflecting their meaning components as well as their different senses and usages. 
The conceptual aspects which are used as points of departure for the derived 
meanings are discussed in detail, since they reveal the diverse ways which lead to 
the establishment of non-literal and figurative senses and allow for an analysis of 
their conceptual structures. 
In most of the networks investigated here, the domain of emotions is 
included, i.e. specific conceptual aspects of the body part terms are incorporated 
in concepts of, for example, ANGER, FEAR or STUBBORNNESS via the usage of 
the lexemes. The conceptualizations of these figurative constructions form the 
second topic. For cognitive theories, these expressions constitute special 
challenges due to their complex forms which do not directly express the 
intended target but implicitly refer to a relationship between some specific state 
or activity of a body part (or SEAT OF EMOTION) and the emotion or personality 
trait to be actually expressed. 
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Besides the conceptual make-up of the body part terms, the realization of 
the verbal meanings in relation to the body part terms as subjects is discussed. 
The figurative meanings of the emotion expressions on the one hand reflect 
embodiment and cultural models as determining factors in the conceptualization 
processes. On the other hand, they reveal the complexities of the relationships 
between (similar) linguistic forms and (diverse) underlying structures. 
To describe and investigate the different senses and usages of polysemous 
lexemes, Langacker’s Network Model (1987, 1990) is applied. This allows for the 
identification of the relationships holding between the various meanings, and the 
underlying conceptual structures and frames included in such complex meaning 
networks. 
Consequently, it is embedded in the holistic approaches (Jackendoff 1983, 
2007, Lakoff 1987) as opposed to two-level models preferred by Bierwisch 
(1982, 1983) and others (e.g. Lang 1990, 1991). This means that no distinction 
will be made between world or encyclopedic knowledge on the one hand and 
linguistic or semantic knowledge on the other. Furthermore, language and 
cognition are realized as closely associated and corresponding. Thus, language 
does not constitute an autonomous system in cognition, but rather an open 
subsystem of knowledge, which includes all kinds of information from diverse 
experiences and knowledge. Still, linguistic evidence is used carefully since 
linguistic structures as realizations of conceptual processes differ from these 
underlying structures. Correspondingly, similar linguistic forms result from 
differing conceptualizations. 
For the discussion about which conceptual mechanisms are at work, i.e. 
how the meanings under discussion are created, which conceptual parts are used 
and how different domains are combined, the Conceptual Metaphor Theory 
(CMT) (Lakoff & Johnson 1980, Lakoff 2006[1993], Kövecses 2010) is 
integrated and discussed in detail. For the description of the conceptual 
constructions of individual expressions of emotion, this approach provides an 
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important starting point and theoretical background. In addition, other 
frameworks are integrated to capture the relevance of language use and 
language-specific structure for meaning creation. It will be shown that 
conceptual metaphor plays a role for the concept SEAT OF EMOTION of the body 
part terms. For the complex emotion expressions, conceptual metonymy is 
presumed as the main device. Furthermore, an intermediate level of “linguistic 
conceptualization” is defined to explain the non-prototypical usage of lexical 
material, especially the verbs and stative verbs in combination with body part 
subjects. It will be argued that shared conceptual aspects found in the abstract 
target concepts and in the source domain (as the prototypical context of the 
verbal meanings) are extracted and realized as linking features between these 
concepts. This is combined with discussions about the view that conceptual 
metaphor is not the only structure underlying linguistic metaphors (Grady 1999, 
Glucksberg et al. 1997, Evans 2006, 2010a). Linguistic mechanisms also create 
and affect polysemous meanings and figurative language. 
 
To sum up, the research topics of this work are the following: 
• conceptualization of body part terms in Beaver: what do the 
semantic networks look like? 
• description of the cognitive mechanisms giving rise to the distinct 
meanings 
• awareness of Beaver speakers of the relationships holding between 
the different senses of the polysemous body part terms  
• conceptualization of linguistic metaphors expressing emotions: 
what are the underlying conceptual strategies? 
• roles of conceptual metaphor and conceptual metonymy in the 
individual idiomatic expressions  
• role of the mental lexicon, linguistic structure and language use  
• interplay of linguistic and cultural knowledge 
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The structure of this paper is as follows. The interplay of culture, language 
and thought is discussed in chapter 2: the notion of cultural models is 
introduced in chapter 2.1., followed by a description of the mental lexicon and 
its relationship to cultural models (2.2.). Its structural organization including 
polysemy and the conceptual ingredients are focused on in chapter 2.3. Chapter 
3 comprises a delineation of the Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT): literal 
and figurative meanings, embodiment and cognitive models (ch. 3.1.) constitute 
important concepts for the specific data. After defining conceptual metaphor 
and metonymy in the subchapters 3.2 and 3.3., recent developments in metaphor 
research and other approaches to figurative language are presented in 
combination with the examination of specific aspects of the CMT (ch. 3.4.). 
After an introduction to the Beaver language and a description of the 
linguistic and metalinguistic data (ch. 4), the Beaver data is presented in chapter 
5. First, each body part term under discussion is presented as a complex network 
of interrelated meanings and conceptualizations. The usage of these lexical items 
in expressions of emotions are introduced in a descriptive fashion in the 
subsections of chapter 5. In chapters 6.1. and 6.2., problematic theoretical 
considerations of the CMT are discussed. The conceptualizations underlying the 
linguistic constructions are described with the notion of “linguistic 
conceptualization” (ch. 6.3.). Thereafter, the data are not divided with respect to 
the included body part terms, but analyzed according to linguistic patterns (6.5. 
& 6.6.). The empirical and theoretical sections are combined in a modified 
approach to conceptualization, non-literal and figurative language and the 
relationships between them. In the last sections, topics for further research 
brought up in the present work are presented. 
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2. CULTURAL MODELS & THE MENTAL LEXICON 
Investigating cultures and the relationship between language and culture 
often feels like starting out on a bold venture. In cognitive linguistics as well as 
in anthropology, various theoretical frameworks have elaborated models to 
grasp the complex notion of culture in relation to linguistic structures (Holland 
& Quinn 1987, Geertz 1973, Kachru & Kahane 1995, Palmer 1996, Jackendoff 
2007). The mental lexicon of a language opens one door for investigating how 
the links between cognition, knowledge organization and communication are 
intertwined (Aitchison 2003, Wierzbicka 1992, 1997). In the following chapter, 
theoretical concepts relevant for the description of the body part terms in the 
Beaver mental lexicon will be introduced and discussed. After a classification of 
the notions of culture and knowledge in relation to language, cultural models are 
defined (ch. 2.1.1.). Then, the mental lexicon will be discussed, defining 
meanings and concepts and how these can be examined in relation to cultural 
models (ch. 2.2.). Finally, polysemy, figurative extensions and the resulting 
network design of lexicon structures are introduced (ch. 2.3.). 
2.1. CULTURE, LANGUAGE & KNOWLEDGE 
The cognitive linguistics approach allows for, or even claims the 
interrelation of linguistic and encyclopedic knowledge, defining meanings as 
parts of the cognitive system directly linked to language use (Lakoff 1987, 
Langacker 1988, Evans & Green 2006). For example, the meaning of the lexeme 
“heart” is assumed to be represented as the concept of HEART established via 
everyday experiences through time in a speech community. It includes – besides 
linguistic features – all kinds of information usually not considered to be 
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linguistic. Two-level advocates (e.g. Bierwisch 1982, Bierwisch & Lang 1987, 
Lang 1991) – stating that the level of linguistic knowledge is divided from the 
level of conceptual knowledge (Schwarz 2005: 281) – criticize this inclusion of 
“non-definitional information”. They deny the point of realizing that the latter 
knowledge is indeed linguistically relevant, especially for figurative language or 
socio-culturally based usages, as will be seen throughout this work. As semantic 
units, meanings of lexemes are parts of cognitive domains, and thus fully 
involved in the cognitive system without constituting an independent mental 
structure. Encyclopedic knowledge therefore is an essential part of the mental 
lexicon, together with linguistic knowledge located at the level of conceptual 
structure.  
People take their culture and language with their categorizations of the 
world for granted, i.e. not like products for understanding the world. Rather, 
they are understood as tools to think and talk about reality just as it is. This is 
due to the fact that the whole speech community – as communication partners – 
shares this model and acts according to it, in general behavior and in linguistic 
behavior (Holland & Quinn 1987, Wierzbicka 1997). Speakers acquire and use 
their native language, and with it the concepts and classifications included. They 
usually do not challenge how the world around them is affected and regulated by 
their speech. Since speakers use language first and foremost to communicate 
with each other, and not for consciously organizing the world or for being aware 
of each linguistic feature and its function, certain aspects remain subconscious. 
The mutual power of socio-culturally influenced exposure to the world and the 
way of talking about it is similar to the hen and the egg paradox. The linguistic 
classifications are indeed created by the speakers and their attempts to categorize 
the world around them. Yet, speakers are not conscious of their influence on 
their language as well as of the linguistic impact on their cultural concepts 
(Palmer 1996, Wierzbicka 1999). 
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The (bidirectional) dependencies as well as the mutual interactions 
between language and culture determine to what extent culture is included in 
meaning creation. They also affect how speakers realize cultural influences in 
talking about the world and the things in it. Moreover, cultures influence the 
organization and structuring of linguistic manifestations, resulting in variation in 
the classifications and semantic and conceptual networks in the languages of the 
world. To quote Geertz:  
“[Culture] [...] denotes a historically transmitted pattern of meanings 
embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in 
symbolic forms by means of which people communicate, perpetuate and 
develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life” (1973: 89).  
This definition could be used for language as well as for culture. As will be 
seen throughout this thesis and in detail in chapter 5, language, and foremost the 
lexicon in use with its fixed expressions, figurative language, and collocations, 
provides evidence for the reality of culture. It is exactly here that specific ideas, 
concepts, and relations are stored in an easily accessible form. At the same time, 
other ideas have not been considered worth lexicalization. Thus, investigating 
the semantics of a language contributes to the understanding of cultural 
meanings. Furthermore, it accounts for the implicit suppositions which are 
connected to them and which are implicitly understood by the community 
members, but not accessible to outsiders. To use Sapir’s words: “Vocabulary is a 
very sensitive index of the culture of a people” (Mandelbaum (ed.) 1949: 27). 
Moreover, both language and culture are historically transmitted systems, and 
both show flexibility, and heterogeneity. There is one significant difference 
between the two: while cultures must be able to adapt to quickly changing 
conditions or environments instantaneously, languages need and do not without 
some time lag. Instead, linguistic meanings are extended or modified in the long-
term. First, they mimic the known (past) reality, before modified meanings are 
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conventionalized and truly come to refer to the entities or ideas now found in 
one’s culture. 
There exists a common basis for experiencing the world determined by 
human perceptiveness, and the experiences we are able to have. This is 
subsumed under the notion of “embodiment” (see ch. 2.1.1. below and ch. 
3.1.2.). From here on, variation appears due to differing individual experiences 
with the adjacencies, and diverse living conditions. These give rise to varying 
conceptualizations, and varying needs for certain expressions and lexicalizations, 
while other ideas, activities or entities are not realized as significant enough for 
being memorized in fixed expressions in the lexicon. In short, there are some 
meanings linguistically encoded in one culture or community, but not in others. 
These differences are grounded in cultural models as assumptions and ways of 
thinking (see ch. 2.1.1. below) in relation to various environmental settings and 
differently realized experiences. The similarities found in many languages and 
cultures, on the other hand, mirror the universality of human conceptualization 
patterns. Equivalently, Wierzbicka (1997) state that linguistic universals provide 
the common groundwork from which variation found in the world’s languages 
(and cultures) is developed. Consequently, studying one of these two sides will 
also lead to a better understanding of the other one. If we comprehend forms, 
functions, and patterns of universals, we are able to infer characteristics of the 
culturally shaped variations found worldwide, and vice versa. 
2.1.1. CULTURAL MODELS 
For further investigation of the relationship between culture and language, 
or the role cultural aspects play in the organization of meaning, the concept of 
“cultural models” (Holland & Quinn 1987) has been established. The aspects 
described below are similar to Lakoff’s “universal cognitive models” presented 
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in chapter 3.1.3., emphasizing the relationships holding between cultural models 
and linguistic and cognitive structures.  
Cultural models show characteristics which both advance and complicate 
meaning availability and accessibility. Before these are presented, the notion of 
“embodiment” – discussed in more detail in chapter 3.1.2. – is briefly introduced 
as a similarly relevant and influential factor. 
Embodiment includes all interaction with the world, i.e. observation of 
and experience with physical objects, our body and events in the world. This is 
contrary to principles like the mind-body-dualism proposed by rationalist 
approaches like Generative theory advocated by Chomsky and others. Cognitive 
linguistics denies the idea that language can be investigated without reference to 
the human body and the consequences following due to the way we experience 
the world. Therefore, cognitive linguistic approaches investigate cognition and 
language against the background of embodiment (Gibbs 2003, Evans & Green 
2006). This is bound to the hypothesis that our understanding of reality is 
affected by our bodily conditions. Accordingly, it contradicts objectivist 
definitions of language as a tool for an objective description of the world. Reality 
is not objectively perceived by humans. Rather, it is construed according to our 
physical capabilities or facilities, also including our neurological organization. An 
obvious example is presented by our visual system with three different color 
channels as opposed to other species whose physical build constitutes two or 
four photo-receptors. The “reality” we see, i.e. visually perceive, is – even if only 
to some degree – a different one than other organisms realize. Such bodily 
features correlate with more abstract cognitive aspects, since such experiences 
are cognitively processed. 
Embodied experience constitutes a major reason for conceptual 
correspondences. For example, a person bodily experiences warmth when the 
first caretaker holds her/him near, but also when s/he takes care of her/him in 
other ways or, in other words, shows affection for that person. This first 
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embodied experience of affection leads to a conception of affection which 
includes warmth (Kövecses 2000: 93). How this experience is further 
conceptualized and included in linguistic structure will be discussed in chapter 3. 
 
Cultural models include cultural knowledge accumulated by many 
generations via numerous experiences, and also include knowledge about 
linguistic behavior and language in general. Patterns for communication, such as 
when to talk, how to talk to whom in which situations and so on, are compiled 
in the cultural system as well as knowledge about meanings and usages. Every 
culture, or every community experiences the world around itself in slightly 
different ways. To a certain extent, different groups have different experiences 
by virtue of unequal environments and living conditions. For example, a 
community living in the mountains makes other experiences concerning sun 
movement, day and nighttime, distances, and horizontal as well as vertical axes 
than communities living alongshore in plain areas. This example only reflects a 
few geographical aspects, but climate, nutrition, neighboring communities, etc. 
all exert influence on how reality is realized in a group (Wierzbicka 1992). The 
different conceptualizations are not only a result of direct environment, but also 
of the exposure to it. There are differences in how experience is put into words, 
how and how often these words are used, and to what extent they are 
conventionalized, lexicalized, grammaticalized, and readily available. As Locke 
puts it:  
“[communities, CP], by their customs and manner of life, have found 
occasion to make several complex ideas, and given names to them, which 
others never collected into specific ideas.” (2004 [1690]: 31) 
A first indication that such a model is not simply a mirroring of the world 
is the fact that there may exist several, alternative models, intra- and inter-
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culturally.3 The availability of other models alludes to the fact that there may be 
some inconsistencies. Yet, these do not lead to abandonment of the whole 
model system, but to the existence of alternatives for cases where an existing 
and established model does not fit. This could be called a case of subconscious 
acknowledgement that the cultural model is just a model, and not a one-to-one 
copy of the existing world. Still, speakers do not switch consciously to an 
alternative model when they realize that the other one does not fit. Due to the 
incoherence, cultural models are better understood as numerous domains of 
diverse culturally shared schematizations, designed for the performance of 
(cognitive) activities (Holland & Quinn 1987). 
Cultural models emerge parallel to an individual society as a whole, and the 
same holds for their “intrinsic persuasiveness” (Holland & Quinn 1987: 9). They 
are hierarchically organized, in the sense that one may be partially used in a more 
general one or vice versa, following the rule “what people need to know in order 
to say the things they say” (Holland & Quinn 1987: 5). Furthermore, cultural 
models have a subtle character, appearing in nearly every marginal aspect of life, 
but also in important cultural domains like marriage or politeness. Here, both 
linguistic as well as non-linguistic aspects of action and behavior are meant. 
Community members are born into societies which already act in accordance 
with their traditional models, leading to a kind of subliminal, natural, and 
indirect set of instructions. Members gain insight into the cultural knowledge 
and socially required behavior stored in these cultural models. Hutchins calls this 
phenomenon “referential transparency”: “Once learned, it becomes what one 
sees with, but seldom what one sees.” (1980: 12) However, these models are also 
challenged by the community members, leading to a co-existence of alternative, 
sometimes even conflicting models which indeed may exist adjacently. 
                                               
3  One example are western societies which are on the one hand science-oriented and on the 
other religion-based. 
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Cultural models as defined here are not to be paralleled with expert or 
scientific models which are required to be completely coherent. Instead, they 
show inconsistencies, and contradictory aspects. These are used whenever one 
model does not fit or explain a certain phenomenon in a useful way. Also, 
models may in some situations be abandoned in favor of other, more adequate 
ones. To sum up, cultural models encompass a huge amount of expertise and 
cultural knowledge, but the whole system is variable and not always coherent, 
showing other characteristics than scientific theories. 
2.1.2. CONTEXT 
In this section, several levels of context are presented, the importance of 
which is reflected in language use (Leckie-Tarry 1995, Evans 2010b): as Evans 
points out, figurative language is not exclusively processed in our cognitive 
system, but is also affected by the usage of linguistic structures in 
communication. Therefore, linguistic and non-linguistic contexts are briefly 
introduced. 
In cognitive linguistics approaches, the role of several levels of context is 
assumed to be fundamental. Despite the heuristic importance of Saussure’s 
distinction between ‘langue’ (competence) and ‘parole’ (performance), the 
investigation of language in use and context is advocated here. It is oriented 
towards speakers’ definition of language as a communication tool and thus used 
in real situations by individual language users. As Kress & Hodge (1979:13) put 
it: “without immediate and direct relations to the social context, the forms and 
functions of language are not fully explicable”. Moreover, language is bound to 
social interaction, allowing the exchange of experiences and knowledge in the 
social reality of a community. This social reality is “not a ‘fact’, but an ongoing 
accomplishment, the often precarious result of the routine activities and tacit 
understandings of social actors” (Giglioli 1972: 13). 
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To explain the diverse relationships holding between the different levels of 
context, the concept of schemata was introduced to the scope of context 
interpretation (e.g. Dijk & Kintsch 1983). Schemata are defined as  
“[…] a valuable means of explaining the relationship between the various 
levels of context and providing an explanation of the means of access from 
one level of situation to another, from one knowledge system to another” 
(Leckie-Tarry 1995:22).  
This enables speakers to interpret texts, and to trigger and deduce missing 
information. Widdowson (1983) emphasizes the cognitive nature of schemata or 
“frames of reference” (1983: 91), as they provide for the organization of 
knowledge in long-term memory. Moreover, they allow for predictions via their 
stereotypic images which are imposed on actual situations to ease their 
understanding and their classification in existing and known patterns. 
The relationships between the different levels of context play an essential 
role. For example, the context of a situation is dependent on existing schemata 
with which former situations have been experienced, thus, the cultural context is 
needed for providing an appropriate pattern. Furthermore, such a pattern is 
modified whenever new situations are included, so that the context of culture is 
constantly adjusted, procuring assimilated patterns for new situations which in 
turn are processed against the slightly changed cultural background knowledge.  
Cultural context is a level – alternatively termed “Members’ Resources” by 
Fairclough (1989:141) – which includes intricate and extensively structured 
knowledge organized in an overall system which enables the creation and 
interpretation of meaning. This level contains schematic, actual knowledge about 
the world, about (physical) processes and phenomena, about one’s language etc. 
Experiences made by the community, and the structured processing of them, are 
represented in this knowledge: “[I]t refers to the factual, institutional and 
ideological background knowledge prevalent within any society or culture [...]” 
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(Leckie-Tarry 1995: 23), thus constituting the knowledge resources of a 
community. Furthermore, knowledge of semantic relations and their 
organization is detached from specific texts, and stored in an independent, 
abstracted way. In other words, knowledge of how the linguistic stock of one’s 
language is organized, and how to use this stock, is subsumed in this contextual 
category.4 
2.2. THE MENTAL LEXICON 
In this subchapter, the mental lexicon will be described in relation to 
cultural models and communication. Prior to that, the basic phenomena – i.e. 
concept, word, meaning – are introduced. 
2.2.1. CONCEPTS 
Concepts are mental representations of concrete objects, abstract 
phenomena and their classifications. It is important to draw a distinction 
between words and lexical items on the one hand and concepts on the other. 
Lexical entries are linked to conceptual memory, but they should not be 
understood as the linguistic equivalents of concepts. They are evoked by words 
or other lexical forms, but they are not intrinsically linguistic. Thus, there exist 
concepts that are not involved in word meanings at all, and thus do not show 
any direct links to linguistic forms. Rather, they are structural elements of human 
                                               
4 Another important area are traditional stories and narratives which show links to cultural 
models which to a certain degree constitute and modify meanings, and include meanings and 
concepts in contexts which may help to understand the relations between older and newer meanings. 
Statements like “we need a teacher”, “those older people would have known”, or “I lost my mom 
early so she couldn’t tell me all these things” (all answers to linguistic questions about linguistic 
structure, not, for example, culture or tradition) clearly indicate that besides cultural and world 
knowledge linguistic and conceptual knowledge is also transmitted over generations. 
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cognition, organizing our cognitive system. As cognitive structures they 
represent our knowledge of the world, and they guide our thoughts about and 
interactions with the world (Frawley 2005). The whole conceptual system may 
be defined as patterns of ontological categories for processing and classifying of 
our environment, and transmitting between language and world (Sambor 2005). 
Concepts are results of mental processing and are organized in conceptual 
groups as result of experiences. Established concepts are not individual, 
independent, and unlinked categories to think with. Rather, the occur in linked 
schematic patterns – worked out of the ‘world’s chaos’ via abstracting away 
from minor differences –, interrelated with similar as well as opposite concepts 
and resulting in a hierarchy of salience and embeddedness. Therefore, concepts 
structure experience by establishing reoccurring patterns or similarities, leading 
to more abstract schemas. These again, can be “filled” by individual instances of 
new (combined) experiences and their linguistic manifestations. 
Furthermore, concepts do not constitute primitives or single simple 
meanings. Again, this is due to the fact that their meaningful function results 
from their systematic organization, i.e. the relations to all other concepts within 
the knowledge system:  
“Their meaning consists in their position within the cognitive grid, at the 
same time determining the function of a semantic category in terms of its 
linguistic manifestations.” (Zelinsky-Wibbelt 1993)  
The hierarchical structure of conceptual networks spreads out in both 
vertical and horizontal dimensions, providing for dependent, embedded or 
dominant levels as well as for similarity, or paradigmatic levels (Zwitserlood 
2005, Langacker 1988). ‘Families of concepts’ arise from this organization, 
smaller networks again structured according to their parts as well as to other 
families. The crucial point is not all that members of such families are necessarily 
linked to a (or the) common semantic core, i.e. one stereotypical, prototypical, 
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ideal or best member. Instead, members may show connections to other, more 
similar parts of the family, while links to the most salient member become 
indirect, via intermediate links to other members of similar salience. This will be 
seen in more detail in chapter 5.1., where derived meanings are established on 
the basis of other derived, non-prototypical senses. 
That “there are not always one-to-one correspondences between 
conceptual and lexical units” (Zwitserlood 2005: 104), becomes apparent 
regarding polysemous instances which evoke conceptual aspects of the literal as 
well as the intended figurative meaning of lexical material. As will be discussed 
in more detail in chapter 5.7., the Beaver body part term -dz̲é̲é “heart” 
constitutes a lexical entry point to a complex conceptual network with several 
senses and conceptual domains. Besides the specific conceptualization of the 
body part term as SEAT OF EMOTION in the target meaning of, for example, 
sadzé̲éʼ xááts ̲ʼat “I am angry (my heart falls out)”, the literal and basic meaning 
(i.e. the concrete conceptual aspect BODY PART) is available in metalinguistic 
discussions about this idiomatic expression. Concepts are abstract phenomena 
to which we have only restricted and indirect access. Hence, linguistic forms are 
most often considered and examined in order to grasp the underlying 
representations. Yet, their meanings already show diversity and evoke numerous 
conceptual domains. The conceptual network of a polysemous lexical item 
therefore includes interrelated concepts which play various roles in the 
conceptualization and interpretation of the intended meanings. For example, in 
English, we find several lexical items linked to the concept of ANGER, so that 
here many lexical constructions (e.g. “rage, fury, incensement, ire, wrath”, but 
also “fume, boil, simmer, explode”, etc.) refer to or display one concept. On the 
other hand, a lexeme like “head” is included in and linked to several conceptual 
domains (e.g. BODY, LEADERSHIP, FORCE, HEIGHT, BASE, etc.).  
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2.2.2. LEXEMES & MEANINGS 
In cognitive linguistics, a lexeme or linguistic unit is paralleled with a 
mental unit, standing in relationships to other, linguistic as well as conceptual, 
units, and creating a kind of lexical and conceptual network in long-term 
memory (Schindler 2005). The lexicon is realized as one pole of a continuum, of 
which grammar constitutes the other pole. Both ends include symbolic units, the 
lexicon specified symbols (words) and the grammar schematic units or 
“established patterns” (Schindler 2005). Words are defined as conventionalized 
relations between phonological, syntactic (or combinatory) and conceptual 
information (“sound-grammar-meaning triples”) (Zwitserlood 2005: 103); the 
interfaces of these three are then captured and managed by the lexicon (Frawley 
2005).  
Lexical item are defined as basic and fixed linguistic units in competence, 
while words are interpreted as an uttered part in communication situations in 
performance. Both are not just independent items, rather they constitute a 
“family of related meaning-form pairs” (Zwitserlood 2005: 103).  
Meanings are defined as ‘mental representational units’ (Schwarz 2005: 
279) of conceptual structure. To understand and use for example the Beaver 
verb xáá-ʼah which can be roughly translated as “start/open” in English, a 
speaker needs to have knowledge about the different activities involved in the 
act denoted by the lexeme and defined by socio-cultural conventions. Therefore, 
the interpretation of a linguistic form is typically interconnected with conceptual 
knowledge in an inseparable way. Speakers have to rely on their knowledge 
about (and conceptualization of) the world and about the language as well as 
about the code of the statement. In Beaver, the form xáá-ʼah “start/open” 
shows a different semantic and conceptual structure than for example the 
English equivalents, as is reflected by the following usages and collocations: 
 
  28 
(1) médzine   xáádyįįʼah   “turn on the radio” 
(2) tsatsónétʼa  xáádyįįʼah   “turn on / pre-heat the oven” 
(3) adééʼǫ   xáádyįįʼah   “open the door”5 
 
This makes perfect sense, keeping in mind that languages offer ways of 
talking about the world which differ in many degrees. Hence, encyclopedic 
knowledge – as the basis of the projected mental mirror of the unorganized 
world outside – must be related to the linguistic realizations or manifestations of 
the underlying conceptualization patterns.  
To use Murphy’s example, the meaning of the English phrase “be treated 
like a dog” (Murphy 2005: 271) does not refer to essential definitional aspects of 
the meaning of DOG. Nevertheless, the expression allows for insight into socio-
cultural aspects of the speech community. On the one hand, it reveals the fact 
that dogs are involved in social life in a specific way in the speech community 
using such an expression. On the other hand, it uses this encyclopedic 
knowledge just stated – as a part of the concept of DOG – to express a situation 
which shows similar cognitive components. It is exactly this combination of 
knowledge in concepts going beyond the traditional aspects of meaning. It calls 
for evaluative features of lexical units and for the creation of metaphors or 
figurative language in general. This also implies that for example, for the Beaver 
body part term -dz̲é̲é “heart”, discussed in detail in chapter 5.7. The links to 
emotions and personality traits are not only linguistically established, but also 
rest on culture-specific knowledge. Thus, non-linguistic or encyclopedic 
knowledge must be considered in the analysis of language in order to account 
for all influential aspects. 
                                               
5 Note that the verb stems alters when the meaning implies “open with a key”: 
méhxadatʼáheʼéh xádįʼǫ.̨  
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The meanings of words are numerous, including different semantic, 
pragmatic or grammatical contents. They constitute the mental aspects of lexical 
items which are represented in the lexicon and activated in language processing 
(Sambor 2005). This mental level is important in a two-fold way, first, meaning 
may be situated or defined as an aspect between purely lexical phenomena and 
non-linguistic concepts, acting as a bridge between language and mind (i.e. 
cognition). How this (in-)direct relationship between lexical material and 
concepts emerges in linguistic structure and what mechanisms are at work when 
non-literal meanings are established are some of the questions discussed here. 
Second, meaning and meaning relations are crucial not only for competence, but 
also for performance. Thus, they allow for the investigation of the mental 
lexicon as a conventionalized network. They also enable the exploration of 
different and differing meanings in language use, where modification of 
meanings, modulations of new senses, etc. are instantiated. 
2.2.2.1. COMMUNICATIVE ASPECTS OF MEANINGS 
Meanings of words are often investigated at their structural level, while the 
examination of their communicative functions in context is often neglected, or 
at least thrust into the background. The communicative role of meanings is 
investigated in relation to its generating affects for the usage, processing, and 
understanding of lexical items. It is assumed that the meanings and weight of a 
word are developed through time and usage of this word in social, 
communicative activities (McConnell-Ginet 2008, Evans 2010a). Moreover, as 
McConnell-Ginet points out: “[...] certain aspects of meaning arise, are 
sustained, and are sometimes transformed in social practice.” (2008: 506). 
Consequently, meaning is defined as a network of senses and usages which 
found and maintain the complete complex organization. 
McConnell-Ginet defines the concept of “lexical significance” (2008: 499), 
which goes beyond the notion of lexical meaning and word-meaning pair: 
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besides the components “semantic representation” and “reference” the 
additional aspect “conceptual baggage” is included. 
 
Semantic Representation & Reference 
Semantic representations subsume all semantically relevant linguistic 
aspects of a word, so that its argument or event structures, pragmatic 
characteristics and so on are included under this level. Hence, extension and 
intension of a word – i.e. relationships to other words as well as its own 
compositional components – will be found at this level of lexical significance. 
McConnell-Ginet calls this component “mind-oriented”, since the 
representations are organized in the speakers’ minds, and included in the 
knowledge of a word if fully acquired. However, this does not imply that 
knowledge of semantic representations is always explicit and directly accessible 
to speakers. 
The second component – reference – has been highlighted by formal 
semanticists for a long time, focusing on the referential and content aspects 
meanings show. Indeed, the relations between linguistic forms and the physical 
entities denoted are essential for systematically communicating about things in 
the world, but also for expressing abstract concepts like emotions, opinions, etc. 
As McConnell-Ginet puts it: “Referential meaning embeds language in the rest 
of life, creating the possibility for socially shared and thereby extended or 
collectively enriched access to the world” (2008: 510). 
 
Conceptual Baggage 
The last component – conceptual baggage – does not constitute a part of 
the linguistic meaning of a word, but subsumes different kinds of additional 
aspects which appear when using a lexical item: 
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“[...] connotations, but also encyclopedic knowledge, stereotypes or 
prototypes, and background assumptions, as well as knowledge about social 
practices in the course of which the word gets used.” (McConnell-Ginet 
2008: 512) 
This baggage may have salient communicative impact via the inferences it 
triggers, which often constitute a salient part of the significance of an utterance. 
Additionally, the baggage can be compared to the influential character of 
ideologies, which determine speakers’ language and reasoning. It can affect 
speaker and/or hearer unconsciously, so that some inferences may arise in the 
hearer without the speaker being aware of them, or which s/he would even 
reject.6 Conceptual baggage is neither definable in terms of implicatures nor 
explicatures, since it is “typically not even meant, much less said” (McConnell-
Ginet 2008: 514). Thus, is also not to be included in what the speaker says or 
what the speaker means. The relevant fact is that this baggage has 
communicative effects on speakers and hearers:  
“[...] there is simply a linguistic trigger that leads a speaker’s audience to 
activate certain background assumptions already in some sense available to 
them” (McConnell-Ginet 2008: 514) 
Conceptual baggage plays an important role concerning the speakers’ and 
hearers’ understanding of a lexical item, as well as in semantic changes (Traugott 
& Dasher 2002). These result in meaning extensions, elaboration, changes in 
usage and so on. There is no need for conscious realization or awareness on 
both the speaker’s and hearer’s sides; the baggage is activated independently of 
their intentions. Usage in natural contexts (i.e. in discourse) causes the baggage 
to be linked to a lexical item, implying that cultural and social background 
aspects play some role in shaping this baggage. Nevertheless, this does not mean 
                                               
6 See Kitzinger (2005) for a detailed study. 
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that every use in every situation modifies this baggage, since the distribution of 
influential usage is not “democratically apportioned” (McConnell-Ginet 2008: 
515). And the effects are not only those recognizable by the communicating 
partners, but foremost those which affect subsequent discourses and long-term 
usages of that word. 
Conceptual baggage – although not a part of lexical meaning proper – can 
influence the usage of expressions, but also meaning extension and further 
senses or usages of a lexical item. Such aspects are reflected in metalinguistic 
statements of speakers: 
 
Consultant101: And that word tʼoitsʼat (“s/he is dead”), you know, it sounds like 
a person just don’t care he is dead or not. That’s what it sounds like, so it’s 
better for them to say matlʼǫe ̨́ʼ  ǫ́lį “s/he is dead (lit. her/his end is there)”, 
you know, more polite way.    (metaphors140) 
 
Consultant505: To me itʼs just as well say while youʼre thinking of everything. 
xadáá aziséʼ (“moose hide”), and “white manʼs [moose] hide”. That sounds 
like in- itʼs coming to where you have a camp, and you have tents and tarps. 
It also is- means that.     (misc_verbs001) 
 
2.2.3. STRUCTURES OF THE MENTAL LEXICON 
The mental lexicon is defined as the cognitive organization of the complex 
structures and relationships holding between concepts of words in the speaker’s 
mind:  
“The mental lexicon, the dynamic organization of words in the mind, is the 
backbone of language ability, comprising a vast and complex network of 
mental representations, associations, and processes.”  (Libben et al. 2011) 
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The modeling of this phenomenon often applies a network model (e.g. 
Langacker 1988) to comprehend and visualize the assumed structures of words, 
meanings and concepts. The mental lexicon is not to be paralleled with a 
dictionary, the organizations differ in complexity and arrangements. How the 
mental lexicon works is investigated by linguists and psychologists (Aitchinson 
1994, Libben & Jarema 2002): the research questions deal with the retrieval of 
lexical knowledge, the number of words speakers have (an adult speaker is said 
to know about 150,000 words), and how they manage to coherently use this 
huge amount of lexical forms. The complex organization of the mental lexicon is 
fundamental for such processing operations, since the relationships and various 
levels allow for the fast applications. What is of special interest in this work, is 
the organization of lexemes in relation to one another. Furthermore, the focus is 
on the organization of different meanings of one lexeme, i.e. structures of 
polysemous networks and how these look like in the mental lexicon. 
For the investigation of figurative expressions in a specific language, an 
overall picture of the corresponding semantic and conceptual networks of 
meanings stored in the mental lexicon provides a salient superstructure. This is 
especially true if this language is not analyzed in as much detail as linguistically 
well described languages like English or German. Semantic shifts, kinds of 
polysemy, and transferred meanings arise in relation to language-internal 
linguistic patterns and meaning relationships. Semantic and lexical networks are 
structures one needs to comprehend in order to understand how non-literal and 
figurative meanings and usages made their way into conventionalized language 
use.  
In this work, parts of the Beaver lexicon will be described and examined as 
parts of the mental lexicon. This means that mental representations, 
organization of meanings and corresponding conceptualizations and 
conceptualization patterns are included and focused on. This seems to be a 
favorable approach for the aims of this thesis, which are to understand the 
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structure and organization of the mental lexicon. This especially holds for non-
literal and figurative meanings and the relations to their literal pendants, patterns 
of non-literal and figurative language, their relation to the world, to cognition 
and conceptualization and their accessibility for native language users. To give 
an example, in figure 2.1., the polysemous network of the lexical item -zí̲s ̲
“skin/hide” is presented as part of the mental lexicon of Beaver speakers:  
The notion of a mental lexicon – as well as the cognitive linguistics approach 
used here – already implies that lexical and mental units have to be considered to 
complete the picture. Yet, to equate lexical units with mental units is not 
enough, since this locates lexical entries deeper in the mental world of speakers, 
but does not bring us closer to its nature. The idea to parallel lexical units with 
mental units mainly emphasizes the fact that linguistic expressions are essentially 
linked to mental processes, and that language constitutes a part of our cognition, 
without being divided from it or creating an independent subsystem within it. 
Hence, to investigate linguistic networks, one should keep in mind that these 
systems are rooted in an overall cognitive system, and that both interact with 
each other on diverse levels. What such relations and interdependencies look 
like, is one of the great questions of cognitive linguistics (and psychology) still to 
be answered. This work discusses some of these aspects, and offers empirical 
evidence for prevailing theoretical assumptions. 
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Figure 2.1.: conceptual network of -zí̲s ̲“skin/hide”. 
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The mental lexicon of a language is defined not only as storing all lexical 
items available in a language. In addition to this function, it systematically 
organizes meanings and forms, and somehow links related meanings and forms 
to one another to enable communication. The principles of economy and 
efficiency underlie communication as a highly complex social action, so that the 
construct of a mental lexicon is also based on these principles, since it developed 
from the need of valuable communication. Consequently, the functions of 
lexical organization, semantic shifts, polysemy and the like came into existence 
by meeting the pragmatic demands of a speech community.  
It is not sufficient for a speaker to show linguistic competence in social 
interaction and particularly in communication. Cultural knowledge, as well as 
participation in cultural and social activities are as essential as the knowledge of 
the code. Moreover, these skills are interwoven, combining in a complex system 
of interdependent areas. So, what speakers exhibit is better called 
“communicative competence” (Hymes 1966), extending Chomsky’s idea of 
linguistic competence. As Giglioli puts it:  
“[...] a person endowed with mere linguistic competence would be a sort of 
cultural monster. He would know the grammatical rules of his language, 
but he would not know when to speak, when to be silent, which 
sociolinguistic options to select from a repertoire on what occasion [...]” 
(1972: 15) 
What can be implicitly understood from this notion is that social meaning 
is a factor not to be disregarded or excluded from the investigation of meanings 
in general, and especially of non-literal and figurative meanings as parts of the 
mental lexicon. Speakers are offered linguistic choices between several linguistic 
expressions to communicate what they intended to communicate, although 
decision making is to a certain degree influenced by their language with its fixed 
expressions, and lexicalizations which are easier to access or automatically 
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available. Nonetheless, the choice of one way of expressing the intended 
meaning over another is also a social one. 
Furthermore, relationships between basic, prototypical meanings of the 
linguistic material and their non-prototypical senses and figurative usages are at 
least partially a result of the cultural organization of personal experiences. These 
effects are recognizable and available for members of a community, sharing the 
same knowledge, and cultural background, while outsiders fail to access the 
whole collection of information stored in the mental lexicon.  
Linguistic units as mental units are interlinked and stored in the lexicon in 
long-term memory. Semantic memory is understood as a “network of concepts, 
interconnected by means of labeled arcs which specify the relations between 
concepts” (Zwitserlood 2005: 104). These serve as basis on which a mental 
lexicon operates, using some but not all of the existing concepts for linguistic 
meaning creation and organization. This mental level of words provides an 
interrelated, bound subsystem of cognition without constituting an individual 
and somehow autonomous module. Hence, analyses of linguistic meanings are 
dependent on or at least influenced by features of organization and the 
processibility of conceptual structure. 
Lexical structures in the mental lexicon are not completely random or 
senseless. Taking into account the systematic and hierarchical organization of 
the mental lexicon, the complex interrelatedness of lexical items to each other 
clearly reflect motivation of lexical organization in the mental lexicon. For 
example, the Beaver form-meaning relation saa “sun” may be an arbitrary one, 
but the forms i ́z̨áa “month (lit. (its) sun)”, saa adástlʼíze “calendar (lit. sun 
paper)”, and sáátlʼuléʼ “rainbow (lit. sun rope)” show meaningful relations to 
each other and to the form for “sun” on the conceptual and linguistic level. 
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2.2.4. THE “CULTURAL” LEXICON 
To gain insight into cultural models in relation to linguistic forms, 
conceptualizations and the mental lexicon, some approaches attempt to grasp 
cultural knowledge by analyzing the lexicon and referential meanings, but the 
results are not uncontroversial. 
When looking at non-literal expressions in the languages of the world, we 
see that there are some parallels appearing in nearly every language, whereas at 
the same time a great deal of such figurative forms in a language show 
idiosyncratic characteristics. These must be understood against the cultural 
background of the speech community. Near-universals are based upon our 
perception of the world: embodied experiences we all have as humans with the 
restricted possibilities we have, namely as seeing, hearing, feeling, and structuring 
organisms. 
Goddard & Wierzbicka (1994) emphasize the importance of culturally 
salient words as “conceptual tools that reflect a society’s past experiences of 
doing and thinking about things in certain ways; and they help to perpetuate 
these ways” (1994: 22). This does not mean that a society is fully dictated by its 
amount of concepts. Rather, these concepts realized in the lexicon exert 
subliminal influence to some degree on the community as a whole. At the same 
time they are designed by cultural and historical aspects in combination with 
embodied experiences. This collective heritage which is based on an implicit 
agreement of all community members leads to idiosyncratic ways of thinking 
about entities or actions in the world. These are established as common or 
typical, and result in lexicalized or fixed expressions. Wierzbicka (1992, 1997) 
advocates the value of lexicons for investigating cultural phenomena, stating that 
they – analyzed appropriately – are indeed able to provide insights into culturally 
defined concepts, and world views. 
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Holland & Quinn (1987) remark that new approaches doubt that 
regularities in the lexicon are able to uncover culturally shared knowledge. 
Hence, they define the relationship between cultural models and semantic 
domains as “complex and indirect at best” (1987: 16). They deny procedures by 
which research can derive the one from the other. In chapter 5, the practicability 
of the lexicon for investigating culturally based conventions and models will be 
tested. This will be done by analyzing metalinguistic discussions and polysemous 
networks, as well as usage patterns for lexical items, complex expressions, and 
finally figurative language. 
Wierzbicka (1997, 1999) on the other hand, confirms human universals in 
language and the lexicon, but focuses on those parts in a lexicon that go beyond 
such universals. These parts are shaped by the diverse cultural needs found in 
individual communities. Especially the structuring of everyday life is tangible via 
the structure and content of individual lexicons. This is related to the fact that 
everyday life is something everyone has to cope with permanently and 
everywhere. Consequently, these areas of life need structure and a 
conceptualization of why and how one has to act. This organization is available 
to all community members via the lexicon with all its conventionally lexicalized, 
grammaticalized, grouped and ordered entries (Wierzbicka 1997). 
The knowledge of every day experience is stored in memory in another 
way less often used knowledge is, resulting in a conceptual domain that is under 
“conscious and voluntary control whereas other pieces are less available for 
introspection and articulation” (Holland & Quinn 1987: 8). A continuity view is 
assumed here, i.e. the domains are not completely divided, but rather taken as 
two end points of a continuous scale. This implies that the whole set of such 
classes is connected via diverse kinds of mutual relationships. This is exactly 
what conceptualization is about, what is more important for a speech 
community is held more dear, and thus processed more easily and more 
profoundly than aspects which are (at least at a certain time) less relevant. 
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Significant domains are subject to intense usage, hence constituting main areas 
of cultural conceptualization, and being involved in subordinate concepts as an 
underlying basis. The linguistic pendants therefore constitute polysemous 
network structures which vary cross-linguistically. As a consequence, 
fundamental differences entail a slew of further differences in all subordinate 
fields. This affects all kinds of action, also – and not only – including the action 
of accomplishing understanding, transmission of knowledge, etc., everything 
which can best be achieved by verbal communication. In Beaver, for example, 
the lexical item -zí̲s ̲ with the prototypical meaning “skin/hide” is additionally 
conceptualized as CONTAINER. This is reflected by the derived senses and usages 
of the lexeme. As a consequence, expressions for “bags” extend the meaning of 
-zí̲s ̲ from the body part “skin/hide” to tyúú zí̲s ̲ “water bag (lit. water 
skin/hide)” and tlʼǫéédze zí̲s ̲“gallon (lit. onion skin/hide)” (see ch.5.1.). 
Concepts and families of concepts linked to linguistic items are not fixed 
and completely stable constructs. Rather, they are constantly changing, and meet 
the needs of speech communities to express new experiences or to deal with 
new situations. Motivations for meaning shift develop on the one hand from the 
need to denote abstract entities which impede “easy” or direct conceptualization, 
and new entities in the speech community’s environment. On the other hand, 
meaning shift motivation is linked to Geeraerts’ pragmatic principles (Blank 
2005). According to this idea, research has to cope with two opposing principles 
of increasing efficient communication: the speaker-oriented principle of product 
optimization on the one hand, and the hearer-oriented principle of perception or 
receive optimization on the other. Therefore, polysemous items consisting of a 
network of senses result from such principles of meaning shift in relation to the 
wishes of communication partners for successful communication. From an 
extensional point of view, such networks can be defined as prototypical 
categories with fuzzy boundaries, and points of overlap with other, at some 
point similar categories. Concerning the intensional meaning, an established 
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network is not only based on linguistic knowledge – encyclopedic knowledge 
provides further essential meaning aspects and relations to be considered in 
order to produce relationships between categories and concepts. 
When the need comes up to denote a new meaning, existing linguistic 
form-meaning pairs are subject to modulation. Out of possibly complex 
meaning structures, some prototypical sense is modified according to relevant 
meaning aspects of the new concept. This modulation provides for and supports 
a radial structure of categories. This again promotes creation and modulation of 
linguistic metaphors and metonymies, since these phenomena also show fuzzy 
boundaries, and do not favor the distinction between linguistic and encyclopedic 
knowledge (Schwarz 2005, Geeraerts 2003). 
2.3. THE LEXICON & POLYSEMY 
In this section, theoretical assumptions about polysemous structures as 
found in the mental lexicon are compiled. Furthermore, the notion of figurative 
meanings are discussed with some Beaver examples. 
2.3.1. POLYSEMY 
Based on the aspects just discussed, a new meaning is defined as a 
lexicalized semantic innovation, developed via an associative relation to an 
existing meaning of the lexical unit in question. As a synchronic result of the 
lexicalized innovations, polysemy comes into existence. Put simply, polysemy is 
defined as the ability of one word to have multiple related meanings. Such a 
coexistence of several senses is promoted by the fact that established and 
conventionalized meanings do not necessarily die at the moment new meanings 
are established. Rather, lexicons include many words with many meanings. 
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In cognitive linguistics, polysemous lexemes are characterized by the 
relationships that hold between the different senses, creating a semantic whole 
(Geeraerts 2006). Compared with the mental lexicon, a polysemous word shows 
similar structures in miniature: a network of meanings interrelated via 
association, similarity, and contiguity, resulting in a hierarchical organization 
within the network. Not all meanings of a polysemous word are absolutely equal 
concerning their status within the polysemous network. Furthermore, polysemy 
is also ruled by the economy of language, and hence, the principle of least effort. 
Accordingly, a restriction suppressing meanings of lower status in polysemous 
networks, and therefore favoring an increase in lexical items, is unfavorable. 
The meaning structure of a word may reflect its semantic development, 
although this is usually only possible to some degree. One seldom finds paths to 
follow the development back to its very beginning, i.e. synchronic results are at 
best only partly transmittable to diachrony (Blank 2005). The synchronic 
structure of a meaning or concept does not necessarily reflect the complete 
history of meaning, at least not explicitly, and is better seen as an instantaneous 
picture lacking an origin or recipe. Formally established meanings may die, 
semantic bridges between senses break down and lead to homonymy on the one 
hand, and folk etymologies on the other, since speech communities – and not 
only linguists or more generally, scientists – try to make sense of the linguistic 
inventories and meanings (Blank 2005; Schwarz 2005). 
In addition to the points just discussed, still another aspect concerning 
polysemy and meaning shift plays a role in meaning accessibility: the distinction 
between rule-based, and therefore predictable polysemy, and idiosyncratic 
polysemy, restricted by individual lexical behavior (Blank 2005:1330). Predictable 
meaning shifts are defined as analogous transfers of established similarities or 
contiguity relations. Here, cross-linguistically well-known patterns of metaphor 
or metonymy are applied to express an intended meaning. This can be observed 
in the systematic conceptualization of body parts as SEATS OF EMOTIONS in 
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Beaver. The use of body part terms for this meaning aspect constitutes a 
predictable pattern to express emotions and personality traits (see also ch. 6). 
Such applications of patterns do not always end up in lexicalization, however. 
Speakers create a new sense in analogy to known polysemous expressions (e.g. 
‘institution/building/persons’ of the term “school” in English) in a 
communicative situation, whereas conventionalization is neither consciously 
intended nor forced. Hence, some of such outcomes will indeed be used by the 
speech community, and will therefore get lexicalized over time, while others will 
keep their status and characteristics as ad hoc innovations. The important aspect 
is the fact that meaning shift here is not bound individually to the lexical items 
affected, but constitutes instances or tokens of a shift type or pattern. 
“Discourse traditions” frame the rules for these analogies, but also the scope of 
application. In Beaver, not only do body part terms in their realization as SEATS 
OF EMOTIONS constitute examples for meaning structures, but also specific, 
conventionalized linguistic patterns like [NO BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION] 
described in detail in chapter 6. 
Idiosyncratic polysemy on the other hand, restricts the rule-based, but 
productive usage of specific polysemy patterns. Blank (2005) uses the example 
of a Polizeiwache “police post / station house”, where the sense “time spent in 
location” cannot be transferred to this item in analogy to, for example, “school” 
in “after school the children went home”: “*after police post the officers went 
home”. In Beaver, semantic and structural patterns employed for emotion and 
disability idioms are not used in combination with all body parts included in 
emotion concepts: e.g. the often applied pattern [NO BODY PART / SEAT OF 
EMOTION] is blocked in combination with the body part term -dzé̲é “heart”: 
*sadzé̲éʼ nadyuéʼ “you have no heart” (metaphors001).7 
                                               
7  Instead, another pattern in negative form is conventionalized: adyuu sadzééʼ ghǫ́lįį “my 
heart is not there, does not exist”. It has to be noted that this token of the pattern [BODY PART DOES 
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In meaning shift – resulting in polysemous structures – contiguity and 
similarity are the most basic and important associations. The similarity between 
two concepts – be it naturally or socio-culturally based – provides an 
“associative-semiotic basis” for metaphor, while the contiguity of concepts gives 
rise to metonymic structures (Blank 2005). The latter results in expressions like 
sadzagéʼ nadyuéʼ “be stubborn (lit. have no ears)”, where the metonymic chain 
EAR/INSTRUMENT – PERCEPTION/ACTION – HEARING/ 
SENSORING – OBEDIENCE/ MENTAL ACTION is applied, reflecting 
juxtapositions which hold between the parts of this chain, consistent with the 
embodiment hypothesis and similar models found across languages and cultures. 
However, this chain is not only based on embodiment, i.e. the structure cannot 
be imposed in exactly the same form in every language which has lexicalized the 
sensory perception of “hearing” to “listen (i.e. consciously hearing)” and to 
“obey” in the same way. Cultural models play an important role in creating and 
modifying such concepts. In the Beaver culture, the act of “not listening” is not 
linked to obedience as is known in our western traditions. Teaching and learning 
are not understood as explaining and listening. Rather, (younger) persons are 
advised to listen to the experiences had by elder people. They do not get 
instructions for how to do things, but rather field reports, which they process 
before they have their own experiences (Mills 1986). 
2.3.2. FIGURATIVE MEANINGS 
Figurative language originates in usages of lexical items in non-prototypical 
linguistic contexts, so that the new use of the word goes beyond its literal 
meaning. Figurativity is predestined to be linked to prototypical meanings. 
Rosch (1975) established the notion of prototypical organization of lexemes, an 
                                                                                                                               
NOT EXIST] additionally blocks usage of the other pattern typically used in combination with other 
body part terms (see ch. 5.7.3.3. and 6.5.7.). 
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approach further applied to polysemous meanings of one lexeme (Lakoff 1987, 
Langacker 1988). Prototypicality refers to the finding that the internal structure 
of word fields or polysemous lexemes constitutes a radial organization of 
meanings. These show distinct levels of closeness to each other and to the best 
example, i.e. the most prototypical meaning. The link to prototypical or basic 
meanings is not a necessary or sufficient condition for “good” metaphors or 
metonymies (see chapter 2.2.1.). What seems to be more important here are the 
type and value of the relationship developed between the known, 
conventionalized form-meaning pair, and the new sense to be established on the 
basis of similarity or contiguity associations (Geeraerts 2003). Still, prototypes 
show a special salience here, since they offer conventionalized meaning and 
usage patterns, and their meanings are often on a basic level. As will be shown in 
chapter 5, sadee “my eye(s)” in the construction sadee nadyuéʼ  meaning “I am 
blind (lit. “I have no eyes”)” is indeed linked to the prototypical meaning of the 
semantic network – i.e. the concrete body part –, and refers to it via metonymic 
relations (INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION). sadzé̲éʼ “my heart” in emotion 
expressions, on the other hand, does not primarily constitute or refer to the 
prototype of the network HEART, but the already transferred sense SEAT OF 
EMOTION. The culturally based elaboration of the BODY PART meaning presents 
a gradual deviation from the basic meaning, while both conceptual aspects 
remain available. The SEAT OF EMOTION function is put in focus and applied in 
forms like sadzé̲éʼ xaats ̲ʼat “I am angry (lit. my heart falls out)”, and then used in 
analogy to the relation between EYE as body part and SEE. 
Therefore, innovations can have as their starting points any level in the 
semantic structure of a word. Meaning shifts are based on available 
conceptualization aspects of the linguistic source material. It is exactly this 
typical, well-known meaning detail or component on which both hearer and 
speaker rely as their “cognitive reference point” for new senses of existing 
linguistic items (Blank 2005). Furthermore, this meaning allows the speaker to 
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use as few forms as possible, while it gives essential hints for the hearer to relate 
a known form to a new meaning. As will be shown in detail in chapter 5.1., 
derivative meanings of the lexical item -zí̲s ̲“skin/hide” like “bag, backpack” are 
conceptualized using the conceptual aspect CONTAINER of the prototype 
meaning “skin/hide”, and not the most salient feature BODY PART. These 
network structures show that further derived conceptualizations can have as 
their basis already derived, non-basic conceptual aspects. Hence, less 
prototypical senses – which may include potential aspects predestined for 
association like their prototypical pendants (Dirven 2003) – and encyclopedic 
aspects or conceptual baggage can be chosen as a basis for new meanings. As a 
result, the conceptual relationship between the additional sense and the 
prototypical meaning is situated in encyclopedic or cultural knowledge. 
Figurative senses and usages are not completely arbitrary, but nevertheless 
one out of many possible focus and usages. They are based on all kinds of 
similarity or contiguity associations, as well as socio-cultural rules and linguistic 
patterns. There is no clear cut in the metalinguistic statements between meanings 
with confirmed origins and concepts on the one hand, and meanings lacking any 
known diachronic ‘biographies’ on the other hand. Coherence of explanations is 
not always found, since humans’ tendency and need for classification of the 
world may result in inconsistent models: the one which best suits the context is 
adopted in individual situations. To give an example, in Beaver several concepts 
are expressed via the linguistic pattern [tyu / dǫ / bwil / dlúk (cause) -xį] 
“water / hunger / sleep / laughter (causes) die/kill.sg”: 
 
(4) dǫ sazéhxį “I am starving (lit. hunger causes that I die)” 
(5) tyuyazexį   “I am drowning (lit. water causes that I die)”  
(6) bwil sazéxį   “I am very tired (lit. sleep causes that I die)” 
(7) dlúk sazéxwį  “I die laughing (lit. laughter causes that I die)”  
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The first two forms apply the metonymy CAUSE FOR EFFECT in a 
descriptive fashion, and the other two are figurative manifestations of this 
conceptual structure. 
While these literal meanings are most often given immediately, the 
underlying conceptualization of these intended meanings is less apparent, at least 
for some of these constructions. Asked for the “drowning” idea, speakers refer 
to the descriptive aspects of this term, after all, water causes the death of a 
drowning person. Additionally, drowning is a concrete event. Asked, however, 
why “sleep is killing you” in the case of FATIGUE or why “laughter is killing you” 
in the case of PAROXYSM OF LAUGHTER, speakers show uncertainties. These 
concepts are more abstract and the linguistic realizations show figurativity 
difficult to explain: 
 
Consultant101: [[laughter]] “Laughing kill you.” 
Researcher: You can say that? 
Consultant101: Mhm, that’s what it is, [dluk sazéxį] (“I die laughing (lit. 
laughter causes that I die)”). That’s “you couldn’t stop laughing”, that’s 
what it means, but as we say dluk sazéxį (“I die laughing (lit. laughter 
causes that I die)”) means “you died with laughing”. 
Researcher: That’s because you can’t breathe? Or why is that? 
Consultant101: Aha [“yes, right”] I don’t know. nǫhdluk sazéxį (“I die laughing 
about you (lit. laughter about you causes that I die)”). 
Researcher: What does that mean? 
Consultant101: I couldn’t s- “I laughed at you so hard I died.” 
Researcher: And then you can say bwil sazéxį (“I am very tired (lit. sleep causes 
that I die)”)? 
Consultant101: Mhmm. 
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Researcher: And that means? When would you say that? 
Consultant101: “Sleep kill me.” bwil sazéxį (“I am very tired (lit. sleep causes 
that I die)”). 
Researcher: So, It- just like you’re falling down? Or what is it? 
Consultant101: No, you’re just- you’re dying. 
Researcher: You’re dying? 
Consultant101: Well, when you go to sleep you’re dead, that’s what it means. 
Researcher: Ah, ok, yeah, it’s kind of almost like being dead, I guess. 
Consultant101: Once you fall asleep you’re gone, that’s why they call that- 
        (metaphors100) 
 
A possible analysis extracts the conceptual aspect of UNCONTROLLED 
PHYSICAL EVENTS similar to death. This feature can be identified in all forms. In 
these instances, the person affected by the respective force takes on the role of 
an experiencer not retaining control over oneself. That means, the concept of 
SELF-CONTROL and a feeling of being overwhelmed is the linking aspect 
establishing the relations between the meanings manifested via this construction. 
The “linguistic conceptualization” (see ch. 6.3.) is based on the conventionalized 
pattern known from the form for “to drown” and “to starve” and the shared 
conceptual aspect UNCONTROLLED PHYSICAL EVENTS (water / hunger / sleep / 
laughter). 
In this chapter, the structure of the mental lexicon has been described. 
Besides cultural models, the basic terms concept, lexeme, polysemy and 
figurativity have been introduced. Their definitions are relevant for the next 
chapter, where theories of cognitive and linguistic structures will be introduced.    
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3. CONCEPTUAL & LINGUISTIC STRUCTURES: 
METAPHOR & METONYMY 
This section focuses on the relationships between linguistic and conceptual 
structures. One of the first and still most important cognitive approaches to 
figurative language and thought is presented in detail: the Conceptual Metaphor 
Theory (CMT) describes specific cognitive mechanisms which are based on 
embodied experience and which are manifested in linguistic forms (Lakoff 1980, 
2006[1993], Kövecses 2000, 2007, 2010, Kövecses & Csábi 2009). The 
definitions of conceptual structures resulting in figurative language – i.e. 
conceptual metaphor and metonymy – constitute a huge theoretical construct. 
This model contains highly relevant hypotheses about the relations between 
these two phenomena of thought as well as between them and linguistic 
structures. Recently, other frameworks bring up new aspects in this discussion 
and offer alternative descriptions of and approaches to linguistic metaphors and 
their conceptualizations (e.g. Glucksberg et al. 1997, Evans 2006). 
The present work concentrates on the CMT, but does not follow all of the 
theoretical hypotheses. In combination with the other approaches, alternative 
explications fitting the Beaver data will be presented in chapter 6. In the present 
chapter 3, basic assumptions needed for the comprehension of the theories of 
figurative language and thought are included: first, the notions of literal and non-
literal language, the embodiment hypothesis and universal cognitive models are 
introduced (3.1.). Then, the CMT and its the main characteristics are described: 
conceptual metaphors in their organization and variations are discussed in detail 
(3.2.), followed by a similarly intense exploration of conceptual metonymy (3.3.). 
In chapter 3.4., recent developments in cognitive theories dealing with figurative 
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language will be introduced. Finally, chapter 3.5. gives a short introduction to 
basic emotions and their verbalization. 
 
TERMINOLOGY 
In contemporary CMT and related frameworks, ‘metaphor’ and 
‘conceptual metaphor’ are no longer used for the linguistic realizations, but for 
the underlying mappings in the conceptual system. This follows from the 
assumption that it is not language in which metaphors are created, but our 
cognitive system which allows for linguistically expressing one thing via another. 
The results of these – for example, English expressions like “you waste your 
time” or “she is a block of ice” – are denoted as ‘metaphorical expressions’ or 
‘linguistic metaphors’. TIME IS SPACE, on the other hand, constitutes a 
conceptual metaphor. This distinction is also reflected in the typographical 
conventions: conceptual metaphors and metonymies appear in capital letters. 
Linguistic manifestations are not marked, while concepts, conceptual aspects 
and domains are displayed in small capitals and linguistic forms in quotation 
marks. 
3.1. BETWEEN LANGUAGE, BODY & THOUGHT 
In CMT, metonymy is defined as conceptual mapping inside one domain 
or “domain matrix” (Dirven 2003: 14), where one concept “provides mental 
access to another” (Radden & Kövecses 1999: 21). Metaphors are defined as 
mappings between two different domains or frames: 
“A conceptual metaphor is such a set of correspondences that obtains 
between a source domain and a target domain, where metaphorical 
linguistic expressions [...] commonly make the conceptual metaphors [...] 
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manifest (though there may be conceptual metaphors that have no 
linguistic metaphors to express them)” (Kövecses 2006:123). 
Hence, metaphorical expressions are the “[…] derivative of two 
conceptual domains being connected” (Kövecses 2005: 121), strengthening the 
fact that metaphors are not linguistic outputs in the first place, but are verbalized 
expressions of metaphorical concepts in thought, and body. 
 
conceptual 
metaphor 
source domain target domain linguistic 
manifestation 
LOVE IS A 
JOURNEY 
JOURNEY LOVE 
RELATIONSHIP 
“we are at a 
crossroads” 
   conceptual 
metonymy 
domain matrix linguistic 
manifestation 
PART FOR 
WHOLE 
CROWN / CEPTRE / … / REGALIA / 
EXECUTIVE / … / MONARCHY 
“the crown has 
decided” 
INSTRUMENT 
FOR ACTION 
HEAD / BRAIN / MIND /…/ 
THINKING / WORRY 
satsí̱íʼ nakǫįl  
“I worry (lit. my 
head is heavy)” 
Table 3.1.: Domains and domain matrices in conceptual metaphor and 
metonymy 
Source domains are conceptual constructs – or frames – from which a 
concept or part of a concept is taken to show similarities with the target domain 
or structure. These similarities are used to talk about the target domain. 
Domains are not linguistic phenomena, but mental constructions for organizing 
knowledge and experience. They are used to act in the world and to talk about 
the world, and therefore also similar constructs like cultural models (see ch. 2.1.). 
Thus, the domains form a conceptual systems found in every speaker’s mental 
world and are partly reflected in their ways of linguistic and other behavior. This 
also shows how deeply interwoven such conventionalized concepts are with 
everyday life and culture. They accompany us in all situations in life, organize 
our experiences accordingly, and are manifest in the ways we talk and behave. 
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To give some well-known examples, in expressions like “Christmas has arrived”, 
“she is in trouble” and “he is at a crossroads in his career” metaphorical 
concepts and non-literal language is attested (Lakoff 2006[1993], Fauconnier 
1997, Kövecses 2010): the conceptual metaphors TIME PASSING IS 
MOTION (i.e. “Christmas” moved in time), STATES ARE LOCATIONS (so 
that persons are “in” psycho-somatic states), A CAREER IS A JOURNEY 
(possible directions in a career are like “crossroads”) are applied respectively. 
Definition of domains and domain matrices is a complex task, especially in 
the discussion of metaphor and metonymy. Langacker’s definition of a 
conceptual domain indeed specifies the phenomena, but at the same time 
introduces terms which again lack a clear and unequivocal description:  
“Any coherent area of conceptualization relative to which semantic 
structures can be characterized (including any kind of experience, concept 
or knowledge system).” (1991:547)  
Notwithstanding, domains and domain boundaries are cognitive structures 
with an abstract character, and are partially socio-culturally established and 
therefore not necessarily self-evident or predictable. 
The phenomena of metaphorical language and especially metaphorical 
concepts have been discussed in detail since Lakoff & Johnson’s “Metaphors we 
live by” (1980). Their work – being one of the first to relate cognition with 
metaphor in such a complex way – states that languages are linked to huge 
hierarchically organized metaphorical systems at the cognitive level. Although 
the authors concentrate on English, they opened a wide field to investigate 
cross-linguistically and to elaborate in cognitive linguistics.  
As was already shown, culture is a determining factor concerning how we 
conceptualize and structure the world around us. Hence, when mappings of 
structures are created, speakers not only use the given similarities between 
source and target domain, or their bodily experiences. In addition, they are also 
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influenced by “the particular communicative, cultural, and historical situations in 
which we think metaphorically [...]” (Kövecses 2006:138). Source domains are 
not only isolated entities, but complex frames or models. They constitute a 
system of culturally influenced meanings, inner relations and inferences, as well 
as relations to other models. Bearing this in mind, a conceptual metaphor – as a 
mapping of two different domains – can be defined as an interaction of two 
culturally structured models. 
Cultural models are said to be conceptualizations of experiences in order 
to make sense of the world, especially of abstract ideas in it, like emotions. 
According to the CMT, because such abstract concepts have a low structure, 
conceptualizations are metaphorical, i.e. people use other, unrelated embodied 
experiences or perceived similarities and ‘convert’ them. As a consequence, they 
fit abstract targets which in some way or another show parallels to concrete 
experiences, as in the example above, where MOTION is used to describe TIME. 
The definitions of such abstract concepts are created “automatically and 
unconsciously [...,] as givens that are literal” (Kövecses 2006:201). They are not 
literal meanings, but are constituted by conceptual metaphor. Yet, conceptual 
metaphor and metonymy again run without conscious cognitive actions. 
Kövecses places such definitions of conceptual metaphors at the 
“supraindividual level of conceptualization” (2006:201): they are understood as 
inaccessible and automatic, resulting in a feeling that these concepts are literal, 
for example, that emotions are forces operating inside a person. 
Such an extensive and sweeping system like that of conceptual metaphors 
ruling to some degree the way people think and talk about the world needs 
verification. Lakoff (2006:188) defines several aspects related to conceptual 
metaphors as evidence, like the phenomenon of polysemy which can be 
explained by conceptual metaphors. Linguistic expressions being used with 
related, but still different meanings for different domains, show polysemous 
features which are hard to understand without the underlying mapping. For 
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example, words for travel in English are also used to talk about love (“dead-end 
street”, “look how far we’ve come” (Lakoff 2006:189)). Without the underlying 
mapping LOVE IS A JOURNEY the systematic employment of journey 
concepts and linguistic material is not accounted for. With knowledge of this 
conceptual metaphor – underlying English forms in this case – the similarities 
are visible which hold between a journey and a love relationship. That is, to 
know this part of the conceptual system of the language in question means to 
realize that the usage of journey expressions in the ‘new’ love context is not 
strange but rather intuitively comprehensible.  
Similarly, newly created, not (yet) conventionalized metaphorical 
expressions are often intuitively understood, or felt as fitting the situation. This 
is true despite the fact that they are not (yet) known to individual speaker-
hearers and the whole community. They are also explained with the underlying 
conceptual metaphor which generates these linguistic metaphorical expressions. 
The expressions originally belong to the source domain and are then utilized for 
expressing aspects of the target domain. Hence, even if a linguistic metaphor is 
heard for the first time by a community member, s/he will very likely be able to 
grasp what is meant. This works due to the known conceptual basis of the new 
metaphorical expression. If the whole community starts using such a new 
expression, it will become conventional just like the already known linguistic 
metaphors also based on the similarities between the source and target domain. 
This works because each mapping is “[...] an open-end class of potential 
correspondences across inference patterns” (Lakoff 2006:194). 
In the next sections, the definitions, functions and forms of metaphorical 
structures in language and cognition will be discussed, starting with a brief 
review of earlier traditional views. 
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3.1.1. THE LITERAL – NON-LITERAL CONTINUUM 
One of the most important points made by Lakoff and Johnson (1980; 
also Lakoff 2006[1993]) is that metaphor is not only a linguistic phenomenon. 
Rather, metaphorical language is based on our ways of thinking about and 
conceptualizing the world. Thus, metaphorical expressions are the result of 
cognitive processes which have to cope with all the unstructured and 
unorganized experiences we have in the real world. Likewise, they are involved 
in processing our inner states, emotions, and feelings. Since we talk about both, 
the world outside and our inner states, language is linked to the cognitive 
processes with which we organize what we experience. This view introduced by 
Lakoff and Johnson contradicted traditional hypotheses about literal meanings. 
Traditional assumptions stated that literalness constitutes the main part of a 
language, that literalness is used for understanding abstract meanings and that 
grammar does not include any metaphorical concepts (Lakoff 2006[1993]: 187). 
These were proved to be wrong (Barcelona 2000, Kristiansen et al. 2006, 
Kövecses & Koller 2006). 
The continuity view proposed by, for example, Ortony (1993 [1979]) and 
Lakoff (2006[1993]) presumes that linguistic metaphor as a figure of speech 
must not be excluded from natural language usage, or highlighted as a special 
linguistic ‘behavior’. Furthermore, metaphor often shows to have its basis in 
metonymic structures. Since metonymy is manifested non-figuratively as well as 
figuratively, it again emphasizes a continuous view of literal, non-literal, and 
figurative meanings. In addition, the embeddedness of both processes in 
cognitive as well as natural language structure and usage emphasize their 
relevance not only in specific (linguistic) forms (Radden 2003, Dirven 2003). 
This point will also be made clearer as figurativity in some metonymic 
constructions will be analyzed and discussed (ch. 3.3.). This contradicts the 
traditional assumption that metaphorical language is not to include in everyday 
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language, but represents a marked way of consciously creating pictures for 
special purposes, like rhetorical exquisiteness or poetry. Lakoff & Johnson 
(1980) showed that metaphorical structures can be found throughout a whole 
linguistic system, in everyday language just as in every other discourse. 
Furthermore, the focus of attention is not on individual linguistic 
expressions which do not mean what they literally should and are not used for 
what they literally and prototypically should be used. Rather, the underlying 
metaphorical concepts are more relevant which give birth to metaphorical 
expressions like “this idea is founded on stable arguments” (IDEAS ARE 
BUILDINGS) or “this category includes several subclasses” (CATEGORIES 
ARE CONTAINERS). Hence, it is exactly everyday conventional language that 
is structured via these concepts to be able to express abstract ideas or emotions. 
This further strengthens the continuity view concerning literal and figurative 
language. If a huge part of language is said to be organized via metaphorical 
mappings, a cut between literal and non-literal expressions would blur a 
distinction neither intuitive nor useful. It is not just an alternative way to talk 
about many concepts, it is the conventionalized principle found in everyday 
language in speech communities. This view arose through the analysis and 
understanding of conceptual structures found deeply embedded in thought and 
language.  
Another traditional argument says that figurative abstract meanings are 
understood literally, especially “dead metaphors”, whose conventionalized 
character blocks access to (possible) underlying mappings. This was falsified by 
psychological experiments which tested conventionalized metaphorical 
expressions and the relation to their underlying concepts.8 Their results show 
that people indeed fall back on metaphorical concepts, more precisely on the 
underlying embodied experiences. These formed the basis of the expressions in 
                                               
8 For the detailed studies see Boroditsky & Ramscar (2002) and Boroditsky (2001). 
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question, and people use them to make sense of the linguistic forms in relation 
to the situation at hand. Hence, even ‘dead’ – or highly conventionalized – 
metaphors are not understood literally. Rather, the corresponding mappings are 
used for processing and understanding, and therefore also in on-line 
interpretations. Accordingly, this disproved the traditional statements that 
meanings can be literal and abstract at the same time, like LOVE or HATE, which 
according to the old view, are understood literally, while at the same time they 
manifest abstract meanings (Lakoff 2006[1993], Kövecses 2006). 
Research today denies a strict distinction between literal and non-literal 
meanings because of the huge amount of metaphors with their even bigger 
number of metaphorical expressions. Cognitive linguistics tries to grasp the 
whole picture. Therefore, it examines conceptualizations, transfers and their 
domains, analyzes their forms and functions, and defines their scope instead of 
separating literal and non-literal expressions. Accordingly, the term ‘literal’ is 
only used for “those concepts that are not comprehended via conceptual 
metaphor” (Lakoff 2006[1993]: 188): there is nothing metaphorical about both 
the fact and the expression “the chair is near the table” if it is like that. 
But how do metaphorical concepts work? Several approaches try to 
describe the design of conceptual metaphors, to what extent these structures are 
available in speakers’ consciousness, and which cognitive mechanisms – 
especially cultural models and embodiment – are included (Gibbs 2001, 
Kövecses, Palmer & Dirven 2003; Kövecses 2005). Before the CMT and other 
approaches to metaphor are described and discussed, the important notion of 
embodiment is defined in the next paragraph. 
3.1.2. EMBODIMENT 
The term embodiment was briefly introduced in chapter 2.1.1. as cognitive 
structure interrelated with cultural models and linguistic behavior. This 
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phenomenon is relevant for the Beaver data in a twofold way: first, the body 
part terms’ conceptualizations are tightly linked to the body, but go beyond a 
physical notion. The embodiment hypothesis allows for a consistent explanation 
of such extensions to psychological concepts (Lakoff 2006[1993], Gibbs & 
Colston 1994, 2003, Gibbs & Costa Lima 2004, Rohrer 2006). Second, 
embodiment serves as a basis for the definition of conceptual metaphor and 
metonymy in the expressions of emotion, which – despite their abstract 
character – arise in the body.  
Our cognitive system relies on our physical experiences and their 
processing. The notion of embodiment includes this physiological faculty. 
Cognitive approaches promote the importance of the dependency relations 
between bodily experience and human cognitive structure, after all, we can only 
use language for things and events we experience and process (Lakoff 
2006[1993], Lakoff & Johnson 1999, Evans 2003).  
Our physical experiences not only lead to mental concepts, but they also 
constrain possible correspondences or mappings. This is due to the fact that 
embodied experience is one of the main motivations for metaphors, providing a 
significant amount of experiences as source domains. At the same time, the 
forms of embodied experience are limited, while other possible ways of 
experiencing the world – e.g. via physical or biochemical processes – cannot be 
taken into account as source domains. This limiting aspect can also be found in 
the identification of similarities influenced by cultural models, since mappings 
are possible only where humans perceive parallels. However, here the 
constraints show other qualities than in embodied experience, since the latter 
“works automatically and unconsciously” (Kövecses 2005:119).  
According to Kövecses, speakers are not aware of embodiment: 
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“As a matter of fact, it is characteristic of such embodied experiences that 
they are not conscious most of the time. We experience such correlations 
in bodily experience preconceptually and prelinguistically.” (2005: 117) 
Lakoff and Johnson conceive of three different levels of embodiment: 
“[…] the neural level, phenomenological conscious experience and the cognitive 
unconscious” (1999: 102). The notion of consciousness is somewhat 
problematic in this approach, since the last account (“cognitive unconscious”) is 
declared to constitute “the 95 percent below the surface of conscious 
awareness” (1999: 102). If this is the case, the question of identification and 
definition comes up on the one hand – how do we describe a phenomenon not 
consciously available? On the other hand, when such a huge part of thought and 
language are at an unconscious level, there is “no real place for the two central 
concepts of conventionality and representation” (Zlatev 2009: 14). 
Embodiment exerts relevance and influence on metonymy as well as 
metaphor, since both are linked to embodied experience (Rohrer 2006). Taking, 
for example, the experience of increased body temperature while performing an 
intense physical activity, and taking the very similar experience of heat because 
of getting angry, one can abstract both into INCREASE IN INTENSITY and 
INCREASE IN HEAT. Their correlation constitutes the metaphor INTENSITY IS 
HEAT9, which proves that metaphor is not only in thought and language, but 
also in the body (Kövecses 2005:118).  
For the investigation of emotions and similar abstract mental phenomena 
in relation to their linguistic manifestations, conceptual metonymy is highly 
important. This is due to the fact that the target as well as the source concepts 
admit for inclusion in one domain or domain matrix (Croft 2000, 2002, Panther 
& Radden 1999). In addition, metaphors often show metonymic origins in 
                                               
9 The definition of this correlation as conceptual metaphor instead of the fitting metonymy 
HEAT FOR INTENSITY will be discussed in chapter 6. 
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conceptually contiguous domains. According to Radden (2003), experienced 
conceptual contiguity allows for “correlation” and “complementarity” as 
fundamentally metonymic relationships and is also found in metaphor: 
“correlational mappings within conceptual metaphor should also be seen as 
metonymic” (2003: 416). For example, “complementarity” as a relationship 
between contrary parts applies to BODY and MIND: both are tightly linked to 
each other despite and because of their coexistent oppositeness and unity. It is 
this specific instance of PART-PART-relations which reflect a metonymic basis. 
first, mental phenomena take place in the body. Second, linguistic expressions of 
mental states are indeed related to and supported by body, for example, via 
gesture and mimic. Third, the body is affected by emotions, personality traits 
and similar mental phenomena, and reacts to them in specific ways. These 
physiological consequences are in turn conceptually and linguistically employed 
to communicate these abstract targets like ANGER, FEAR or LOVE. This again 
underlines the relevance of the alliances holding between language, body, and 
thought. Yet, embodiment cannot be seen as an isolated phenomena: Zlatev 
(1997, 2003) realized this shortcoming, and developed the notion of “situated 
embodiment” to include socio-cultural features in the notion of “language as 
situated within socio-cultural practices” (Zlatev 2003: 306). Similarly, Sinha et at. 
(2000) broaden physical embodiment to “extended embodiment” in order to 
include bodily and cultural experiences in language not detachable or 
independent from socio-cultural ideas or processes. 
A clear distinction or relationship between metaphor and metonymy needs 
to be investigated, since the different, but to some degree also similar 
mechanisms at work in both phenomena are not undisputable. The example of 
the embodied link between affection and warmth given in chapter 2.1.1., is said 
to result in the conceptual metaphor AFFECTION IS WARMTH (Kövecses 
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2005).10 Since a real physiological effect is identified for affection, namely 
WARMTH, which can be perceived and felt in reality, an underlying conceptual 
metonymy WARMTH FOR AFFECTION is also perfectly convenient for the 
example as well as the theoretical reasoning. This methodological question will 
be discussed in chapter 6. 
Before conceptual metaphor and metonymy will be discussed in the 
following sections, universal cognitive models (image- and propositional 
schemata) as abstracted embodied substance will be introduced. Their forms and 
functions are included here, since they are linked to embodiment and cultural 
models and influence meaning elaboration and polysemous structures. 
3.1.3. UNIVERSAL COGNITIVE MODELS 
To investigate how embodiment and knowledge contained in cultural 
models is practically used, and how it affects the cognitive tasks on which it 
operates, Lakoff (1987: 71) assumed two kinds of universal cognitive models, 
which can be applied to both, models which are culturally shared and practiced, 
and the more idiosyncratic models of individuals. I will use Holland & Quinn’s 
terminology here, defining “proposition-schemas” (Lakoff’s “propositional 
model”) and “image-schemas” (Lakoff’s “image-schematic model”) as two 
forms of knowledge arrangement, used for differing kinds of cognitive tasks 
(Holland & Quinn 1987). It is important to notice that these two models are 
used for meaning formation in general, and not only for figurative language 
formation. 
Image-schemas – determined and structured by embodied experience – 
represent abstract representations of these experiences and reflect physiological 
                                               
10  Since these concepts have not been investigated in numerous languages until now, the 
examples used here should be reduced to the English language to avoid overgeneralizations. Also, as 
will be shown, such experiences do not have to result in exactly the same metaphors, cf. ch. 3.2.2. 
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sensory-perceptual abilities. They are to a great extent are constituted by our 
bodily experiences, and can be understood as abstracted, schematic pictures of 
experiences had, which lack details, but allow for an extended usage, since the 
more schematic the stored information, the more targets will fit one schema. 
They are defined as “pre-conceptual experience” (Johson 1987, Evans & Green 
2006), since they are tightly linked to embodiment and real experience, and not 
to cognitively formed structures in the first place. Hence, they constitute 
necessary constructs for the establishment of conceptual structure for more 
abstract patterns. 
Lakoff and others explicitly state that without metaphorical mappings 
there would be no way of conceptualizing abstract entities, features and 
relationships in an image-schematic form (Lakoff 2006[1993], Hampe & Grady 
2005, Kövecses 2010). Using a metaphor allows us to map these somehow 
intangible or non-physical things to image-schemas. It enables us to talk about 
them in a way we would talk about things existing physically in the world, and 
thus physiologically perceived by speakers. To clarify, this hypothesis states that 
non-physical parts of our world cannot be conceptualized in image-schematic 
form in language without metaphors. Only these mappings make it possible for 
us to comprehend the non-physical, invisible, or unknown parts of the world 
around us. Speakers build analogies and use image-schemas to simulate how the 
non-physical entity or situation at hand can be comprehended and explained. 
The main difference between these two schemas is their functions in the 
system. While proposition-schemas deal with specific concepts and their 
relationships to each other, image-schemas concentrate on physical phenomena, 
and thus are related to the embodiment or “embodied cognition thesis” (Lakoff 
& Johnson 1980). This is based on the idea that the complex conceptual systems 
found in the world’s cultures or speech-communities originate in the interaction 
between our abilities to create concepts, and our abilities to have experiences in 
the world. The latter is restricted to our physical characteristics, allowing for the 
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perception of things and events around us in a specific and limited fashion 
(Johnson 1987, Evans & Green 2006). 
Image-schemas are “gestalts that make multiple relations more 
immediately apprehensible” (Holland & Quinn 1987: 28). Although Lakoff 
compared them with visual images, they can take a much more schematic form, 
taking only the most significant characteristics. The term “image” is not 
constrained in this context like it is in everyday language, including only visual 
experience. Therefore, image-schemas are not to be compared to mental images, 
which show far more detail, and which can be “viewed in mind”, like for 
example, the face of a known person. Rather, it “encompasses all types of 
sensory-perceptual experience” in an unspecified, abstracted way (Evans & 
Green 2007: 179). To use Lakoff’s example of a candle: “Our knowledge about 
candles includes a long, thin object schema” (1980: 10). Thus, image-schemas 
are more sketches than elaborated images, transferring shared knowledge of 
physical properties like shape, motion, etc. For example, in conceptual 
metaphors like ANGER IS HOT LIQUID IN A CONTAINER, the image 
“hot liquid in a container” is used to schematically conceptualize such an 
emotional condition in order to be able to communicate one’s feeling, to talk 
about it. Note that this image-schema contains another image-schema, 
CONTAINER, which does not show any specific characteristics or details, and 
thus suits the term “schema”. These schemas rely on repeated embodied 
experiences, which then lead to non-prototypical containers like “clothing” 
(‘climb into your robe’, Johnson 1987: 331). The functions of image-schemas also 
hold for concrete activities or entities (Kempton 1987). Additionally, kinesthetic 
information is contained in image-schemas. 
Image-schemas are emergent, since they evolve through experiences made 
via interaction with the world, and therefore cannot be defined as innate 
knowledge (Lakoff 1987, Johnson 1987, Palmer 1996). Nevertheless, they 
constitute a special kind of concept, since they are the first ones to emerge in a 
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person, and they are the most schematic ones. Hence, they are starting points 
for other concepts at a lower level in the whole conceptual system. They leave 
enough room for specification, but at the same time show restricted access for 
speakers: their deep embeddedness in our cognitive system makes speakers 
unaware of these concepts (Johnson 1987, de Mendoza Ibánez & Aransaez 
1998). We ourselves do not consciously realize that we are constantly physically 
present in a physical world, nor do we consciously process every experience. 
Proposition-schemas determine culturally shared structures for 
propositions, i.e. concepts, as well as their relationships to each other. As a 
universal cognitive model, they create and retain fixed structures for conceptual 
metaphors and build up relations between concepts and schemas, i.e. they 
establish and manage organization (Holland & Quinn 1987). As propositional 
forms, they constitute sentence-like parts of the common ground for further 
conceptualization and linguistic manifestation. These relations are – in a 
communicative situation – not always visible or traceable, resulting in seemingly 
empty links for outsiders. But if the communication partners are members of 
one speech community, they are able to use their shared knowledge about the 
world to close the gaps in the explicitly formulated information, and to insert the 
missing parts for review. It is exactly this ability offered by the culturally fixed 
proposition-schemas that allows community members not to make explicit the 
complete causal chains involved in a communicative act. It enables the speakers 
to talk about the world and to infer familiar concepts in an economic way, and at 
the same time “allow these inferences to be made swiftly and accurately in the 
first place” (Holland & Quinn 1987: 25). In Beaver, the culturally shaped 
conceptualizations of specific body parts as SEATS OF EMOTIONS are defined as 
such shared knowledge. 
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3.1.3.1. THE INVARIANCE HYPOTHESIS 
The abstract structures of image-schemas as well as their inferences 
determine the domain based upon these schemata. If a domain is used as the 
source for another, abstract target domain, its topological structure will be 
transferred to the new domain. This entails that all inherent inferences which are 
compatible with the target, will also be assigned to the target domain, not only 
the schema independently of its structural supplement. Hence, this 
generalization includes both, linguistic and inferential consequences of image-
schemas. It rules out analyses which concentrate on abstract schemas without 
taking the metaphorical ingredients into account, and therefore miss the 
important links which lead to metaphorical manifestations of such a mapping. 
Lakoff defined this “Invariance Principle” as follows: 
“Metaphorical mappings preserve the cognitive topology (that is, the 
image-schema structure) of the source domain, in a way consistent with the 
inherent structure of the target domain.” (2006[1993]: 199) 
To take his example of the CONTAINER mapping, the hypothesis states 
that the image-schematic structure of the source – here, interiors, exteriors, and 
boundaries – is kept constant. Like this it is mapped onto the corresponding 
inherent structures of the target, hence onto its interiors, exteriors, and 
boundaries respectively – whatever these may be. In a mapping like ANGER IS 
HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER, the body of the angry person constitutes 
the container with its boundaries, while the emotional state is inside it (“s/he is 
filled with anger”, “s/he is bursting with anger”, “s/he has so much anger in 
her/him”), or enters the exterior outside the person / container (“s/he is letting 
off steam”, “s/he blew up at me”, “s/he just exploded”) (Lakoff 2006[1993]). 
As becomes obvious from these examples, similar structures in target 
domains are used to allow for adaptation of the schematic structure of source 
domains without violating the image-schematic structure of the targets. There 
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will be no mapping which links, for example, the goal of a path source domain 
onto the trajectory of a target domain (Lakoff 1993). Hence, the principle 
defines certain restrictions on correspondences, based on the limiting 
characteristics of the target. For example, the English expression “to give 
someone advice” (or “to give instructions / a kick”) does not entail that the 
receiver ‘owns’ the “advice” afterwards, due to the constraining target domain 
feature of “advice” as being neither tangible nor possessable like a concrete and 
lasting object. In this correspondence, the aspect “receiver possesses given 
object” of the concept GIVE cannot be mapped onto the topological structure of 
the target. The “object” in the target domain differs in structure, and lacks the 
constant characteristic of the source domain object.  
 
What part do both schemas assume in metaphor formation? And what 
role do they play concerning metaphor processing, and understanding? Lakoff 
and Johnson (1980) presume that information from the physical world is 
transfused into non-physical domains by metaphorical thought and language. In 
metaphors, both image-schemas and proposition-schemas in known, physical 
fields are mapped onto similar structures in other, non-physical fields. If a 
concrete domain is mainly defined in terms of physical experiences, it is 
predestined as a source domain for metaphorical transferences. Furthermore, 
such physiologically based sources provide the essential input for image-
schemas. Non-physical, abstract domains are declared not to be ready for 
communication (Lakoff 2006[1993], Kövecses 2010): we lack the concrete or 
physical experiences which lead to comprehension and categorization and allow 
these concepts to be talked about. Put differently, the low structure of abstract 
entities and their concepts is claimed to request additional substance. Hence, 
conceptual metaphors are said to express and contain ideas which would not be 
understandable or discussable if language did not already use verbalized bodily 
experiences as linguistic sources (Lakoff & Johnson 1980). 
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3.2. CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR 
In the next sections, conceptual metaphor systematics are described. This 
includes the organization of the cognitive structures, hierarchical levels and their 
inheritance patterns. Furthermore, different dimensions of variation found in 
the conceptual metaphor systems – in one language and culture, but also across 
languages and cultures – are discussed. 
3.2.1. CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR ORGANIZATION 
In this section, conceptual metaphors will be described according to 
various levels and classifications. Conceptual metaphors are not independent 
and unrelated conceptual structures, but are organized in a complex system with 
hierarchical (vertically arranged) levels in horizontal coordination. In the system, 
further classifications can be observed, relying on inheritance of structure from 
higher levels on the vertical axis to more specific conceptual metaphors at lower 
levels (Lakoff 2006[1993]: 207). 
First, several classifications will be described which concentrate on 
different aspects like conventionalization and ontological function. Then, the 
organization of conceptual metaphors as a complex system will be presented. 
3.2.1.1. METAPHOR CLASSIFICATION 
Conceptual metaphors allow in their complexity for numerous ways of 
possible classification according to the aspect focused on. As will be shown, 
however, the different classifications show intersections, and should therefore be 
understood as one classification system rather than independent classes.  
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Conventionality 
One classification parameter is the conventionality of conceptual as well as 
linguistic metaphors. Both may vary according to their embeddedness in 
language use in the community and in individual speakers. There exist 
conceptual metaphors that are less used and thus rather unconventional. On the 
other hand, others are well-known to all speakers, are used frequently for 
linguistic manifestation and possess many variants at basic levels. Similarly, 
linguistic metaphorical expressions are conventionalized to certain degrees, 
showing a high frequency in use at one extreme. At the other extreme there are 
quite unconventional linguistic metaphors which are seldom used, but 
nevertheless understood by all members of a speech community due to the 
underlying conceptual metaphor (Lakoff 2006[1993], Kövecses 2010). 
 
Cognitive functions 
Another way of classifying mappings across domains highlights their 
cognitive functions. A huge number of metaphors are ‘structural metaphors’, 
where the source domain applies parts of its structure to the structure of the 
target domain. For example, the (English) metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY 
takes structure of the source JOURNEY, and imposes it on the target domain LIFE 
(Lakoff 2006[1993]). 
‘Ontological metaphors’ are said to enrich otherwise low structures, and to 
create an existential basis for target domains via a qualified source domain, 
giving the target a metaphorically ‘tangible’ status. Accordingly, abstract 
phenomena become things to talk about, “visual perceptions become containers, 
actions become metaphorical objects, and states become substances” (Kövecses 
2006:128).  
‘Orientational metaphors‘ are needed for a coherent organization of 
numerous metaphors showing parallels at decisive points. For example – as 
found in many languages – positively connoted abstract phenomena like health, 
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control, morality etc. all underlie the metaphorical idea GOOD IS UP, and thus 
are realized linguistically via corresponding orientational linguistic metaphors 
(Lakoff & Johnson 1980, Kövecses 2010). In English, many expressions are 
identified as tokens, for example, “s/he is off the ground” (HAPPY IS UP), 
“s/he climbs the social ladder” (SUCCESS IS UP). As can be seen, the source 
domains systematically subsume a great number of concepts (Lakoff & Johnson 
1987, Lakoff 2006[1993]).11 
These generic metaphors are very abstract, and are not consciously 
available, or at least very restricted in accessibility. Additionally, sources often 
show to be quite abstract and schematic. Therefore, the reasoning that 
conceptual metaphor arises due to the fact that the target domains are too 
abstract and lack their own structure, is disputed, for example, by Croft & Cruse 
(2004) or McGlone (2007). In this case, more concrete sources would suit the 
notion of well-known and experienced concepts consulted to make the target 
structure comprehensible (see also ch.6). 
3.2.1.2. INHERITANCE HIERARCHIES & CENTRAL METAPHORS 
The vertical organization of conceptual metaphors includes hierarchical 
structures in which aspects of mappings from higher levels are passed on to 
ones at lower levels. Since metaphorical meaning extensions of lexical forms 
take place in connection with more abstract mappings at a higher level in the 
hierarchy, it would be redundant to modify the meaning in each lower level 
mapping in which the lexical expression occurs (Lakoff 2006[1993]). Rather, it is 
by means of the inheritable characteristic that the extended meaning is 
automatically evoked in every other mapping originating from a higher one. 
                                               
11 In Beaver, sįdyíge ghǫ́lįį “I am happy (potential literal meaning: I am up)” and mayue 
náskáát “I respect her/him (potential literal meaning: I cover under her/him)” cannot be 
unequivocally assigned to the conceptual metaphor discussed here, since neither more extensive 
linguistic analysis nor metalinguistic statements are available. 
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Metaphors are hierarchically organized, with a small number of highly 
generalized mappings at a generic level (Kövecses 2007, 2010). A far bigger 
number of more specific metaphors are placed at a basic level, inheriting main 
characteristics of the higher level “parent concepts”. Similarly, while source 
domains in mappings at the superordinate level are also generic, their linguistic 
manifestations use base level special cases which fit best in the whole 
metaphorical context (e.g. VEHICLE becomes CAR or BOAT or their inferential 
characteristics respectively) (Lakoff 2006[1993]). Thus, the number of highly 
generalized mappings is smaller than the inheriting basic level metaphors. The 
linguistic manifestations often use correspondences or inferences from these 
basic level domains.12 In Beaver, the conceptual structure SEAT OF 
EMOTION IS BODY PART is identified as positioned at a superordinate level, 
while, for example, SEAT OF ANGER IS HEART is a more specific 
conceptual metaphor at a lower level in the hierarchy. 
 
superordinate level SEAT OF EMOTION IS BODY PART 
 
 
basic level 
SEAT OF ANGER 
IS HEART 
SEAT  
OF STUBBORNNESS 
IS HEAD 
SEAT OF COURAGE 
IS HEART 
SEAT OF WORRY 
IS HEAD 
Table 3.2.1.: Levels of conceptual metaphors 
Besides the classifications already mentioned, there is another class of 
culturally based metaphors which play a special role in understanding. Central 
metaphors characterize a community, or culture, in that they constitute the 
                                               
12  This generalisation needs more empirical research with cross-linguistic data. So far, it holds 
for English, but hypothesis states that Beaver shows similar tendencies. Furthermore, the hierarchy 
(Lakoff 2006[1993]) is at least partly based on introspection, so that maybe not all of these 
inheritance patterns really exist. 
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groundwork for many levels of knowledge and of linguistic expressions 
manifesting these underlying main concepts. These “large-scale conceptual 
metaphors that organize extensive portions of experience in a culture [...]” 
(Kövecses 2006:144) give rise to many other metaphors on a lower level in the 
inheritance hierarchy. It is exactly these central metaphors towards which 
ideologies are oriented, taking for granted and adopting their way of 
understanding and organizing the world. In Beaver, SEAT OF EMOTION IS 
BODY PART – already mentioned above as located at a high level in the 
hierarchy – constitutes a central concept participating in several 
conceptualizations of emotions and personality traits.  
Central metaphors do not only differ in their linguistic realizations, but 
also in the source domains that are chosen for framing a target domain. As was 
already discussed, metaphors are not only a matter of language, but of thought, 
culture, concepts and body. Accordingly, differences in (central) metaphors lead 
to variation in cognitive processing: “differences in metaphorical language seem 
to shape the way people speaking different languages in two cultures think about 
the same target domain” (Kövecses 2006: 152). Speakers concentrate on 
different parts of experience because the linguistic realization of their culturally 
based concepts determines how and what they encode. For example, while 
English uses the metonymy-based expression “my heart stopped” to express 
fright, Beaver linguistically utilizes this experience (madzééʼ łííníítlʼa “s/he died 
(lit. her/his heart stopped running (uncontrolled))”) to refer to the death of a 
person (see chapter 5 for a detailed description). 
The term “congruence” is used in this context to refer to metaphors as 
vertically organized in the inheritance hierarchy and thus related to one another, 
but differing in their degree of specificity. Concepts at superordinate levels in the 
hierarchy are defined by their generic character, the lacking of details, and their 
use as a basis for more specific metaphors. For example (see Kövecses 
2006:158), an assumed generic metaphor like AN ANGRY PERSON IS A 
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PRESSURIZED CONTAINER13 on its own does not tell anything about what 
sort of container is meant, what exactly is in the container, if heat is involved, 
how the pressure came to exist, what characteristics of the content of the 
container are effected by the pressure, etc. All these ‘place-holder’ aspects may 
be substituted cross-culturally in individual linguistic expressions based on this 
concept, for example, where exactly anger is positioned in the body/container, 
what happens when the pressure gets too strong, what consistence the content 
of the container has, what increases the pressure, etc. At this specific level, many 
linguistic metaphors using the same conceptual metaphor can be found cross-
linguistically. Each operates differently on the basic, generic mapping, focusing 
on different aspects, and choosing differing concrete objects for the abstract, 
unfed entities found in the generic conceptual metaphor. Hence, there exists a 
superordinate level metaphor which is found in many languages, but in many 
different, though congruent, linguistic manifestations, using many distinct, 
culturally colored, concrete entities to express what the mapping states in 
general. A well-established example is the conceptual metaphor MORE IS UP. 
This cognitive form is found in many languages in various realizations, while the 
opposite form (MORE IS DOWN) is not attested. Another well-known 
example is the conception of time in terms of space (TIME IS SPACE). As a 
result, in many languages expressions of time utilize spatial vocabulary (e.g. 
English the future is in front of us, German diese Zeit liegt hinter uns “this time is in 
back of us (lit. lies behind us)”, Hungarian Ez már mind mögöttünk van “that’s all 
behind us now”, Chinese guoqu “past (lit. passed/gone by)” (last two examples 
taken from Kövecses 2007: 48f)).14 
                                               
13 This form is disputed due to its relation to the metonymy PRESSURE FOR ANGER, 
where physiological effects are applied to express the cause, i.e. ANGER. 
14 Note that this metaphor is challenged by linguists and psychologists since the end of the 
last century (Rice et al. 1999). There is evidence that speakers do not have access to the conceptual 
metaphor TIME IS SPACE when they talk about time using spatial vocabulary:  
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Mappings manifested in linguistic expressions do not necessarily comprise 
complete domains or entire frames: “only certain aspects of either the source or 
the target participate in metaphors” (Kövecses 2006:124). Consequently, other 
parts are not used for mappings, in fact these may be either from the source or 
the target domains. Instead, only specific features of a source domain are 
‘utilized’, while only certain aspects of a target domain are ‘highlighted’ by the 
linguistic expressions. Together, they constitute the underlying basic mapping 
which is assumed to enable communication of the intended meaning. 
In a mapping of two domains not only do the basic correspondences of 
the two manifest in metaphors, but also peripheral characteristics included in 
aspects of the source domain (similar to conceptual baggage, cf. ch. 2.2.2.1.). 
The consequences of our knowledge of the source are visible in many 
entailments also carried over with the basic correspondences. So, taking LOVE 
IS A JOURNEY as an example, we can – due to our knowledge about journeys 
and all interrelated aspects (e.g. conditions of roads and vehicles) –, also transfer 
smaller, less relevant individual features into the target domain and therefore 
create diverse metaphorical expressions. The linguistic forms which are based on 
such entailments are still accessible to speakers, since their knowledge allows 
them to understand the connections grounded on similarities of more basic 
aspects of the domains. Even if an expression is new, it will be understood 
                                                                                                                               
“although the spatial and temporal meanings of prepositions are historically linked by 
virtue of the TIME IS SPACE metaphor, they can be (and may normally be) represented 
and processed independently of each other in the brains of modern adults” (Kemmerer 
2005: 797 (abstract)) 
Such results point out that lexicalization patterns and polysemy play a relevant role – 
linguistic structures do not necessarily point to very similar conceptual structures. The linguistic level 
must be taken into account in the same way the conceptual level is by Lakoff (2006[1993]) and other 
CMT theorists. 
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because of the mappings and entailments which exist between the domains. 
Speakers can infer what is meant on the basis of the source domains’ meaning 
aspects. 
There seems to be no clear-cut line for exactly which aspects or features 
will be taken as basic, but Grady (1997) made the point that selection depends 
on primary metaphors. Primary metaphors are abstract metaphors located at 
high levels of the hierarchy. They are used to create complex ones which are not 
always accessible without their primary metaphorical parts. Thus, to understand 
why individual aspects are utilized and highlighted in metaphorical expressions, 
one has to decompose the complex conceptual metaphor to gain access to the 
primary core which explains these choices and cultural models. Theoretically, it 
is quite plausible to reduce complex metaphors in order to gain access to the 
underlying meanings. Examples are presented in the next parts, where 
dimensions of variation are discussed. Variation in conceptual metaphor is 
relevant in this work because the identification of such cognitive structures is 
complicated by socio-cultural and language-specific differences. Variation 
patterns allow for a discrimination of idiosyncratic realizations of similar 
embodied concepts and unrelated conceptualizations. 
3.2.2. DIMENSIONS OF METAPHOR VARIATION 
Metaphor variation can be found along several dimensions, each linked to 
differences in some aspect of the mappings, inter-cultural and -linguistic as well 
as intra-cultural and -linguistic. Cross-cultural variation comes into existence as a 
result of distinct factors leading to different ways of either conceptualization or 
manifestation of conceptualization. Here, language-specific structures are also 
relevant, since they also affect how concepts are manifested. Within-culture 
variation will be discussed thereafter, highlighting the fact that a culture or a 
community does not constitute a monolithic whole, but shows variation, change, 
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and heterogeneity. The traditional view of a speech community as a coherent, 
monolithic whole was proven false by many authors providing evidence for 
heterogeneity, subcultural groupings, and variation within one society or 
community (Kövecses 2010). Taking this for granted, one must assume 
conceptual variations as well. They lead to some degree to different metaphors, 
different linguistic metaphorical forms, and different usages of concepts and 
expressions. The possible dimensions include individual, regional, ethnic, and 
social-cultural, besides others. 
Metaphorical mappings show to have a great deal of potential. We find a 
huge amount of different connections in the languages of the world reflected in 
linguistic forms (Kövecses 2010). In fact, in each language, and in each speech 
community, there are sensible reasons for each of the rules, constraints and 
classes found. These reasons are grounded in cultural assumptions, models and 
theories developed during a time of decisive experiences, reflecting the interplay 
of cultural models and embodiment. As a consequence of variation in 
experience and processing of experience, diverse conceptualizations appear. 
Together, they form a cultural model system which in turn generates numerous 
metaphors and figurative expressions in an individual language not found in 
others. Domains which are used as source domains for conceptual metaphors 
already show variability cross-linguistically. These classes are chosen due to the 
cultural weighting of the ingredients contained in a concept. As Holland & 
Quinn point out, speakers consider those classes as appropriate source domains 
that seize “aspects of the simplified world and the prototypical events unfolding 
in this world, constituted by the cultural model” (1980: 30). This entails that 
most metaphors grant access – or at least insight – into cultural categories, 
conceptualization patterns and the existing entailments among them of a given 
speech community. Additionally, speakers do not realize a concept or class as a 
whole, but as a conglomerate of characteristics which does or does not fit the 
purposes of the target domain in which it will be included. If two or more 
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features of the source domain meet the demands of the target domain, speakers 
are more willing to use that concept as the source domain (Lakoff 1993, 
Kövecses 2006). Potential source domains are rejected if one or more aspects 
contradict any feature of the cultural model of the target domain. In Beaver, the 
English expression and concept “break one’s heart” is not accepted. This is 
assumed to be linked to the cultural model of autonomous individuals not 
intervening in other person’s decisions or lives, so that such explicitly stated 
intrusion is avoided (Goulet 1998, Mills 1986). Additionally, the 
conventionalized Beaver pattern is sadzé̲éʼ tyíhsa̲ne “I am lonely (lit. my heart 
is pitiful)” already carries out the expressive function for the intended meaning. 
All this allows us to observe and comprehend at least some aspects of the 
cultural models underlying linguistic realizations. 
The question of universality has been raised many times in the 
investigation of conceptual metaphors. The contemporary theory states that 
embodied experience constitutes the origin of metaphor in thought. This means, 
it forms the basis of (real or culturally created) similarities which are realized due 
to some sort of experience. Therefore, a great deal of universal parallels are 
expected in the conceptual systems of languages all over the world. Indeed, the 
first analyses of different languages supported this hypothesis, for example 
extracting the HAPPY IS UP metaphor in unrelated languages like English, 
Hungarian, and Chinese (Kövecses 2006: 156). The linguistic realizations differ 
in their constructions as well as in the choice of lexical forms used, but the 
underlying concepts are the same. The MORE IS UP orientational metaphor is 
presumed to be one of the most central ones and is thus positioned at the 
highest level in the inheritance hierarchy.15 Generic level metaphors pass down 
their main characteristics to more specific metaphors, so that a whole range of 
                                               
15 Note that others, for example, Radden (2003), define this form as metonymic (UP FOR 
MORE). 
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metaphors from all levels constitutes a culturally colored conceptual system in 
an individual community (see also 3.2.1.2.). Here, the influences are specific and 
individually shaped by factors like living conditions, environment, existing 
cultural rules and so on, leading to great variation potential in the individual’s 
conceptual and linguistic organization. 
As was already discussed, metaphors consist of several components, each 
of which can constitute the relevant point in variation. Cross-cultural variation 
may depend on the range of source domains and the scope of target domains, 
constituting relevant variables in the mechanisms under discussion. Concerning 
ranges and scopes, the discussion concentrates on metaphors found at lower, 
and thus more specific levels in the hierarchical conceptual system. 
3.2.2.1. SCOPE OF SOURCE AND RANGE OF TARGET 
The distribution of both source and target domains, and the relations of 
these are not easy to grasp. This is the case especially in less described languages 
where lexicons, dictionaries and linguistic – and especially semantic – analyses 
do not exist and thus lack for versification and rechecking. The relation between 
one source and one target domain is not a one-to-one relation. Instead, 
cognition and experience choose different frames for one target domain to be 
used as sources of conceptualization of the domain aimed at, and these diverse 
concepts may co-occur within the target domain. For example, LOVE as a target 
domain uses various source domains in English, combined in conceptual 
metaphors like LOVE IS A JOURNEY, LOVE IS AN ARGUMENT, LOVE 
IS A GAME, etc. This is due to the fact that all mentioned domains provide a 
conceptual frame for the abstract/emotional idea of LOVE, and show similarities 
– at least in some aspects – with the target, or are based on related embodied 
experiences. There is no clear blocking of usage of other sources which also 
have potential correspondences. Thus, the range of target domains is open to 
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make available numerous source domains for metaphorized concepts, if they fit 
the needs to a certain degree. 
The same holds with the scope of the source domains. One frame can be 
the basis of numerous target domains, if it shows parallels with the whole 
abstract or emotional idea, or with some facets of it. Hence, a source can apply 
to many target concepts, and there may be overlaps or intersections, i.e. two or 
more different sources can apply to the same target concept. In Beaver, for 
example, the linguistic pattern [NO BODY PART] reflecting ABSENCE is applied for 
negative personality traits (sadzagéʼ nadyuéʼ “be stubborn (lit. my ears do not 
exist)”), but also for disability like sadzii wǫjué “be deaf” (lit. “my inner ears do 
not exist”). 
As a result, despite universal characteristics of many mappings due to their 
(embodied) experiential basis, one finds many diverse systems, and a huge 
amount of altering metaphors established in the world’s languages. The 
conceptualization of time is an often used example, since time is nearly 
universally understood by means of space because of our experiences. 
Nevertheless, the concepts, metaphors and linguistic expressions differ to 
express time from culture to culture. They are subject to socio-cultural aspects 
influencing which specific conceptual aspects of lexical items are focused and 
used in other contexts, but also to linguistic conditions regulating available 
patterns. In conceptualizing spatial relations, speech communities select 
different parts of the (extended) body or the immediate environment for 
establishing a spatial system, most of them based on the human body in upright 
position (see e.g. Heine 1995; Heine, Claudi & Hünemeyer 1991). Some, 
however, take the horizontally oriented body of, for example, an animal with 
four legs or swimming humans or animals. These languages create systems 
which differ at the highest level mappings from those oriented towards the 
prototypical human body. This choice again reflects experiential (relationship to 
animals, individual environment), and cultural aspects (social organization as 
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hunter-gatherer society, status of animals). They generate and modify further 
mappings, correspondences, and linguistic expressions, and the resulting 
variations found across languages are due to use of different sources or 
conceptual aspects in the linguistic manifestations. There are also examples of 
languages using the same abstract source at a high level in the hierarchy, but 
organizing the conceptual system differently, i.e. not highlighting the same 
features or characteristics of the source. For example, focusing on manner or on 
direction in motion verbs -, which again may result in a changed linguistic 
realization of the target domain.16 
Source domains like SPACE, OBJECT, BODY PART etc. can be found in many 
languages due to their general, unspecified natures’. On the other side, source 
domains like WAR, FLOWERS or PLAY are more specific ideas with more concrete 
features. These constitute culturally biased domains, chosen (probably at some 
point unconsciously) to express culturally shared assumptions about the world, 
or one’s own behavior in this world. Ning Yu (2002) for example attributes the 
Chinese mapping HAPPINESS IS FLOWERS IN THE HEART to the fact 
that Chinese mentality is “more introverted”. Thus, their HAPPINESS metaphor 
concentrates on the emotion being inside the happy person and intended for 
him/her alone, not to be exhibited for all other people around the experiencer. 
This is unlike the (American) English mappings which express happiness as 
something visible to others, and as worthy of being seen by all, for example, 
BEING HAPPY IS BEING OFF THE GROUND (Kövecses 2006:159). 
Such differences in the choice of source domains may show consequences 
on many different levels of the system, depending on where such dissimilarities 
arise. The Chinese example is placed at a medium level in the inheritance 
hierarchy, as it is quite generic in character, but at the same time more specific 
than for example, HAPPINESS IS A PLANT IN A CONTAINER, 
                                               
16 For a detailed study, see Özcaliskan (2003/4). 
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characterizing FLOWERS, and the HEART as a special place in the body container 
(Yu 2002). Still, it may give rise to other mappings based on this HAPPINESS 
metaphor, as well as to many different lexical manifestations of the 
correspondences found in this mapping. Comprehensibly, individual metaphors 
are interrelated to numerous other metaphors and integrated in a complex 
conceptual system. Modifications, changes and innovations affect not only one 
specific level or one individual mapping, but may draw a line throughout the 
whole system. 
Cross-linguistic variation of metaphors and their diverse aspects occurs 
due to “differential experience and differential cognitive preferences, or styles” 
(Kövecses 2006:167). These will be discussed in the following sections. 
3.2.2.2. VARIATION IN EXPERIENCE 
As was already mentioned, although we all live in the same world, our 
experiences differ according to our direct environment, social organization, 
existing communicative patterns and so on. As Kövecses put it: “we are (mostly 
unconsciously) aware of the context around us” (2006: 167). This phrase raises 
an important question, namely to what degree speakers are aware of or 
consciously use transferred concepts to talk about objects, states or actions. This 
is especially relevant for those abstract phenomena otherwise said to be 
incomprehensible (i.e., not physical objects, for example, LOVE as opposed to 
DOG, states like BE IN A BAD MOOD as opposed to BE BIG, or actions like 
UNDERPIN AN ARGUMENT / TAKE A NAP as opposed to TAKE AN APPLE). 
Coming back to the notion of cultural context: cross-culturally related 
values and (basic) concepts, as well as their organization vary and therefore give 
rise to different linguistic expressions. The same holds for central metaphors in a 
society, which form the basis for many other concepts at lower levels of salience. 
In the European and American tradition, for example, Geeraerts and 
Grondelaers (1995) showed that the medieval idea of the “four humors” was a 
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central component in life and culture. It influenced many important social 
aspects, and generated the conceptualization and understanding of emotions, 
especially ANGER. Still, at the highest, most abstract level in the inheritance 
hierarchy, AN ANGRY PERSON IS A PRESSURIZED CONTAINER is said 
to maintain its (nearly) universal character due to our shared physiological 
experiences. The place of variation is at deeper levels, where culture-specific 
concepts in fact derive from the PRESSURIZED CONTAINER metaphor. They 
constitute part of a complex cultural system of concepts and propositions, and 
accordingly differ from culture to culture: “[...] culturally unique key concepts fill 
out generic-level schemas in the creation of cross-culturally differential 
metaphors” (Kövecses 2006:168). 
Another related aspect giving rise to culturally based variations refers to 
the history of a society or speech community. If a group has always experienced 
hard living conditions, or has always had to wage war against other groups, it 
seems likely that such groups will show different concepts of life than groups 
whose living conditions are less hostile, and whose neighboring groups are not 
warmongers.17 What is also of interest here, is the fact that cultures are not 
entirely free to choose a source domain for such mappings, but that the 
experiences made in their history have great impact. This is even enlarged by the 
fact that communities are not aware of such influences, and therefore fall back 
                                               
17 Evidence for conceptual consequences of differing external factors is provided by 
Kövecses (2002), who showed that the Hungarian concepts LIFE IS WAR and LIFE IS A 
COMPROMISE can be traced back to the martial history of the Hungarian people due to their 
geographical situation, while the concepts LIFE IS A GAME and LIFE IS A PRECIOUS 
POSSESSION found in the American tradition show a completely different, positive basic idea 
about how life is (or should be) experienced and understood. See also Wierzbicka (1997) for relevant 
socio-historical reasons which influenced these meanings in the mental lexicon. 
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on them unconsciously.18 This partly parallels embodiment which affects 
conceptualization in a similar way. 
3.2.2.3. VARIATION IN COGNITION 
As was already shown, the processing of human experiences is not always 
the same, despite the fact that all humans live in the same world and have the 
same capabilities of perceiving experiences. Individual living conditions, social 
organizations and so on lead to differing experiences, which again result in 
diverse cognitive processes. Furthermore, bodily experiences provide potential 
sources for metaphorical mappings, but actual utilization is dependent on 
“differential experiential focus” (Kövecses 2006:170). Out of the numerous 
bodily experiences, groups may choose to highlight single aspects, and to use 
only these in mappings, while other features are ignored in cognitive processes 
involved in conceptualization. Good examples are the conceptualizations of 
ANGER, which are often based on bodily experience, but which have selected 
different aspects of our physiology to put into focus (Kövecses 2006:171). 
Members of, for example, American and Chinese societies made the same 
experience: both experienced heat and pressure in the state of being angry. And 
indeed, both use these two aspects in their conceptualization of ANGER., 
although in different formats. In English, for example, the experience of 
INCREASE IN TEMPERATURE while being angry is highlighted, while Chinese sets 
the focus on the experience of PRESSURE. But this is not where the variation 
ends, since the concepts found in English and Chinese described above are not 
irrevocable and ever-present, but subject to many influences. 
                                               
18  Parallels to linguistic relativity are visible here, since the phenomena show the same pattern 
of subliminal influence, operating with such a matter of course that they seem objective rather than 
individual as in the case of historical experiences, or subjectively modified as in the case of linguistic 
structures. 
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Gevaert (2005) traced back the English conceptualization(s) of ANGER 
back to before 800 A.D., and the number of linguistic metaphorical expressions 
using the ANGER IS HEAT mapping showed great variation over time.19 The 
results of this study underline that such conceptualizations are not ever-lasting. 
Furthermore, they are exposed to factors which again – after the creation of 
individual concepts – modify them according to new experiences, changes in life 
style or living conditions, etc. Following Kövecses, this is taken as evidence “that 
universal physiology provides only a potential basis for metaphorical 
conceptualization – without mechanically constraining what the specific 
metaphors [...] will be” (2006:171; emphasis by Kövecses). As a consequence, 
investigations of concepts should be understood as pictures of (parts of) systems 
in motion, with no claims as to durability. 
Another mechanism of cognition variation can be found in the usage and 
understanding of metaphor and metonymy. Communities may select the same 
concepts to be used as sources for figurative language, but the (cognitive) 
processing of these domains can show salient differences by means of either 
mapping entities from one domain (metonymic mappings) or from two different 
ones (metaphorical mappings).20 Such differences are again the result of culture-
specific features, although the reasons are not as obvious and tangible as one 
might wish. 
To sum up, embodied experience, cultural experience, and cognitive 
preferences are all related to each other. They show dependencies and are often 
coherent with the whole conceptual system. What I made explicit here it that not 
                                               
19 Before 850A.D. 1,59% of all expressions meaning anger manifested the conceptual 
metaphor ANGER IS HEAT, between 950 and 1050 6,22%, by around 1200 1,71% and by around 
1300 0,27%. After 1400 the number increased and today, the ANGER IS HEAT mapping is still 
dominant. 
20  Systems most often show tendencies to one or the other way of mapping, i.e. probably 
both appear, but with different values in the system. 
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only does embodiment (universal bodily experience) generate conceptualization, 
but that “cultural-cognitive” aspects are also intensively involved in the creation 
of metaphorical linguistic forms. The main difference between these two is that 
one is oriented towards universalities of language, while the other is related to 
variation in culture and language. 
3.3. CONCEPTUAL METONYMY 
Conceptual metonymy is a highly relevant and frequently used cognitive 
phenomenon, resulting in different kinds of figures of speech. Its realization 
patterns are like those of metaphors – bound to cultural models, embodiment 
and related conceptualizations and structures. But while in CMT, conceptual 
metaphor involves two independent domains – source and target domain – 
being related to express a non-literal meaning, in metonymy other mechanisms 
are at work. This phenomenon is defined as mapping inside one domain or 
domain matrix. In this cognitive act, access to the target domain is provided via 
another, related concept or part of the target concept by means of semantic 
contiguity and highlighting processes. As a prototypical metonymic case, a part 
of an entity or class is used to conceive of this entity or class as a whole:  
“a well-chosen metonymic expression lets us mention one entity that is 
salient and easily coded, and thereby evoke – essentially automatically – a 
target that is either of lesser interest or harder to name” (Langacker 1993: 
30).  
The present work will concentrate on fixed constructions stored in the 
mental lexicon and denoting unequivocal referents. Therefore, specific cases of 
Dirven’s (2003) “conjunctive” and “inclusive metonymy” as described in the 
following sections, will be examined here as parts of the Beaver lexicon. 
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Metonymic language use in conversation (linear metonymy in Dirven’s 
classification) is not described in detail. 
Although metonymy indeed operates automatically, cultural and linguistic 
conventions must be taken into account to allow for such easy processing21. In 
Beaver, prototypical functions of entities are often linguistically realized to refer 
to the object, e.g. makʼéhʼetsʼehdii “table (lit. you eat on it)”. This structure 
implies that both source and target are processed and preserved, as opposed to 
metaphor, where specific aspects of the actually unrelated source are transferred. 
Put differently, conceptual juxtaposition or concomitance occur in the case of 
metonymy, while real or culturally based similarity of two otherwise disparate 
concepts occur in metaphor. Metaphor utilizes one or more properties of the 
source suiting the target. Contrary, metonymy focuses on one relation holding 
between two parts of a domain or concept, so that no substitution of concepts is 
involved (Warren 2003, Sweep 2009). Consequently, in metonymy, it is this one 
linguistically realized relation which is processed. In metaphor, there is no such 
restriction, the realized correspondences can be numerous when they match the 
conceptual structure of the target. What approximates these two cognitive 
activities is their classification on a literal–non-literal–figurative scale. Metonymy 
does not only occur in a literal, descriptive form as in the Beaver example above. 
Depending on the type of relation chosen and the aspect or part used for 
realization, conceptual metonymy may underlie non-literal and figurative 
instances. A Beaver example is atsóódale “dogberries (lit. someone’s excrements 
are red)”. The result of eating these berries is linguistically manifested to denote 
the items, and the relationship between the result of eating the entity and the 
entity itself is processed: EFFECT FOR CAUSE. The conceptual distance 
                                               
21 This means that although someone who does not know the Beaver language understands 
the relation between “you sleep on it” and “bed”, the referent must not be automatically evoked due 
to the lack of knowledge about the convention of linguistically manifesting a function while 
intending the object (makʼéhtsʼééstyį “bed (lit. on it you sleep)”). 
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between these two parts is great enough to evoke figurativity. Although they 
belong to one domain matrix (NUTRITION-DIGESTION), the relation is neither 
the only one nor the most prominent. Predestination for figurativity and creative 
language use are aspects often employed by speakers and speech communities to 
ensure communication. This is the case not only where abstract concepts refuse 
direct denotation (e.g. emotions), or where metonymy allows for unequivocal 
reference (e.g. “the steak wants a coffee” for ‘the restaurant customer who 
ordered the steak wants a coffee’). The phenomenon is also used to overstate or 
linguistically exaggerate concrete concepts. For example, “I get a hernia”, but 
also “I explode” or “my blood boils” are used to mean ‘I am angry’, based on 
the physiological effects PRESSURE and HEAT of ANGER22. Metonymy, just like 
metaphor, can be found in every language, and is used to ease understanding, 
and processing of the target. Therefore, the idea is to make the world simpler 
than it actually is for the purpose of talking about it.  
Moreover, metonymy is identified in several diverse types in many lexical 
fields, strengthening its status in cognition and language. In Beaver, metonymy 
plays an important role in form and function, i.e. for the indirect creation of 
meaning as well as for the creation of linguistic patterns (ch. 5). 
Metonymy operates in cases where it is assumed to be more practical in a 
given communicative situation not to take a whole concept with all its borderline 
cases and exceptions for linguistic expression. First, a kind of typical or salient 
                                               
22 The linguistic forms are defined as instances of conceptual metaphor by Lakoff (1987). In 
this thesis it will be argued that this is controversial, since the metonymy EFFECT FOR CAUSE is 
founded on a perfect and real physiological basis for these linguistic metaphors. Our usage of 
language, i.e. choice of linguistic material, evokes figurativity via overstatement, i.e. our blood is not 
really boiling, but the feeling of heat due to anger is real. Similarly, we do not explode, but we feel 
objective pressure inside our bodies caused by anger. Yet, we do not express this anger linguistically 
via a simple notion like “I feel pressure”, but exaggerate this meaning in order to maximize the effect 
in communication.  
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example like a stereotype, or an ideal is realized (Barcelona 2002, Radden 2003 
Dirven 2003). Second, concrete features of more abstract phenomena are 
linguistically exploited, for example, the physiological effect of the pressure of 
ANGER (PRESSURE FOR ANGER). 
A prototype already includes the necessary characteristics of the concept 
meant, and additionally it provides easier access to the relevant aspects (Rosch 
1978, Lakoff 1987). The proposition-schema is not deduced from a stereotypical 
case dominant in the real world, but from an idealized version of how it should 
be. This aspect serves one of the main communicative functions of metonymy, 
i.e. the representational function of “unambiguous reference” in the case of 
referential metonymy (Dirven 2003). Metaphor, on the other hand, is bound to 
an expressive function, realized as a “conceptualization instrument and force” 
(Dirven 2003: 105).  
Several assumptions concerning metonymy will be examined in the Beaver 
data. Although metonymy needs not result in lexicalization, in Beaver this device 
is extensively used for old and new vocabulary. Consequently, it constitutes an 
important means for conventional extension of the lexicon. In the corpus, 
several different basic metonymies are identified, giving rise to many linguistic 
manifestations for concrete entities and abstract concepts of several semantic 
domains. Thus, metonymy in Beaver establishes a system of interrelated 
concepts; for example, EFFECT FOR CAUSE, FUNCTION FOR ENTITY, 
SHAPE FOR ENTITY are numerously applied to express the intended targets. 
These often comprise content fields like household items, professions, and 
therefore especially modern vocabulary, but also animals, food, place names and 
others. 
For the description of the Beaver forms and patterns, I use Dirven’s 
classification of metonymy, since special attention is paid to the notion of 
figurativity, and its relation to metaphor. Dirven (2003) distinguishes three main 
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types, reflecting the transition from literalness to figurativeness: linear, 
conjunctive and inclusive metonymy.  
3.3.1. LINEAR METONYMY 
In the first type, a linguistic syntagmatic form – e.g. a phrase – is 
understood metonymically if its context provides the necessary information. On 
its own, the form does not include any metonymic aspect, like for example, 
“different parts of the country” in “different parts of the country don’t 
necessarily mean the same thing when they use the same word” (Dirven 2003: 
79). This form refers to the inhabitants instead of geographical parts only if a 
corresponding context gives rise to such an interpretation. 
Linear metonymy shows a huge amount of specific realizations of 
WHOLE-PART or PART-WHOLE relations, to name but a few from the most 
common ones in the literature: 
LOCALITY FOR INHABITANTS (“France loves its tower.”) 
CONTAINER FOR CONTAINED (“He drank the whole bottle.”) 
PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT (“She reads Goethe.”) 
In all these cases, the conceptual categories standing for the referents are 
closely related, but show a different “referential mass than the common 
expression(s) used for the intended referent”, to use Dirven’s cognitive 
definition (2003: 80). This definition fits the properties of examples like 
“different parts of the country”, meaning “inhabitants of the different parts of 
the country”. In the Beaver cases though, the metonymic expressions do 
constitute the “common expression(s) used for the intended referent”. They are 
not variants or alternatives reflecting the speaker’s intentions in specific speech 
situations. Rather, the speech community (unconsciously) conventionalized and 
lexicalized those form-meaning pairs at some point in time, systematically using 
metonymy as an instrument for meaning construction. This means that the 
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forms are included in the Beaver lexicon as fixed expressions with fixed 
meanings. The English examples above, on the other hand, are neither 
lexicalized nor do they constitute fixed meanings of the lexical items which are 
included in the lexicon. Another important fact excludes all Beaver metonymic 
expressions described in this work: linear metonymy as defined by Dirven (2003) 
does not involve a constant shift in meaning. Rather, it depends on the context 
in which it is embedded in a communicative situation. That means, linear 
metonymy includes expressions not conventionally used and lexicalized in their 
metonymic meanings. Consequently, such constructions do not lead to or result 
in polysemous networks stored in the lexicon. Figurativity does not play a role in 
this type either: the referent does not show a conceptual distance great enough 
from the concept of the metonymic form to trigger figurative interpretation. 
Since no (lasting) shift in meaning, i.e. no conventionalization, is 
established via this type, and only stylistic / pragmatic expressions in language 
use are construed, linear metonymy will not be further investigated in 
combination with the Beaver data. 
3.3.2. CONJUNCTIVE METONYMY 
The second type of metonymy shows an important difference from the 
first one concerning shifts in meaning. While the linear forms of metonymy are 
context-dependent, conjunctive tokens include both, the original meaning of the 
expression as well as a lasting meaning extension (broadening). Although this 
type is located closer to the figurative end of the literal–non-literal continuum, 
the meaning extension meant here does not necessarily include figurative 
meanings, though one of the two subtypes of conjunctive metonymy described 
below results in figurativity (Dirven 2003).  
The first and non-figurative subclass subsumes the well-known cases of 
nouns, for example, “the Times” denoting a magazine with its premises, staff, 
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and issues, or a building and the institution, with its (concrete and abstract) 
components and subordinates, e.g. “school” in “the school is angry (meaning 
‘staff / teacher(s)’, ‘department’, ‘headmaster’)” or “the school broke up 
(meaning ‘school year’)”. Here, the constant shift in meaning expands the 
original meaning without deleting or losing it.  
In the Beaver language, many verbal forms are used to denote, for 
example, household items or professions, so that the literal meaning “s/he talks 
for the people” only refers to dane ghaawudyíhe “translator” if the context 
allows for or promotes that meaning, otherwise this form is understood literally. 
“To talk for people” is indeed an important aspect of being a translator. In 
cognitive linguistic approaches to such figures of thought, this form is described 
as ACTION FOR AGENT (crucial aspect for entity). The Beaver word for 
“table”, makʼéhʼetsʼehdii literally means “on it you eat”. Again, one of the crucial 
features of a table is highlighted, and stands for the whole, applying 
FUNCTION FOR ENTITY. Here, similarity to linear metonymy can be seen, 
since the literal meanings of these phrases can occur without referring to “table” 
or “translator” respectively. The relevant difference is their status as lexicon 
entries: tokens of linear metonymy are not lexicalized nor stored as fixed 
constructions. 
 
The second subclass contains instances of metonymy which always include 
a figurative meaning. This is due to the fact that the distance between the 
denotation and the entity referred to is relatively great as opposed to the first, 
non-figurative subclass of conjunctive metonymy. To use Dirven’s example: a 
figurative conjunctive metonymy like “crown” for the ‘monarch’, transfers a 
concrete object of royal regalia – which itself is one component out of three 
(prerogatives, executive, regalia), so that the object ‘crown’ belongs to the next 
sublevel, together with other subordinates like ‘scepter’ or ‘robe’. This transfer 
from one (sub-)domain to the target domain has to cover quite a great distance, 
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and it is this distance that triggers figurative meaning, while the transfer from, 
for example, “school” to “teacher” also results in polysemous concepts, but this 
conceptual shift does not include figurativity, because the distance between both 
exists, yet, is not large enough. Note that a ‘crown’ itself as well as the 
component ‘regalia’ are not the most important aspects in this system. The 
crucial point here is that the crown is “an almost predestined candidate for 
figurativisation” (Dirven 2003: 103). People have stored the picture of a crown 
as symbol for monarchy23, furthermore, it abstracts from the person 
representing the monarchy, and from the fact that these persons change over 
time, leaving the institution as the only referent. To use Dirven’s words, such 
metonymies’ functions are “unambiguous reference, or on the contrary, […] 
exploiting vagueness or ambiguity” (2004: 102). A Beaver example is xáálo 
saẕááʼ tsʼaʼáhe “first communion (lit. first time they put it in my mouth)” (see ch. 
5.3.). 
3.3.3. INCLUSIVE METONYMY 
This last type of metonymy is also characterized by a non-linguistic 
syntagmatic basis, but this basis is not supported by juxtaposition, instead, a 
relationship of inclusion is established. To use Dirven’s example, in “he’s got a 
good head on him” (2003: 83), a physical aspect is used to refer to a non-physical, 
mental aspect, i.e. intelligence. This seems similar to the linear metonymy PART 
FOR WHOLE, however, inclusive metonymy – as opposed to the linear type – 
does not allow for the use one for the other and vice versa. Compare “curly hair 
/ curly head” for a linear relationship, with “brains working slowly / *head 
working slowly” for an inclusive English example. This reversibility is connected 
with the fact that in linear metonymy, there is no extreme difference between 
                                               
23 This relation seems to be bidirectional: both the non-linguistic behaviour and the linguistic 
manifestations influence one another. 
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the two domains involved, for example, hair and head both denote concrete 
body parts. For “head” and “brains”, on the other hand, abstract notions of 
mental activity are included, constituting a distinct distance between source and 
target. Since the difference or distance between (concrete) source and (abstract) 
target is enormous, one cannot include both in one domain, like in the linear 
type. Neither is this relation to be understood as a mapping from one unrelated 
domain to another, although the concepts of concrete domains differ to a huge 
extent from those of abstract (mental) domains. Rather, both constitute different 
subdomains of one “domain matrix”, showing less overt closeness, or 
relatedness (Croft 2002). Thus, in the case of “good head”, the subdomains 
{mental world} and {physical body} are included in the domain matrix {human 
being}. 
Both metonymy and metaphor involve conceptual processes, the 
difference for CMT is that in metaphor no domain matrix is established via 
juxtaposition or conceptual contiguity, where both domains remain intact, like in 
the metonymic expression “tea is a large meal”, where the real event of tea 
drinking expanded, became socially ritualized and was combined with eating to 
constitute a meal. The conceptual contiguity between drinking and eating is kept, 
and both domains along with their characteristics are included and maintained. 
In metaphor, on the other hand, the source domain (or better, the crucial 
aspects allowing for correspondences) is embedded in or swallowed by the 
target, in other words “the source domain is merely ‘hypothetical’” (Warren 
2003: 91). For example, in the metaphor “drinking Belgian beer is drinking and 
eating” (example taken from Dirven 2003: 89), some aspects (e.g. nourishing 
effect, solid consistency) of the source domain ‘eating’ are mapped onto the 
drinking of Belgian beer, but the real act of eating does not occur in the real 
world or in the referent (as it does in “tea” above). 
In the example “he’s got a good head on him” given above, ‘intelligence’ as 
an abstract, mental property is figuratively realized as a concrete object. It is 
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situated in the ‘head’, which belongs to the subdomain (physical) body parts. 
Head is connected to ‘intelligence’ via a metonymic relationship that holds 
between head and brain, as well as between brain and intelligence. These 
relationships are part of what Dirven calls “chain of inclusion” (2003: 84). The 
metonymic relationship classifies the elements in such a metonymic chain as to 
include one another (e.g. head, brain, grey cells, thinking/thought processes, 
mind, thoughts, intelligence (taken from Dirven 2003: 84)). The relationship of 
juxtaposition (conjunctive metonymy), on the other hand, creates a “static 
whole”, like “school”, where the different meanings or meaning extensions 
(building, institution, school year, staff etc.) do not include one another.  
This represents and underpins the relation between universal features in 
language – especially embodiment – and cross-linguistic variation. It should be 
kept in mind that the organization described above holds for the English 
language and must not be understood as a cross-linguistic fact found in every 
language. As a universal phenomenon, concrete (bodily) experiences are 
systematically used to enable communication about abstract entities. Specific 
results of conceptualizations of experiences like the metonymic chain linked to 
“head” are not necessarily universal, although this socio-culturally shaped 
relationship shows connections to the reality outside linguistic organization (for 
example, the action of thinking does take place in the brain, which is situated in 
the head). Indeed, it seems to be universal to locate mind, thinking, intelligence 
and the like in the head based on experience. However, in Chinese for example, 
“heart” is conceptualized as SEAT OF EMOTION and SEAT OF THOUGHT, or 
INTELLIGENCE (Yu 2002). Which part will be used in which way, and which 
relations or mappings will arise, is a question of socio-cultural, historical and 
linguistic concepts and the knowledge of individual communities. On the other 
hand, similar conceptualizations and resulting lexicalizations of MIND in 
languages around the world reflect the high relevance of this concept and a need 
to process and communicate psychological and mental aspects (see also ch.5.2.). 
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There may be different systems combining or highlighting other aspects of 
the existing relations between HEAD and INTELLIGENCE, or including additional 
subdomains like SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE as opposed to pure KNOWLEDGE, or 
FAITH as part of real knowledge about the world. Thus, variation not only 
occurs at the inter-domain-level – which domains are combined or linked to 
each other, which are subdomains in a chain etc. – but also at the domain- or 
extensional level, i.e. what is included in individual domains, what is stored in 
separate ones. These decisions again are found at different levels. Speech 
communities conventionalize domains following their cultural models and at the 
same time the concrete linguistic manifestations of mappings are subject to 
interpretations of “culturally-conditioned language user[s]” (Dirven 2003: 88). 
For example, the figurative expression “they are dead slow” could be analyzed 
by native speakers of English either as metonymic (‘they’ = their minds) or as 
metaphorical (PHYSICAL SLOWNESS IS MENTAL SLOWNESS). Again a 
domain matrix can be assumed here: mental slowness is related to the physical 
domain, i.e. metonymic structures are evoked. This mirrors the fact that speech 
communities are not homogenous, and that several explanations based on 
differing models are plausible. 
Concerning the mentioned literal–non-literal–figurative continuum, this 
metonymy type is positioned closer to the figurativity end, since all instances of 
this type show figurative meanings, like in “s/he’s got a good head on her/him”, 
where INTELLIGENCE is figuratively realized as a concrete object. Examples in 
Beaver are: satsí̱íduéʼ “I am stupid/crazy (lit. my head is not there)”, sadzagéʼ 
nadyuéʼ  “I am stubborn (my ears are not there)”, manifesting conceptual 
metonymy with figurative meanings and the conceptualization of the body parts 
as SEATS OF EMOTIONS (see ch.5). 
In the last example, despite similar linguistic realizations in Beaver and for 
example English (“to turn a deaf ear” for ‘not willing to listen / know’), different 
cultural models provide the semantic base. The Beaver concept of ‘learning’ is 
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not necessarily bound to teaching and following rules. Consequently, the 
expression denoting “stubbornness” is not focused on obedience. Children must 
not first listen and learn what adults tell them, before they are allowed to 
perform what they were instructed to do. Rather, first-hand experience is 
promoted, and learning is equated with observing, and not with receiving verbal 
instructions and providing answers to questions (Mills 1986, Goulet 1998). 
 
In general, the metonymy types discussed are positioned at the turning 
point between literal and non-literal meanings, i.e. the types differ from each 
other and from metaphor concerning their degrees of figurativity. Another point 
of dissimilarity is the degree of meaning shift, be it non-existent or ad hoc as in 
the linear metonym “different parts of the country”, or permanent as in 
conjunctive metonymies like makʼéhʼetsʼehdii “table (lit. on it you eat)” which 
systematically extended and conventionalized its meaning to denote a referent 
and to be stored in the (mental) lexicon. 
The aspects discussed of metonymy and metaphor are important 
properties for the definitions of both phenomena: especially, these are 
figurativity and contiguous domains combined in a domain matrix in metonymy 
as opposed to metaphor, where the source domain is said to be erased in the 
mapping (Dirven 2003). The appearance of figurativity crosscuts the distinctions 
made, and cannot be explained by means of them. The notion of a continuum 
with literalness and metaphor (always figurative) positioned at the two ends fits 
the described patterns. The different metonymy types are placed at the points of 
intersection, since the non-figurative and figurative instances metonymy 
constitute gradual transitions from literalness to figurativity (Dirven 2003: 107). 
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3.3.4. CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR, METONYMY & METAPHTONYMY 
Although conceptual metaphor often attracts more interest in research, 
metonymy has recently gained increased attention. The origin as well as several 
problematic aspects of metaphor and the distinction between metaphor and 
metonymy lie more and more in focus, demanding and generating 
comprehension and discussion. The most generic conceptual metaphors defined 
by Lakoff and others also allow for classification as metonymies, as Radden 
(2003) has shown. In CMT, the step from the physiologically based metonymy 
EFFECT FOR CAUSE or rather PRESSURE FOR ANGER to a conceptual 
metaphor (ANGER IS PRESSURE) by Lakoff (1987: 382ff) is equivocal and 
allows for an alternative analysis. Lakoff (1987) explains the “common folk 
theory of the physiological effects of anger” (1987: 281) and connects it to 
metonymic conceptualizations. In the description following, this is converted to 
a conceptual metaphor. The CMT legitimates this evolutionary step of 
conceptual metaphors which have metonymic pendants on a purely linguistic 
basis. However, if physiological effects can be identified which are utilized for 
linguistic manifestation – even if exaggerated – then there is no need for 
conceptual metaphor, i.e. conceptual transfer from an unrelated domain or 
concept. 
Radden (2003) unveils and demonstrates the metonymic basis of 
conceptual metaphors defined as ‘primary or central metaphors’ by Lakoff 
(2006[1993]) and Grady (1997). For example, the primary metaphor MORE IS 
UP has its origins in correlation and conceptual binding. This means, the two 
experienced phenomena (verticality and quantity) are so closely related that we 
do not consciously and ad hoc divide them. But even if they are disconnected, 
they are still realized as belonging to one domain, therefore questioning the 
status of MORE IS UP as cognitive metaphorical structure. 
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The following point is also relevant for the Beaver data and the extraction 
of underlying conceptualizations. Conceptual metaphors and metonymies are 
often linguistically realized in the same way, i.e. via figurative idiomatic 
expressions. Linguistic forms with underlying metonymic structures (e.g. 
EFFECT FOR CAUSE) show figurative features very similar to forms based on 
conceptual metaphor. For example, sadzé̲éʼ xááts ̲ʼat “I am angry (lit. my heart 
falls out)” includes a metaphorical conceptualization of HEART and a figurative 
usage of “fall out” (focusing on SUDDEN/UNCONTROLLED MOTION), especially 
in relation to the subject. On the other hand, madzé̲éʼ dáhʼatlʼis “s/he is excited 
/ scared” literally means “my heart is dancing”: it includes the prototypical 
meaning of “heart” as concrete BODY PART and applies the metonymy EFFECT 
FOR CAUSE. The combination of “heart” and “dance” evokes figurativity 
identical to the case of ANGER (sadzé̲éʼ xááts ̲ʼat). Yet, there is no underlying 
figurative and transferred conceptualization of the meaning. Rather, real 
physiological experience (increased heartbeat) linked to the target EXCITEMENT 
constitutes the underlying concept. Figurativity is evoked by the verb with its 
prototypical meaning (“dance”). In chapter 6, these and other examples will be 
presented and discussed in more detail. 
 
Goossens established the notion of “metaphtonymy” (Goossens 1990) for 
linguistic expressions which reflect both metaphor and metonymy to certain 
degrees. He defines and distinguishes two types: “metaphor from metonymy” 
and “metonymy within metaphor”. The first type is found in expressions like 
“giggle” in ‘Oh dear’ she giggled, ‘I’d quite forgotten’. The meaning extension from ‘to 
laugh in a nervous way’ to ‘say while giggling’ is a metonymic one, while the 
further extension to “to say as if giggling” (Geeraerts 2003) is defined as a 
metaphorical process. Note that this analysis is similar to Dirven’s description of 
figurative conjunctive metonymy (cf. ch. 3.3.2.): for example, “tea” in “tea is a 
large meal” is defined as a metonymic meaning extension. 
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The latter type “metaphor within metonymy” refers to expressions like 
catch someone’s ear “to ensure someone’s attention” (Geeraerts 2003: 21). The 
example reveals the interplay between the corresponding metonymic chain 
HEAR – LISTEN – ATTAIN (– OBEY) in combination with the conceptual 
metonymy ISTRUMENT FOR ACTION (ear for hear/listen). The verb 
“catch” is used in a transferred, non-physical meaning. However, as Geeraerts 
points out: “obtaining something is the result of taking hold of it” (2003: 21), 
and the hearing organ is linked to “hear, listen and attention” through 
embodiment in a metonymic fashion. Hence, a metonymic interpretation is 
preferred and sufficient. Other examples are “to bite one’s tongue off” and 
“beat one’s breast”. These are partially defined as metonymic, since they refer to 
specific effects of the intended meanings (“be sorry for what one has just said” 
and “make a noisy open show of sorrow” (taken from Balbachan 2006: 9)). 
Their metaphoric interpretations are evoked by the fact that these explicated 
activities do not take place – although they potentially could (and really do in 
some appropriate contexts). This constitutes the main difference between these 
instances and, for example, “he exploded” as manifestations of the conceptual 
metaphor ANGER IS PRESSURE (Lakoff & Johnson 1980). The conceptual 
metonymy PRESSURE FOR ANGER itself is transferred to the metaphoric 
concept because the expressed action – explosion of an angry person – never 
occurs in reality. Their metonymic example “get a hernia” (Lakoff & Johnson 
1980, Lakoff 1987), on the other hand, fits the definition of the metaphtonymy 
type “metaphor within metonymy”, since an angry person does not really “get a 
hernia” when angry, but potentially could due to pressure as an effect of anger.  
Goossens’ metaphtonymy (1990) constitutes an important contribution to 
the discussion how conceptual metaphor is defined and how the relationship 
between conceptual metaphor and metonymy looks like. Both of Goossens’ 
types have in common substantial relationships to metonymy, and some of the 
conceptual metaphors defined by Lakoff offer similar relationships to 
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metonymic structures. In chapter 5, it will be shown that the expressions of 
emotion including body part terms in Beaver do not constitute metaphtonymies 
per se. They are neither metonymies used as metaphors nor metaphors within 
metonymy as defined by Goossens. For example, sadzé̲éʼ xaats ̲ʼat “I am angry 
(lit. my heart falls out)” does not refer to a metonymy in the same way Goossens 
examples do: a body part falling out does not rely on real experience. 
Consequently, the data is not classified in terms of this phenomenon.  
3.4. BEYOND CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR THEORY 
In the following section, the recent state of research is provided with 
respect to conceptual and linguistic metaphors. I discuss those parts of 
alternative approaches which are relevant for the data presented here and the 
application of the CMT on these data. At the same time, aspects of the CMT 
particularly problematic in terms of the Beaver expressions will be introduced. 
Many parts of the theory are highly relevant and fruitful for the investigation of 
the relationships between language and thought. Results already achieved clearly 
reflect the importance of this methodology. However, new frameworks modify 
and specify some hypotheses with new data and exert alternative levels in the 
modeling of linguistic and cognitive fields of conceptualization. 
3.4.1. DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO LINGUISTIC METAPHORS & 
UNDERLYING CONCEPTS 
The theoretical framework of conceptual metaphor constitutes one of the 
most important and most influencing theories concerning conceptualization and 
figurative language. This cognitive approach reveals a system deeply embedded 
in our cognitive structures and affecting linguistic structure in a way which was 
not described in such details until Lakoff and Johnson’s work (1980). In the last 
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two decades, however, some shortcomings and disputable aspects become clear, 
as revealed by empirical application of the CMT. As a consequence, several 
authors critically discussed the CMT and presented alternative approaches 
(Fauconnier 1997, Fauconnier & Turner 2002, 2008, Glucksberg et al. 1997, 
Grady 1999, Bowdle & Gentner 2005, Evans 2006, 2009, 2010a, to appear). The 
alternative frameworks offer elaborations, amendments and complementary 
strategies of figurative language analysis in relation to the CMT. 
Most important, the salience of conceptual metaphor is disputed as main 
mechanism of figurative meanings and figurative meaning construction. Evans 
convincingly argues that conceptual metaphors “do not directly motivate 
language use in an isomorphic way” (2011: 2). Rather, there exist additional 
mechanisms deeply embedded in the individual linguistic system of every 
language which generate figurative meanings in language use. Hence, conceptual 
metaphor as non-linguistic knowledge structure is not the only process included 
in and responsible for linguistic metaphors.  
Furthermore, it is difficult to find solid evidence for these conceptual 
structures. There is still no direct way to realize conceptual processes, and 
linguistic evidence is not always as clear as is stated by Lakoff & Johnson (1980), 
Lakoff (2006[1993]) or Kövecses (2010). Rather, it is equivocal if linguistic 
expressions are direct indications of cognitive processes. As is also 
acknowledged by the approaches presented here. Linguistic forms must not 
parallel or directly mirror conceptual structures, so that a linguistic metaphor 
does not mandatorily imply conceptual metaphor. Our own intuitions and 
speculation bias such supposedly strong bonds between language and thought, 
yet this cannot be taken as clear evidence. Conceptual Metaphor theorists 
extensively draw upon their own intuitions and use introspection, while broad 
empirical data is still lacking, especially in combination with an objective analysis 
unbiased by presumed conceptual metaphors. Glucksberg et al. (1997) already 
disproved some assumed connections between underlying conceptual metaphors 
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and linguistic realizations. The fact that – after being offered a suitable 
correspondence – speakers (and linguists as speakers, too) are biased and no 
longer open to alternative accounts, has resulted in unconfirmed speculations in 
some parts of the theory.  
In his Lexical Concept and Cognitive Models Theory (LCCM), Evans 
systematically develops a model which copes with linguistic metaphors not 
suiting the definitions of the CMT (2010a). He focuses on linguistic metaphors 
which reflect language-specific patterns of conceptualization and lexicalization, 
i.e. meaning construction in language use. The notion of “discourse metaphors” 
(Evans, to appear) as figurative language forms contrasts with conceptual 
metaphors with respect to their basis: while conceptual metaphors are said to be 
independent of language, discourse metaphors are “linguistically mediated 
instances” (Evans to appear: 3) of language use. Similar to conceptual 
metaphors, they are linked to their conceptual basis, but they are created in 
language use and consequently are language-specific. Evans uses “frankenfood” 
as an example to demonstrate the creation of linguistically based structures in 
communication events (2011: 2). This discourse metaphor comes into existence 
to facilitate communicative intentions. It relies on the concept of “Frankenstein” 
which is combined with the concept of genetically modified crops and related 
connotations. This and similar forms are established in discourse, i.e. in language 
use, and the new linguistic (and conceptual) forms can, but need not, become 
lexicalized. Alternatively, they get lost again when they loose salience. 
Conceptual metaphors, on the other hand, give rise to linguistic metaphors in 
other forms: they are deeply embedded in our cognitive system and constitute 
stable mechanisms. These mechanisms are neither language nor discourse based, 
but rely on essential experiences. Thus, these two types of metaphor are both 
linked to language and cognition. Yet, discourse metaphors inhere in the 
linguistic system, while conceptual metaphors have their basis in the cognitive 
system (Evans 2011). 
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The cognitive structures associated with discourse metaphors – “lexical 
concepts” are defined as units “of purely linguistic semantic knowledge” (Evans 
2006: 15). The belong to the language-specific level of semantic representation 
and are conventionally combined with linguistic forms, specifying their semantic 
arguments. They operate independently of conceptual metaphor and are 
consulted for polysemy explication besides the cognitive structures presumed by 
the CMT.  
Which meanings of polysemous lexemes will be conventionalized and 
lexicalized in a language depends not only on best practice experience. It is also 
subject to the arbitrariness reflected cross-linguistically in different lexicons and 
grammars. That means, selection does not happen consciously nor 
systematically. Contexts, figurative predestinations and chance finally influence 
the inclusion and integration of highlighted conceptual aspects. Especially, the 
role of linguistic material used to focus on these components needs a deeper 
analysis. Evans strengthens the inclusion of language-specific structures and 
language use as affecting figurative language and concepts (2006, 2010).  
Furthermore, lexical concepts activate “semantic affordances” which 
manage to evoke the relevant meanings in language use and the interpretation of 
figurative meaning (Evans to appear: 24). For example, the English preposition 
in in its various usages and meanings is analyzed in relationship with its lexical 
concepts which respectively underlie each usage. Thus, in addition to the 
conceptual metaphor STATES ARE LOCATIONS, lexical concepts like 
[PHYSIOLOGICAL STATE], [PSYCHO-SOMATIC STATE] or [SOCIO-
INTERPERSONAL STATE] are applied by Evans. These are used to 
differentiate and coherently describe usages like the cow is in milk, John is in love 
and John is in debt (2006: 15). These meaning nuances cannot be explained by the 
conceptual metaphor, but need a language-internal foundation. Note that Evans 
does not question the conceptual metaphor STATES ARE LOCATIONS. 
Other researchers (e.g. McGlone 2007, see below) argue that its scope is 
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problematic: since states can be defined as ‘being in a location’, the mapping 
might be redundant, overstating the notion of metaphorical transfer. Thus, 
Evans’ account is based on the theory of conceptual metaphor and elaborates 
the linguistic side of figurative language and thought. The linguistic structures 
investigated and described within this framework are linguistic metaphors not 
definable only on the basis of conceptual metaphors. This type (or these types) 
of metaphor is also realized and exploited by other approaches. Since these 
expressions often occur in the linguistic form X IS Y (for example, “my lawyer 
is a shark”), the findings are not easily assignable to the Beaver metaphors which 
are not realized as explicit similes. Forms with the literal meanings “my heart 
falls out” or “my minds are plenty” call for a distinct description. 
Grady – one of the leading researchers in the circle of the CMT who 
established the notion of “primary metaphor” – states in his article (1999) that 
not all linguistic metaphors can be explained purely on the basis of conceptual 
(and primary) metaphors. Forms like “my job is a jail”, but also image 
metaphors like “my wife whose waist is an hourglass” need another foundation 
than the postulated correlations based on experience. Therefore, he includes the 
more classical notion of “resemblance” which reflects the functions of the 
linguistic forms (Grady 1999). These functions utilize specific attributes of the 
source and the target concepts because of existing similarities without an 
adoption of the source’s structure. The class of resemblance metaphors is 
further divided into “behavior-based” and image metaphors. The latter refers to 
conceptualizations based on image-schematic visual input which reflects 
resemblance in physical properties. Behavior-based metaphors concentrate on 
dynamic processes which allow for comparison. An example is “my boss is a 
pussycat” (Evans to appear: 8), where characteristics of the source are attributed 
to the target domain. Since we need not having any experience of a correlation 
between “boss” and “pussycat”, but still comprehend the metaphor, a definition 
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of this and similar forms as conceptual metaphors with their experiential basis is 
not applicable (Grady 1999).  
Bowlde & Gentner (2005) emphasize the conventionality of linguistic 
metaphors in their Career of Metaphor approach. Similar to Evans, they 
concentrate on the linguistic side of metaphor and focus on the analogies used 
between source and target irrespective of similarity of the domains. This means 
that lexicalization replaces conceptual mapping when the conventionalization 
process proceeds to a certain point. Their example “roadblock” proves this 
hypothesis:  
“There was presumably a time when this word referred only to a barricade 
set up in the road. With repeated use as the base term of metaphors such as 
Fear is a roadblock to success, however, roadblock has also come to refer 
to any obstacle to meeting a goal”   (2005: 198) 
Hence, they classify such instances as a different type of metaphor than 
conceptual metaphor, because the latter is not dependent of linguistic 
conventionalization and lexicalization. 
Glucksberg et al. (1997) offer an approach with a similar reasoning. The 
Attributive Categorization Discourse Model describes linguistic metaphors as 
“class-inclusion assertions” (1997: 52). They state that property matching 
between two domains mapped in metaphor does not account for the extraction 
of the relevant attributes. Especially in cases where the features of the target are 
not known, property matching does not work. Differences in realization of a 
property are highlighted and lead to distinctions of the domains rather than 
mapping. For example, “men are wolves” relies on the property of being 
predatory. Yet, the two concepts of “men” and “wolves” realize different types 
of (social and carnivorous) predation, a fact which cannot be clearly captured by 
property matching models (Bowdle & Gentner 2005: 6). Furthermore, when 
hearers are not familiar with, for example, “Andrew’s lecture” in “Andrew’s 
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lecture was a three-course dinner”, a matching cannot take place either. Rather, a 
property attribution process selects potentially fitting properties included in both 
domains, the source and the target. In the example just given, properties like 
“bountiful and sumptuous” (Glucksberg et al. 1997: 51) are assumed to 
constitute attributes of a higher category which comprises members like three-
course dinners and lectures, i.e. “things that come in large quantities and high 
quality” (1997: 52). Furthermore, they challenge the CMT by assuming existing 
structures whose similarities are reflected in these higher level categories. This 
means that abstract target domains are not dependent on the mappings. They do 
not need the conceptual structure of the source concept in lack of their own 
structure. Rather, both domains are understood as being members of a higher 
category which is linguistically exemplified by vocabulary of the concrete source 
domain. For example, “our marriage is a rollercoaster ride” is analyzed as a 
category-inclusion assertion: both, the source and the target, belong to the 
category of “exciting and/or scary situations”. A “rollercoaster ride” constitutes 
a literal referent – or linguistically ‘best example vocabulary’. Such concrete 
topics are well-known and easily retrieved from semantic memory, whereas 
conceptual metaphor meanings must be actively processed as mappings (Gibbs 
1992). In the attributive categorization model, the knowledge of the source 
facilitates access to the shared properties of both domains, so that the target is 
understood as an abstract member of the respective category. 
The approach explains linguistic metaphors as the two just given as 
examples as category-inclusion assertions and not as manifestations of 
conceptual metaphor. Additionally, McGlone (2007) suggests that cases where 
source and target are not taken from unrelated domains – as for example 
MARRIAGE and JOURNEY – but belong to related concepts, are also problematic 
when defined as conceptual metaphor realizations. For example, he questions 
the assumption of a conceptual metaphor STATES ARE LOCATIONS for 
forms like “he is in trouble”, because “being in a location is literally a type of 
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‘state’” (2007: 123). Consequently, the application of conceptual metaphor is 
assumed to be beyond its real scope. As a consequence, the notion of 
conceptual metaphor in figurative language creation and usage is not realized as 
the one and only mechanism.  
Although this approach offers a promising methodology, it must be kept 
in mind that the described data again do not match the Beaver forms 
investigated here. Still, the notion of category inclusion is applicable to 
metonymic structures linguistically manifested in a metaphorical fashion. 
Metonymic concepts are often realized with linguistic material prototypically 
related to different, concrete meanings. For example, “he was breathing fire” 
need not to be analyzed as manifestation of a conceptual metaphor (ANGER IS 
FIRE). Rather, the underlying metonymic structure HEAT FOR ANGER, more 
generally, EFFECT FOR CAUSE is processed due to tangible physiological 
experience. The Attributive Categorization Discourse Model (Glucksberg et al. 
1997) operates with “class-inclusion assertions” to deal with this aspect (see 
above). The linguistic manifestation exploits figurativity and exaggeration 
through usage of vocabulary prototypically linked to different, more concrete 
meanings. Extracting the conceptual aspect HEAT (see also ch.6) of the meaning 
of FIRE allows for category inclusion of both concepts, ANGER as well as FIRE, 
in a category of concepts comprising the features HEAT (and 
UNCONTROLLABILITY) in their structure. ANGER – despite its abstract character 
– perfectly suits into this category which consequently constitutes the domain 
matrix for the applied metonymy. 
Finally, I bring up an aspect which is not directly discussed by the 
approaches just mentioned. However, it is related to the CMT’s focus on 
conceptual structure as main reason for linguistic metaphor, a point indeed 
mentioned by the frameworks above. One main argument of conceptual 
metaphor theorists claims that metaphorically conceptualized abstract concepts 
do not have their own structure before adopting (parts of) the structure of the 
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source domain. Lakoff (2006 [1993]) refers to the relations between source and 
target domains as correspondences which “permit us to reason about” (2006 
[1993]: 191) the target. He claims that the “the mapping is primary, in that it 
sanctions the use of source domain language” (2006 [1993]: 192). Since the 
correspondences are said to map parts of the target and source structures onto 
one another, the existence of some kind of structure on the part of the target 
must be assumed. Notwithstanding, conceptual metaphor theorists state that 
“they are not clearly enough delineated in their own terms to satisfy the 
purposes of our day-to-day functioning” (Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 118), and 
“none of them can be fully comprehended on their own terms” (177). Kövecses 
(2010) is even more explicit: 
Try to imagine the goal, choice, difficulty, or progress aspect of love 
without making use of the journey domain. Can you think of the goal of a 
love relationship without at the same time thinking of trying to reach a 
destination at the end of a journey? Can you think of the progress made in 
a love relationship without at the same time imagining the distance covered 
in a journey? Can you think of the choices made in a love relationship 
without thinking of choosing a direction in a journey? The difficulty of 
doing this shows that the target of love is not structured independently of 
and prior to the domain of journey. (Kövecses 2010: 9) 
Thus, the CMT allots concrete domains to abstract ones due to low or lack 
of structure on the part of the concept to be communicated. For emotions, this 
means that speech communities conventionalized specific transfers from 
concrete domains like CONTAINER or JOURNEY to counterbalance the at best 
fragmentary conceptual architecture of, for example, LOVE or ANGER. Two 
things attract attention here. First, the examples for concrete domains are very 
generic and schematic, calling for a prototypical example from a more specific 
level (see ch. 3.2.1.2.) for substantiation. Being the case, this challenges the main 
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reason postulated for the usage of e.g. the domain CONTAINER at all, i.e. the 
need for concrete substance. Such general concepts like JOURNEY show 
schematic – abstract in one sense – features filled up or complemented via more 
specific instances or tokens (Croft & Cruse 2004: 199), i.e. they need elaboration 
in the linguistic manifestations. 
Second, in the body part idioms discussed here, the directionality from 
concrete to abstract is not clear, at least concerning one part of the whole 
expression: the body parts applied are conceptualized as SEATS OF EMOTIONS. 
Body parts in their basic or prototypical meanings are concrete entities, i.e. 
physical objects. These concepts are transferred to and used as something less 
concrete containing non-physical, abstract phenomena like emotions or 
personality traits. In mappings like LOVE IS A JOURNEY, JOURNEY is not 
abstracted to express the target, on the contrary it enables a description of LOVE 
on more concrete grounds. The concept JOURNEY is neither highlighted nor 
modified. In the emotion terms discussed here, specific conceptual aspects of 
the body part terms included are focused on. For example, SEAT OF EMOTION 
constitutes a part of the conceptual network of “heart”. Being the case, a 
domain matrix is established allowing for metonymic constructions. Hence, the 
notion of semantic and conceptual networks including these aspects allows for a 
continuity view instead of the division of these features as completely different 
domains. 
To sum up the last section, conceptual metaphor as underlying cognitive 
mechanism still gains high relevance in metaphor processing and 
comprehension. As a mental strategy, conceptual metaphor relies on experiential 
correlations and is therefore tightly linked to the embodiment hypothesis. 
Conceptual metaphor inheres in our cognitive system and is activated in 
language use, but not affected by it nor by language-specific structures. The 
approaches and models presented above discuss the importance of the CMT 
findings to various degrees and modify certain assumption on grounds of 
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empirical investigations. The relationship between conceptual and linguistic 
metaphors is focused on in many of the approaches, since it is realized that 
conceptual metaphor need not to be the only mechanism underlying figurative 
language. Linguistic structures, language-specific patterns and other 
(encyclopedic and socio-cultural) knowledge types are included in linguistic 
metaphors. The inclusion of these factors allow for a coherent description of the 
forms and functions of linguistic metaphors and their comprehension. In 
addition, language use, conventionalization and lexicalization are emphasized as 
playing an important role besides cognitive structures. 
3.5. BASIC EMOTIONS: 
LINGUISTIC & COGNITIVE EVIDENCE 
Since one of the topics in this work are emotions and their linguistic 
expressions, this section introduces some relevant aspects in relation to the 
conception of emotion. The domain of emotions is a field often discussed in 
cognitive linguistics. Their abstract character and the absence of direct access to 
mental states or activities in general keeps investigations dependent on the 
indirect approach to language, verbalization of feelings, etc. Ungerer (1995) 
discusses several approaches to define basic emotions on the basis of 
physiological and mental effects and experiences, again linguistically expressed 
and described. Besides (cognitive) linguists such as Lakoff and Kövecses, 
especially psychologists try to define emotions, to extract basic emotions, and to 
get an overall picture of how emotions are experienced by individuals. While the 
mentioned linguists are more interested in the linguistic manifestations of 
emotional concepts, and in revealing “the ‘distinguishing potential’ of the 
metaphorical and metonymic expressions” (Ungerer 1995: 186), psychologists 
focus on a definition of emotions as such. For both, language constitutes the 
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entrance point24, so that an incorporation of all results must be aspired to in 
order to approximate an understanding of the abstract domain of inner states. 
Additionally, for linguistics and psychology, researchers’ intuitions play an 
important role in selecting the emotions under discussion. 
In emotional psychology, the idea of defining basic emotions has resulted 
in lists of two up to eleven basic concepts in the last decades. Currently, a list of 
ca. six basic emotions is widely accepted (SADNESS, ANGER, DISGUST & HATE, 
FEAR, LOVE & DESIRE, HAPPINESS & JOY). The list presented in Ungerer is based 
on investigations of natural language data including metaphors and metonymies. 
Additionally, personal reports and statements extracted from interviews are 
evaluated. This approach follows Ungerer’s statement that: 
To provide a comprehensive description of these basic emotions both the 
conventionalized metaphors and metonymies of cognitive linguistics and 
the statements collected by experimental psychology should be taken into 
account. (1995: 188) 
This hypothesis is kept despite the fact that there exist contradictions 
between features ascribed to one emotion, and as a whole, the definitions are 
not very precise, leaving space for vagueness. However, since this is far from 
atypical concerning concepts and conceptual models, the descriptions of the 
consultants constitute important data and are evaluated as intensively as 
possible. 
The data of the investigations discussed in Ungerer vary in length and 
form, but are still comparable. All describe physiological and mental experiences 
of emotions, either in metaphoric or metonymic conventionalized expressions 
                                               
24  In psychology, facial expressions are additional and important objects of investigation. 
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(Kövecses 1990), or in sentences or phrases characterizing behavior exhibited in 
connection with specific emotions (Davitz 1969, Shaver et al. 1987).25 
As a result, basic emotions show relevance and salience for speakers, 
visible in the numerous descriptions given. Additionally, one single overall 
concept of emotion is supposed, which suits the known characteristics of a 
reduced conceptual structure in relation to the basic level concepts which 
provide for a detailed definition of this superordinate emotional concept. 
The basic emotions differ in the scope of physiological effects, and their 
usages for linguistic expressions. Where physiological experiences are not 
available in a sufficient amount, psychological statements are found in an 
increased number. They compensate for this gap in the conceptual structure to 
guarantee “an adequate description even where there is a shortage of specific 
physiological statements” (Ungerer 1995: 195). 
What is important here is the fact that such statements and conceptual and 
linguistic metaphors fall into place remarkably well. In the case of physiological 
statements, this underlines the hypothesis that conceptual metaphors developed 
from conceptual metonymies, which are close to what the statements express, 
e.g. “increase of body heat” for ANGER, with linguistic manifestations like “you 
make my blood boil”. But when one evaluates the psychological statements and 
the conceptual metaphors linked to the corresponding emotion, the 
relationships change: here, the metaphors do not perform a supportive function 
anymore, but demonstrate their concept-creating potentials.  
The co-operation of linguistic data and speakers’ statements implies that 
speakers’ metalinguistic discussions include important insights into the realized 
relations between language and emotion. The combination of linguistic survey of 
the existing constructions and evaluation of metalinguistic statements about 
                                               
25  Parts of the statements were judged by other consultants according to the accessibility of 
the intended emotion. 
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these forms offers a high potential for a detailed description and comprehension 
of such parts of mental lexicons. This is the case despite the ‘cultural model 
glasses’ speakers wear in cases of conventionalized ways to talk about the world. 
From another point of view, psycholinguists and neurolinguists try to gain 
access to mental activities, to illuminate the huge topic of inner states and 
emotions: e.g. what is ‘love’? Is it an evolutionary development of hormonal and 
neuronal methods to ensure survival and reproduction? Do we ‘love’ our 
children because this feeling is needed to guarantee that a parent will take care of 
her/his offspring as long as it is needed to spread her/his genes? If this is the 
case, is this a conscious reality? Or is it more important that we are ‘victims’ of 
our physical machinery making us ‘feel love’ for others without ever accessing 
the concept of ‘selfish genes’? As long as there is no definition of the underlying 
physical processes, the description of (socio-cultural) concepts and linguistic 
manifestations will be a temporary one, and will probably have to be modified 
when deeper insights into emotions and the mind are available. This does not 
mean that we should stop investigating language in relation to this domain, but it 
should be kept in mind that we are just at the beginning of comprehension, and 
that improved methods and hypotheses will arise over the next years. 
 
The specifics and complexities of the constructions discussed here reflect 
the complex and abstract phenomena of emotions, personality traits and related 
mental states. Figurative expressions of emotion like the Beaver forms constitute 
specific data: polysemous structures of body part terms are seldom portrayed in 
theoretical discussions. Additionally, the second level investigated here – the 
expressions of emotion containing the figurative usages of the body part terms – 
does not constitute patterns which are regularly included in the alternative 
frameworks and their findings. Research on such forms most often is based on 
the CMT and is consistent with the theory, as the examples in the next 
paragraphs show. In most cases English structures are investigated, although 
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studies in other languages are also available. The target SEAT OF EMOTION is 
found in many of the language-specific investigations. Body parts are cross-
linguistically realized as containers for emotions and related psychological 
phenomena. The conceptual metaphors at lower levels in the hierarchical 
organized systems show variation, while the central and primary metaphors are 
identical with those defined by the CMT (for example, ANGER IS PRESSURE 
IN A CONTAINER, HAPPY IS UP). However, for example, Deignan and 
Potter (2004) also realize some shortcomings which they identified in their 
empirical work. 
Maalej (2004) explores “figurative language in anger expressions in 
Tunisian Arabic” in the CMT and concentrates on embodied structures in 
relation to cultural aspects of experience. Expressions like haraq-l-i dam-i “he 
made my blood burn” and 3saab-i filtit min-ni “my nerves let me down” are 
described as manifestations of the conceptual metaphors ANGER IS THE 
HEAT OF FLUID IN A CONTAINER and NERVES AS A CONTAINER 
FOR ANGER.  
Yu (2002, 2009) offers complex descriptions of Chinese expressions of 
emotions containing body part terms. He consistently applies the CMT for the 
manifold applications of various body organs like gallbladder, liver and spleen: 
for example, fa pi-qi “loose one’s temper; get angry; flare up (lit. expand spleen-
gas)” as manifestation of the conceptual metaphor ANGER IS FIRE and 
ANGER IS HOT GAS IN A CONTAINER (Yu 2002: 350).  
Deignan and Potter (2004) apply the CMT in their cross-corpus study, and 
discuss the combination of metaphor and metonymy as underlying conceptual 
structures of body-mind-mappings in a study of English and Italian. In addition, 
they acknowledge the relevance of cultural and linguistic structures for metaphor 
realization, i.e. their analysis goes beyond embodied experience and the related 
conceptual metaphors. Their results reveal that “conceptual metaphor theory 
may not be able to offer a predictive framework for the description of non-
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literal language, although it certainly provides a convincing explanation” (2004: 
1251). This appraisal refers on the one hand to the limited findings of coherent 
networks around one conceptual metaphor. On the other hand, variations in the 
linguistic realizations are not explicable within the CMT, i.e. “by a 
straightforward mapping of one semantic field onto another” (Deignan & Potter 
2004: 1250).  
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4. BEAVER & THE DATA 
4.1. BEAVER 
The Beaver language belongs to a Northern branch of the Athabaskan 
language family. It is an endangered First Nation language in British Columbia 
and Alberta, and is still spoken in six different reserves by some 150 people. The 
youngest speakers are in their thirties, but most of the younger generations did 
not learn this language as their mother tongue. Many of the speakers who 
collaborated in the DoBeS Beaver Project are elders about sixty years and older. 
Most of the few publications on Beaver concentrate on the dialects of 
British Columbia, the first records are manuals of devotion and primers by 
Garrioch (1886, 1885). Jean and Marshall Holdstock created pedagogical 
materials of Doig River (Central) Beaver in the 1980s. Altogether, the statement 
of Goddard from 1917 still fits the Beaver description situation: “Of all the 
Athapascan languages of the north that of the Beaver Indians has been most 
neglected.” (Goddard 1917: 403). In the last years, Story (1989), Randoja (1990), 
Miller (2003) and Schwiertz (2009) – works on phonological and phonetic, but 
also morphological aspects of the Beaver dialects – were published. Krauss 
(2006) is an annotated bibliography of the Beaver language from the first 
sources up to now. 
 
The Beaver First Nations are bi- or multilingual26 in Beaver and English. 
English is the dominant language in the area, and Beaver is nowadays seldom 
used in everyday life. Both languages comprise figurative expressions which 
                                               
26  Many Beaver speakers also speak other neighboring indigenous languages, e.g. Slavey 
(Athabascan), Cree (Algonquian), Sekani (Athabascan).  
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differ in their forms, concepts, and usages, but also show similarities in some 
areas. In the documentation project, English is the metalanguage throughout all 
sessions with the speakers of this highly endangered language. 
As hunter-gatherers, the Beaver traditionally lived in nomadic bands 
consisting of small families, and met in larger groups in summer time (Ridington 
1981). Today, the Beaver Indians live and farm on the reserves, but still use 
some of their trap lines. Besides used as sources of food, these activities are also 
realized as a way to maintain their identity. Elders share their skills with younger 
generations, and their way of learning and teaching reflects the ideology of self-
governed and autonomous individuals. Hence, knowledge is often handed down 
in narrative form, and first-hand experience plays a very important role. 
Learning is not linked to following explicit and direct instructions. 
4.2. THE CORPUS 
The Beaver language comprises four dialects spoken in British Columbia 
and Northern Alberta in Canada: Northern Alberta Beaver, Southern Beaver 
(extinct), Central Beaver and Low marked Beaver, the last three all spoken in 
British Columbia. The data of this work reflects the Northern Alberta Beaver 
dialect spoken at the Beaver First Nations at Child’s Lake and Boyer River. 
About 25 people still speak Beaver there, the youngest are about 50 years old. 
The corpus is archived at the MPI Nijmegen(NL) as part of the DoBeS 
program of the VW Foundation. It mostly consists of elicitations and narratives. 
In addition, procedurals of traditional activities were recorded and well-
established stimuli were used to obtain further data, for example map tasks and 
several of the stimulus materials of the MPI Nijmegen. Naturalistic data was 
hardly available, because the Beaver people increasingly use English in everyday 
life.  
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I predominantly used elicitation sessions with adequate topics like 
emotions, metaphors, affection and body parts. Some of the sessions were 
prepared on purpose for this this work, so that additional forms were included 
and doubtful ones were rechecked. Furthermore, tokens found in the narratives 
provided important evidence for the usage of the figurative expressions 
described here.  
4.3. METALINGUISTIC AWARENESS OF SPEAKERS 
Speakers’ access to and comprehension of linguistic forms and their 
meanings is included and discussed in this thesis as additional data to gain a 
deeper insight into the meaning and conceptual structures of the described parts 
of the mental lexicon. Metalinguistics and folk linguistics as methodological 
tools to investigate speakers’ awareness rely on the ability of speakers to realize 
or identify words or phrases as composed of a form and a meaning, to discuss 
these two sides in isolation as well as in relation to each other and to infer 
underlying conceptualizations. The competence in accessing one’s own language 
and to consciously talk about specific aspects of meaning is expressed in 
statements and considerations which were recorded in the elicitation sessions. 
 
In general, a fundamental knowledge domain concentrates on the relations 
between and across meanings. These are also defined as consequences of the 
way humans conceptualize the world around them, and hence how lexicons are 
organised. They are often considered in linguistic investigations of the lexicon, 
since, for example, synonymy, antonymy and hyponymy constitute some of the 
most basic relations found between lexical forms. Language users are aware of 
the fact that “meanings evoke each other across lexical forms” (Frawley 2005), 
and are able to explain that, for example, (near) synonyms have the same 
meaning by substituting them in a context without or only slightly changing the 
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meaning of the whole expression or utterance. Intuition also includes knowledge 
about the compositionality of lexical meanings: in order to understand the whole 
one has to know and to understand the components as well as the combinatory 
rules and which conceptual components are utilized in the diverse senses of the 
lexical material. This processing again goes hand in hand with the principle of 
economy of language. The question here is how can we restrict rules and forms, 
how can we restrict the amount of possible constructions and therefore 
meanings? The notion of grammatical meaning plays an important role, and 
speakers in a speech community also show intuitions – rooted in the 
understanding of the principle of compositionality – of grammatical meaning, 
and hence relate recurring forms to specific semantic patterns. 
There are some essential differences between folk linguistics and the 
science of linguistics as linguists are involved in researching the function and 
role of the language under discussion, as well as the coherence and uniformity of 
descriptional models. One difference between linguistic and folk models, is the 
relation speakers have to their language, and the function they apply to it, 
namely first and foremost to communicate, thus realizing language not as an 
abstracted system of rules and patterns, but as a means of communication. 
Listening to the explanations of native speakers concerning meanings in their 
language, one important aspect appears over and over again: the function of all 
words and forms expressed is to communicate within a community. For 
example, statements like “you have to say which animal, so that they will 
understand you” in elicitation sessions dealing with “crawl (walk on four legs)”, 
and asking for “they are crawling”, demonstrate that language for speakers is 
first and foremost a means of communication, not only a purely logical and 
formal structure with rules for correct usage. This is a point often made clear by 
the Beaver speakers, who always link meanings to their usage in communication, 
and who explain meanings through their contexts. Speakers hesitate or hold off 
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when a word is taken out of its context and asked for its meaning without its 
collocation or its usual entourage. 
Linguists, on the other hand, do not mainly participate in this particular 
function of the language under description, and they do not highlight this aspect. 
Rather, they concentrate on the structures and forms, and how these work 
together to constitute the medium or system ‘language’. Accordingly, there are 
discrepancies between the focus of researchers and speakers. While linguists 
look for formal parallels or differences, relations to semantically similar terms 
unconsciously come to speakers’ minds, and thus, their analogous functions in 
related contexts, again highlighting the communicative aspects. This means, 
while for linguists a sentence like “I hunt” evoke the co-text of, for example, 
paradigms or TAM structures, for speakers, the form triggers concepts like 
“game”, “trap line”, “bush”, etc. 
Similarly, while linguists are interested in (whole) verb paradigms in order 
to describe this part of the language, speakers intuitively concentrate on first or 
third person singular and first person plural forms, since these are the most basic 
ones and are used most often in natural communication or narratives. Similarly, 
in everyday life situations, speakers seldom use expressions describing what their 
communication partner does, i.e. construing utterances with second person 
subjects (e.g. “you go to the city”, “you eat”). Reflecting the Beaver concept of 
humans as self-autonomous individuals not to be governed by others, and also 
not to interfere or intervene in the actions of others (Mills 1986), paradigm 
instances of second person forms are most often given in question form (e.g. 
“do you go to the city?”, “are you eating?”). 
Context is one of the most important features for speakers (see ch. 2.1.2.). 
The embeddedness of an utterance is crucial for its meaningfulness, and 
therefore essential in order to make sense, and this is paralleled with 
grammaticality in the speakers’ concept of language use. If missing a context, 
speakers’ access to such forms and meanings is restricted, since the triggering 
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aspects of language as a communication tool are missing. It is wrong to define 
such (interim) gaps as lost knowledge on the parts of the speakers. Instead, 
giving appropriate contexts in which the relevant form can be naturally 
embedded, facilitates finding the right words.  
Also related to diverse perspectives on language, is the fact that linguistics 
is based on a constant point of view, on one as coherent as possible notion of 
language, while language users do not insist on such a fixed and rigid idea of 
how language is defined or how it works. Their relation to language allows for 
varying perspectives, depending on the situation and context. As was already 
discussed in chapter 2.1., folk organizations include more than one model, 
explanation, or classification, due to the fact that the real world better resembles 
a chaotic mass of entities and actions to be handled and understood, and – as 
essentially opposed to scientific approaches to a topic – this has to be coped 
with immediately, in the situation of experience or communication of that 
experience. 
Additionally, there is no need to seek approaches that will resolve the 
problem of inconsistencies between what people say and what they do. This 
aspect is realized as reflecting the real and natural behavior of people. 
Inconsistencies that occur between what people say consciously, and how they 
unconsciously act must be understood as a typically human imperfection of 
reflecting one’s own actions in a consistent and uniform way. Every one of us 
fails to act perfectly according to the theoretical assumptions we might 
intensively advocate in conscious behavior and speech. As we are aware of this, 
metalinguistic statements can provide relevant data and knowledge to support 
theoretical assumptions. 
In the Beaver documentation project, a huge part of the data was recorded 
in elicitation sessions. The Beaver language is no longer intensively used in 
everyday and speakers do not speak Beaver unsolicited with persons who do not 
know this language. Consequently, English was used as the metalanguage in the 
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sessions and as a communication tool between the Beaver speakers and the 
researchers. Natural language data was collected in the form of stories and 
procedurals of different kinds from various domains, for example, hunting, 
food, handiwork, etc. The story collection contains traditional stories as well as 
historical and biographical narratives. Another point worth mentioning is the 
availability of recordings of the complete sessions, i.e. with all (correct and less 
correct) Beaver forms, hesitations and discussions. In some speech communities 
of endangered languages, language ideologies lead to a more restricted regulation 
of what might be recorded and published27. Here, the concepts of performance 
and competence play an important role: speakers realize the difference between 
natural language in discourse and consciously produced and pronounced 
linguistic forms. In combination with an often lower status of the native 
language in relation to dominant (e.g. national) languages, speakers try to 
establish a picture of a perfect speech community with perfect knowledge and 
usage of their native language. For the purpose of this thesis, the inclusion of 
metalinguistic statements and discussions about potential meanings and 
underlying conceptualizations constitute data highly valuable and are examined 
for the interpretation of the different senses of body part terms. 
The data used in this thesis is a combination of all available collections and 
genres just mentioned, although the most important parts are taken from 
elicitation sessions on the appropriate semantic topics. The selection of the data 
first concentrated on the body parts terms and then on the idiomatic 
constructions for emotion expressions including these forms. Partially, these 
sessions were explicitly recorded for this thesis to recheck and validate forms.28 
                                               
27 Personal communication with other DoBeS team researchers. 
28 The whole corpus can be found at http://www.mpi.nl/DOBES/projects/beaver and 
http://corpus1.mpi.nl/ds/imdi_browser/?openpath=MPI79025%23. I would like to thank Gabriele 
Schwiertz and Dagmar Jung for the special elicitation sessions on emotions. 
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4.4. BEAVER METALINGUISTIC DATA 
The network organization of a mental lexicon is verified by speaker 
intuitions about the organization of lexical semantic structure. Intuitions are 
reliable concerning some specific aspects of meaning structure, and the 
assignment of meanings to forms is one kind of knowledge speakers of a 
language possess. They can readily assess which information is specifically 
included in a lexical unit, and which does not belong to the (truth) value of a 
meaning, but constitutes more additional, variable modification. For example, 
the classificatory verbs in Beaver include specific, grammaticalized information 
about their arguments without the need to explicitly mention the entities or the 
specific properties referred to, while English translations obligatorily have to 
explicitly put in words, for example, the object in order to capture all meaning 
aspects implicit in the Beaver form. Furthermore, knowledge about meaning 
shift and transmission is at work in decisions about which items with the same 
forms show interrelated meanings (polysemy situation), and which are realized as 
showing only formal similarities while they re connected to completely different 
concepts (homonymy situation).  
What is of special interest in this thesis, is the accessibility of literal 
meanings of lexical forms in non-literal or figurative usages. Literal meanings 
constitute salient information for the understanding of the organization of the 
mental lexicon and provide a first step to an examination of conceptual 
structure. For example, the idiom sadzé̲éʼ xááts ̲ʼat “I am angry (lit. my heart falls 
out)” is always explained against its literal meaning, i.e. “my heart falls out”. The 
notion of literal meanings provided by speakers is not to be equated with access 
to the corresponding conceptual links between literal and idiomatic meanings, 
which are more complicated to access. Still, what seems to be crucial for 
speakers to mention is the literal meaning of the single components included in 
such an idiom. The literal meaning is not the intended meaning, but it is too 
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active in processing to be ignored, and therefore at least worth mentioning for 
the speakers. That means that the literal meaning must not be focused on or 
consciously processed in speech. However, especially in elicitation situations, it 
is available if needed. Furthermore, such constructions are predestined to be 
consciously processed due to their figurativity and creativity (Dirven 2003). 
Access to underlying conceptualizations and conceptual mappings needed 
for the identification of lexical ambiguity is difficult to extract and rather 
restricted for quite abstract structures: for example, the form sįdyíge ghǫ́lįį “I 
am happy” could be an instance of the orientational conceptual metaphor 
HAPPY IS UP, since a (possible) interpretation of the literal meaning is “I am 
up” (cf. yídyíge “up there”). However, this mapping is not available for the 
speakers, and in combination with the lack of established etymological, historical 
and socio-cultural knowledge of such conceptualizations in Beaver this 
hypothesis cannot be verified or consolidated. However, although conceptual 
structure is not directly accessed or discussed, some statements and intuitions 
allow for inferences about how underlying conceptualization is organized. 
Differences in the conceptual makeup of similar linguistic realizations can be 
recognized on the basis of differing comments on the lexical form, and 
reoccurring explanation patterns for abstract meanings give hints concerning 
semantic and conceptual networks. 
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5. BODY PART TERMS IN THE BEAVER LEXICON 
In chapter 3, CMT was described and critically discussed as theoretical 
framework for figurative language and the relation to conceptual structure. In 
the following chapter, specific Beaver data is in focus, more precisely, the 
following body part terms are presented:  
 
Beaver body part term Translation 
-zí̲s ̲ skin / hide 
-ẕáá mouth 
-įįdyíí mind 
-tsí̱í head 
-dzagé / -dzii ear / inner ear 
-dzé̲é heart 
Table 5.1.: Body part terms 
All Beaver idiomatic expressions discussed here must be carefully analyzed 
in terms of their components and as complete constructions. The theoretical 
specifications and hypotheses made in the CMT suit some parts of the linguistic 
forms in question, but are not applicable to others, and to the overall picture 
these idioms present. The conceptual transfer of the organ HEART – and several 
other body parts plus MIND – to SEAT OF EMOTION allows for a conceptual 
metaphor analysis in a weaker sense, favoring a gradual transition. Similarly, the 
predicates used as well as the whole constructions provide features which are 
problematic for some of the theoretical assumptions. 
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In the following section, several Beaver lexical items are described and 
analyzed in relation to their semantic and conceptual networks including 
conventionalized senses and usages. It is exactly these networks which constitute 
– as a whole – the conventional meaning of linguistic form. Such networks are 
defined as encyclopedic in scope. Therefore, they include information and 
knowledge on different levels, linguistic as well as non-linguistic. The Beaver 
words will be related to all of their occurrences in the lexicon, many of which are 
compounds or other complex forms. In addition, they are as well linked to the 
domains and frames relevant for the meanings involved. Besides these 
conceptual parameters, linguistic aspects reveal differences in constructions, 
means of extensions (especially metonymy), and allow for a systematic 
description of figurativity in the Beaver lexicon. 
Transferred, non-literal meanings come to existence – and later are 
conventionalized – in specific contexts, where ontological aspects further new 
meanings to arise. Economy and organization of language favor modulation of 
existing structures above creating completely new units. Therefore, new 
meanings in known forms have their cognitive/conceptual basis at a different 
abstraction level than basic and prototypical meanings. The new meanings 
include differently focused semantic and conceptual input than, for example, 
“heart” as concrete body part, which is based on concrete referents in the world 
in a more direct style.  
In the case of emotions or personality traits, their abstract values cannot 
be based on direct perception or concrete experience descriptions, as e.g. visual 
experiences. Instead, a combination of embodiment, cultural models, and 
meaning modulation allows for non-literal expressions for abstract entities and 
concepts. Embodiment offers two types of bodily made experiences: first, 
physiological effects known in connection with emotions are used in a 
metonymic fashion to express the less accessible overall concept of, for example, 
ANGER (e.g. INCREASED BODY TEMPERATURE FOR ANGER) or 
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EXCITEMENT (e.g. INCREASED HEARTBEAT FOR EXCITEMENT). 
Second, for less available target concepts two methods are linguistically applied: 
a) body part concepts are expanded and the conceptualization as SEAT OF 
EMOTION is established; b) linguistic material of concrete concepts is used in 
cases where similarities are realized between these concrete concepts and the 
abstract targets. The results are non-prototypical, figurative usages of the 
linguistic material. The crucial point here is that this usage is based on 
conceptual aspects shared by both concepts. This means neither that a take-over 
of the concrete concept’s structure is carried out, nor that the two domains – i.e. 
the concrete source and the abstract target – are completely unrelated. Rather, 
due to the focus of shared conceptual aspects, continuity plays a role in such 
conceptualizations and usages of linguistic material. 
How this will be done in detail depends on the combination of cultural 
models influencing conceptual as well as linguistic patterns in a speech 
community. For example, body part idioms expressing emotions – if such a 
pattern is established in a language – may be metaphorical or metonymic in 
nature. They may show restrictions according to some culturally based taboo or 
may be realized as individual networks based on real or socio-cultural similarity 
or contiguity associations. 
In order to describe and analyze meanings and concepts in the Beaver 
language, the network model introduced by Langacker (1987, 2000) and 
modified by Taylor (2000) will be used. This approach to meanings, lexical 
items, polysemy, and conceptualization has the advantage of visualizing 
meanings, as well as relations between these, their lexical forms, and underlying 
domains. All this is done in coherence to and adaptation of the conceptual 
structure of meaning networks. 
Words are defined as ‘access points to cognitive information’, so that the 
methodology of the present thesis suits this notion: the starting points are 
linguistic forms found in the lexicon. Ethnographic as well as conceptual 
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knowledge is available in a limited amount or style, while the existing data allows 
for intensive investigation in the framework. Pragmatic and encyclopedic 
knowledge as relevant for the mental lexicon and the organization and 
comprehension of meanings of lexical items are also taken into account. 
The lexical units are arranged according to their numerous senses and in 
relation to their semantic domain(s). Also, they are organized according to 
semantic domains in which senses other than the prototypical one are involved. 
The results are complex networks, in which we can visualize the cognitive links 
that hold between various senses of a linguistic unit and between semantic 
domains. 
Before body part terms included in emotion and personality traits 
expressions are described and discussed, the Beaver lexeme -zí̲s ̲“skin/hide” is 
presented. This form is not used for the abstract concepts of emotions and 
personality traits. Rather, it constitutes a complex conceptual and semantic 
network with usages in different, often concrete domains frequently employed in 
the Beaver language. The network exemplifies the complexities of conceptual 
ingredients in meaning and how these are extracted and highlighted for 
additional senses. Furthermore, the relevance of experiences and cultural models 
influencing the semantic and conceptual structure is reflected. 
5.1. -ẕís ̲“SKIN, HIDE” 
-zí̲s ̲“skin/hide” is an inalienable noun, i.e. it obligatorily requires an overt 
possessor marker to constitute a grammatical word. The non-possessed form -
zí̲s ̲is not a complete unit, and is therefore not accepted by Beaver speakers as a 
word. For the purposes here, the bare stem -zí̲s ̲– as all other body part terms in 
the following chapters – will be used as the default form to avoid additional 
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translations, while the dash indicates that this is not a free standing form nor a 
complete notion.29 
The examples (14)-(34) show all types of -zí̲s ̲ found in the corpus. The 
literal translations in this list given in parenthesis reproduce the literal meanings 
of the forms as translated and expressed by the Beaver speakers. Accordingly, 
some of the translations deviate from the (literal) lexical meanings of the 
individual parts as given in the rest of this thesis: 
 
(14) sa  -zí̲s ̲  “my skin” 
 1sg.poss. -skin 
(15) a-zí̲s ̲    “hide” (lit. its hide) 
 indef.sg.poss.-skin 
(16) sadeeʼ  azí̲s ̲  “eyelid” (lit. my eye its skin / cover) 
 1sg.poss.-eye indef.sg.poss.-skin 
 
(17) a-zí̲s ̲     “canvas” (lit. its skin) 
 3sg.indef.poss.-skin 
(18) agayáás  azi̲zéʼ   “factory hide” (lit. white man’s hide) 
 white.person 3sg.indef.poss.-skin-poss. 
(19) a-zí̲s ̲   ni ̨í ̨́ʼíí  “teepee” (lit. its hide it is standing) 
 indef.sg.poss.-skin be.positioned 
(20) a-zí̲s ̲   xoichʼuge “teepee” (lit. its hide it is pointy) 
indef.sg.poss.-skin be.pointy 
(21) ts ̲ʼ ih  -zí̲s ̲   “mosquito net” (lit. mosquito skin) 
 mosquito -skin 
 
                                               
29  In the case of -zí̲s ̲ the difference between the possessed and non-possessed form is not 
that obvious, since the morphological pattern of possession in Beaver (POSS-lexeme-é’ or POSS-
Phrase lexeme-é’) is fragmentary in the inalienable classes, or even non existent (G. Schwiertz, 
personal communication). 
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(22) satʼúdzéʼ -zí̲s ̲  “bra, brassiere” (lit. my breast cover / bag) 
 1sg.poss.breast-skin 
(23) sadzagéʼ -zí̲s ̲  “earmuffs” (lit. my ear cover) 
 1sg.poss-ear -skin 
 
(24) tyúú-zí̲s ̲   “amnion” (lit. water bag) 
 water-skin 
(25) tyúú-zí̲s ̲   “water bag” (lit. water bag) 
 water-skin 
(26) bwil -zí̲s ̲   “sleepyhead, late riser” (lit. sleep bag) 
 sleep -skin 
(27) xwei -zí̲s ̲   “backpack, bag” (lit. carry bag) 
 carry -skin 
(28) saladzeʼ -zí̲s ̲  “bladder” (lit. my urine bag) 
 1sg.poss.-urine-skin 
(29) lidyíí -zí̲s ̲   “tea bag” (lit. tea bag) 
 tea -skin 
(30) éhtʼoo -zí̲s ̲   “shellbag” (lit. shell bag) 
 shell -skin 
(31) kú -zí̲s ̲   “tobacco pouch” (lit. fire skin) 
 fire -skin 
(32) tlʼǫéédze -zí̲s ̲  “gallon” (lit. onion bag) 
 onion  skin 
(33) súúdagán -zí̲s ̲  “salt shaker” (lit. salt bag) 
 salt  -skin 
(34) ts ̲ʼáátl -zí̲s ̲   “moss diaper” (lit. moss bag) 
 moss -skin 
 
The meaning of a polysemous lexical item like -zí̲s ̲“skin/hide” includes all 
senses and usages found in the language (Langacker 1987). As will become clear, 
the senses and usages reflect several different starting or departure points from 
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the overall meaning “skin/hide”. Accordingly, they show varying semantic and 
conceptual distance from the basic meaning. Furthermore, diverse 
thematic/semantic frames and domains are linked to this semantic and 
conceptual network -zí̲s ̲“skin/hide” via the numerous usages. Only taking into 
account the usages of -zí̲s ̲ as “skin” or “hide”, the frame BODY (PART) is 
available and allows classification or embedding of this lexical item in the 
lexicon. This is also reflected in the knowledge and conceptualization of the 
speakers and therefore part of the mental lexicon. This picture shifts and 
increases in complexity when the frames related to the different senses in the 
network are incorporated. The whole structure is detected via investigation of 
the meanings and usages of -zí̲s ̲ “skin/hide” as well as via the analysis of the 
metalinguistic statements of the speakers with reference to literal meanings, 
contexts, and interpretations of the different forms. 
The definition and inclusion of such frames here is understood in relation 
to the meaning and usage of -zí̲s ̲ in these lexical and semantic contexts. 
Accordingly, concepts like HABITATION or INSECT REPELLENT in the cases of 
“teepee” and “mosquito net” respectively do come up in the speakers’ 
conceptualization of the individual terms. However, these are linked via 
encyclopedic knowledge of the referents, and not via the linguistic constructions, 
i.e. the lexical material does not explicitly evoke these domains. This does not 
mean that they are not part of the speakers’ concepts and knowledge, or that 
they are irrelevant for the overall picture of -zí̲s ̲ “skin/hide”. For example, the 
concept of HABITATION is linked via world knowledge to the notion of 
CONTAINMENT in meanings like “teepee” – houses and tents are forms of closed 
containers, dividing inside and outside. It is not connected through a linguistic 
relation in the Beaver language. Even though -zí̲s ̲ “skin/hide” would allow for 
linguistically referring to this frame – after all, -zí̲s ̲ is also used to highlight the 
concept CONTAINMENT, as will be shown below – speakers’ statements do not 
reveal any consciously realized connection when discussing the linguistic items. 
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In the Beaver language the usage of -zí̲s ̲“skin/hide” is not conventionalized to 
refer to teepees as containers, rather, both descriptive terms for “teepee” 
linguistically concentrate on the MATERIAL used for such habitations (see ch. 
5.2.2.). Similarly, the frame BODY (PART) would indeed manage to include the 
meanings tyúúzí̲s ̲“amnion (lit. water skin/hide)” and saladzeʼ -zi̲s ̲ “bladder (lit. 
urine skin/hide)”. Yet, the linking aspect is not the usage of -zí̲s ̲ – as will be 
shown in chapter 5.1.4. – but the referential meanings of these constructions, i.e. 
the referents of these terms: parts of a human or animal body. 
In conclusion, frames cognitively related to the referential meanings, but 
not linguistically established via the network, will be not further investigated. In 
the network discussed here, besides BODY PART (skin, hide, eyelid, amnion, 
bladder), the following frames are relevant for the individual senses: 
HABITATION (teepee), CLOTHS (brassiere, ear muffs), HUMAN CHARACTERISTICS 
(sleepyhead), CONTAINER (bags) and MEASURE (gallon).  
Concentrating on the thematic concepts motivated by the inclusion and 
usage of -zí̲s,̲ the following, more abstract and image-schematic concepts are 
worked out: BODY PART, MATERIAL, COVER, CONTAINER. 
In the following sections, these forms will be described and discussed 
according to these conceptual aspect highlighted in the forms. Besides the 
semantic analysis, the given translations and additional metalinguistic discussions 
of the speakers further reveal how they are extracted and used for further senses 
in the conceptual network of the lexical item -zí̲s ̲“skin/hide”. 
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5.1.1. -zí̲s ̲AS BODY PART 
5.1.1.1. SKIN, HIDE, EYELID 
The basic meaning in this network is “skin/hide”30, according to 
metalinguistic statements as well as to typological and ethnographic studies. 
These define the human body as one main domain of basic meanings, used for 
and transferred to concepts showing some kind of real or socio-culturally 
realized similarities, for example, body parts grammaticalized as locative or 
orientational terms like “up / down (head / foot)”, “front / back (face / back)” 
etc. (see Heine, Claudi & Hünnemeyer 1991, Hopper & Traugott 2003). 
The first forms sazí̲s ̲“my skin”, azí̲s ̲“its hide”, and azí̲s ̲“(its) canvas” do 
not differ in form, besides the possessive prefixes meaning ‘1sg.’ in “skin”, and 
‘indef.sg.’ in the other two. These prefixes refer to the differences of human vs. 
non-human and inanimate entities of which “skin” or “hide” or “canvas”32 are 
part of, or – linguistically – possessed by. Thus, these three can be defined as 
senses of one polysemous lexical item without requiring any further linguistic 
material. 
The term azí̲s ̲ “hide (lit. its skin/hide)” has a very high relevance and 
frequency in the Beaver language. This is not accidental, but rather intensively 
linked to the Beaver culture and to the traditional ways of life of this people in 
former times. Furthermore, the development of the usages and derived senses of 
-zí̲s ̲ “skin/hide” also mirror socio-cultural traditions and conventions. 
Ethnographic research reveals socio-cultural and historical experiences, e.g. the 
                                               
30 In English, the verb “to hide” is related, and both noun and verb are etymologically 
connected to the notion of “covering”. Accordingly, Old English “hide” would be the best term for 
describing the most basic meaning for the Beaver terms – since in modern English “skin” is 
conventionalized as term for ‘human hide’, the inclusion of both “skin/hide” will be used here. 
32 In this form, the possessive prefix seems completely lexicalized, no speaker explains the 
literal meaning in relation to possession, i.e. explicitly mention “its canvas”. 
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usage of hide as means for transportation of goods, the relevance of hide for 
traditional daily life (e.g. for teepees, clothes etc.) (Goddard 1996). This is a well-
known fact comprised in the embodiment hypothesis. Real-world and first-hand 
experiences are the starting points for realizations and classifications of the 
world and its phenomena, conceptually as well as linguistically (see ch. 3.1.2.). In 
the case of animals’ skin, the conceptualization changed quickly in relation to the 
skin of humans, which was never experienced in other ways than the inalienable 
part of the human body. Nor was there any active “artificial usage” of this body 
part. Although animal skin is also realized in parallel to human skin as a 
prototypical inalienable body part, the everyday life of the Beaver people led to a 
deviance from this concept. Especially moose and its hide was and partially still 
is an essential part of the Beaver life in terms of survival in general, and 
nutrition, clothes, bags and drums, habitation and transportation in particular. In 
the case of hide this means that the concept of the body part inalienably 
belonging to a living animal shifted to the thing one separates or divides from a 
hunted down game. Due to its substance and flexibility, hide was established 
throughout the world as an important material, just as in the Beaver culture. 
Thus, the concept of BODY (PART) forfeited more and more relevance, while the 
notion of MATERIAL increased its pertinence in the conceptualization of the 
referent due to its usage as such. The results are lexical items denoting e.g. 
“tepee” (two terms), “factory hide”, “mosquito net”. 
In a next step, the most relevant applications of the material hide – e.g. as 
cloth and means of transportation – gave rise to focus on the conceptual aspects 
COVER and CONTAINMENT. Consequently, in the semantic and conceptual 
network of “skin/hide” in Beaver, these conceptual aspects of the body parts are 
frequently used as highly relevant concepts. They constitute the starting points 
for a significant amount of the senses and usages of -zí̲s ̲ “skin/hide” in the 
mental lexicon. Lexicalized expressions referring to different “bags” were 
established, but also terms for “ear muffs” and “brassiere”. 
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5.1.1.2. EYELID 
The term for eyelid, sadeeʼ zí̲s ̲“eyelid (lit. my eyes’ skin)” is translated as 
“skin of my eye(s)” according to its literal meaning, therefore highlighting the 
prototypical meaning of -zí̲s ̲ “skin/hide” as BODY PART. Alternatively, this 
construction is translated following the conceptualizations of -zí̲s ̲ as COVER: 
“cover of my eye(s)” (see also ch. 5.1.3.), highlighting the function of this part 
more than its substance. Both aspects – BODY PART and COVER – are extracted 
from the conceptual structure of the basic meaning “skin/hide”. 
5.1.2. -zí̲s ̲AS MATERIAL 
5.1.2.1. TEEPEES 
The construction azí̲s ̲xoichʼuge “teepee (lit. pointy hide)” consists of the 
inalienable noun under discussion here, and a stative verb chuuk meaning “be 
pointy”. The form describes a teepee in a metonymic fashion, focusing on the 
form of the container, concretely, on the outer tent part which makes up the 
design of a teepee as a whole. The general metonymy PART FOR WHOLE is 
used here, which can be further specified as (OUTER) SHAPE FOR ENTITY. 
The linguistic results are bound to language-specific and socio-cultural 
conventions concerning the parts literally used and the types of construction. 
The Beaver language employs several patterns of metonymy regularly used to 
denote entities in the world. The token under description here is classified as 
conjunctive metonymy of the first, non-figurative subclass. Although this 
construction can be used to communicate the literal meaning as intended 
meaning, i.e. “pointy hide” in an appropriate context, the form-meaning pair 
azí̲s ̲ xoichʼuge “tepee (lit. its pointy hide)” is conventionalized in the Beaver 
language. Thus, when asked for the meaning of azí̲s ̲xoichʼuge without context, 
speakers refer to “teepee” in the first place, and do not simply translate the 
literal meaning as “pointy hide” without selecting the specific referent “teepee” 
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in the world. The literal meaning “pointy hide” is extended and conventionalized 
to “teepee”, so that a lasting meaning shift exists (as opposed to linear 
metonymy, see also ch. 3.3.). 
Since the form of teepees indeed is pointy and the material is hide, the 
distance between the literal meaning and the intended referent is not far enough 
to evoke figurativity. Instead, both meanings can be located in juxtaposition on a 
continuity scale, objectively as well as culturally. Objectively in meant in the 
sense that someone who knows a teepee can reconstruct and understand the 
relation that holds between the notion of a “pointy hide” and teepee. Thus, the 
conceptual aspects SHAPE and MATERIAL of a teepee are reflected in the 
linguistic form “pointy hide”: chuuk “be pointy” for SHAPE, while out of all 
conceptual ingredients of -zí̲s ̲ “skin/hide” the aspect MATERIAL is transferred 
and highlighted in this sense. In combination, the whole construction refers to 
these characteristics which constitute a traditional Beaver teepee. 
Another related Beaver expression for “teepee” is azí̲s ̲ni ̨́ʼi “teepee (lit. its 
skin/hide it is standing (existing in an upright position))”. Again, -zí̲s ̲
“skin/hide” is used to refer to the entity in relation to its form. Here, a 
positional verb is used in combination with the noun. Like in the form before, 
metonymy is at work, focusing on the outer form of the housing (SHAPE FOR 
ENTITY). Figurativity is not evoked here either, since the distance between the 
referent and the parts used to refer to it is not big enough. Instead, the concept 
of a teepee is extensively linked to its actual form and material (pointy, upright 
standing hide): both conceptual aspects (SHAPE and MATERIAL) are expressed by 
means of -zí̲s ̲“skin/hide”. 
5.1.2.2. CANVAS 
In the case of azí̲s ̲ “canvas”, the aspect MATERIAL of the item -zí̲s ̲
“skin/hide” is most prominent. Regarding the referent of the term in the real 
world – two-dimensional, flexible material – aspects of “skin/hide” like 
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CONTAINMENT do not come up as corresponding to similar characteristics 
found in “canvas” in the first place. Consequently and according to the 
“Invariance Principle” (see ch. 3.1.3.1.) such features are ignored in the 
mapping, and in the establishment of this sense of the polysemous item -zí̲s ̲
“skin/hide”. 
The recognized and parallelly used aspect MATERIAL of “hide” and 
“canvas” constitutes one part of the conceptualization of -zí̲s ̲ “skin/hide” as 
discussed above. It is detached from a living creature, from the notion of BODY 
PART or organ, as well as from the concept of CONTAINMENT and COVER. 
Similarities based on MATERIAL refer to consistency, but also to the function of 
the substance of skin as ‘fabric/cloth’ in the traditional use of hide e.g. for 
teepees and clothes. This implies that the sense “canvas” is not transferred from 
the prototype or basic meaning “skin/hide” in the sense of “skin of living 
creature”. Rather, it has its point of departure in the already transferred concept 
of “hide” with a focus on the conceptual aspect MATERIAL which can be 
separated from the entity with which it was originally associated. 
5.1.2.3. FACTORY HIDE 
The concept of factory hide (leather) reveals additional socio-cultural 
aspects which mirror historical and ideological events. The Beaver speakers refer 
to this kind of leather as “factory” or “commercial hide”. It is understood as 
hide manufactured in a specific way and used by non-native people. As a 
consequence, “factory hide” is linguistically marked via the explicit inclusion of 
the term for “white person(s)”: agayáás azí̲zé̲ʼ  “leather (lit. white person’s 
skin/hide)”. 
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Researcher: Is there a word for “leather”? Would that just be [azí̲s]̲? 
Consultant505: “Leather”? Would say in moose hide like, xadáá zí̲s,̲ thatʼs 
“moose hide”, but “leather”. That’s kind of- leather [...] agayáás azí̲zé̲ʼ 
(“leather (lit. white man’s hide)”) [[laughter]] You know, “white man made 
it” like, you know, “white man’s moose hide”, yeah. You know the factory 
tan? That kind. agayáás azí̲zé̲ʼ (“leather (lit. white man’s hide)”) 
(misc_verbs001) 
 
Although azí̲s ̲“hide (lit. its skin/hide)” is used in the Beaver culture in a 
very similar way factory hide is used by “white men” – for clothes, shoes, bags, 
etc. – the fact that the Beaver people do not buy leather but make their own hide 
constitutes a realized and significant difference. This is reflected in the linguistic 
forms which clearly distinguish these two types of ‘manufactured hide’. 
5.1.2.4. MOSQUITO NET 
A similar idea becomes apparent in the term for “mosquito net (lit. 
mosquito skin/hide)”: ts ̲ʼ ih zí̲s.̲ Again, the most prominent feature – as 
described by the speakers – of “skin/hide” in this sense is MATERIAL, referring 
to the flexible substance. In addition, the notion of COVER is also employed here 
as correspondence point of “mosquito net”. In the discussions found in the 
corpus, COVER is not mentioned while talking about “skin/hide” in relation to 
ts ̲ʼ ih zí̲s ̲ “mosquito net (lit. mosquito skin/hide)”. Rather, it is drawn on in 
explaining “mosquito net” as covering the person, thereby protecting her from 
the mosquitoes. Note that there is another term in Beaver for “net” used to 
denote a (fish) net, or a snare: mįįł “snare, net” and łuuge mįįléʼ (“fish net”). 
This lexical item has “net” as a second meaning derived from the shared 
function of “snare” and “net” and is not further analyzable, i.e. it is a non-
derived form not found in other or more basic meanings. It occurs exclusively in 
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hunting terminology, and conceptually concentrates on its function as catch or 
trap, a function not found for “skin/hide” or “mosquito net”. In combination 
with the fact that a mosquito net’s function is not to catch mosquitoes, but to 
protect the inside from mosquitoes, these two concepts of NET are linguistically 
separated due to their functions. While mįįł “snare, net” is an item which does 
not seem to be linguistically interrelated with other senses, “mosquito net” 
adopts corresponding features of “skin/hide”, which serves as a conceptual 
source to express the intended meaning. 
According its figurativity, it can be stated that the distance of the literal 
meaning “mosquito skin/hide” from the intended meaning “mosquito net” is 
large enough to evoke figurative aspects due to the real material used. 
5.1.3. -zí̲s ̲AS COVER 
5.1.3.1. EYELID 
As was already mentioned in chapter 5.1.1., the Beaver term for “eyelid”, 
sadeeʼ azí̲s,̲ is linguistically realized as “skin/hide of my eye”, while speakers 
understand and conceptualize this expression as “skin of my eye” and “cover of 
my eye”. In elicitation sessions, the literal meaning of -zí̲s ̲“skin/hide” is given as 
“cover”. In further discussions, speakers realize and mention -zí̲s ̲ as 
“skin/hide”, but insist on the meaning COVER in this expression. Both features 
are available via the conceptual network of -zí̲s ̲“skin/hide”, i.e. both constitute 
conceptual aspects of its meaning and are extracted for different usages. Thus, 
the interchangeability of these aspects provides two similar meanings, focusing 
on slightly different concepts (BODY PART and COVER). 
5.1.3.2. EAR MUFFS 
The term for “ear muffs” sadzageʼ zí̲s ̲(lit. “my ear(s) skin”) is realized and 
translated as “cover of my ear(s)” (“… See? That one’s got a cover …” 
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(metaphor100)). In this realization, the construction is embedded in the COVER 
part of the “skin/hide” network and perfectly reflects the referent’s function. 
The term does not constitute a traditional concept, “ear muffs” are a quite 
modern item of clothing. It is included in the Beaver lexicon via extension of the 
already existing network and the usage of the established conceptual aspect 
COVER as departing point for -zí̲s ̲“skin/hide”. 
5.1.3.3. BRASSIERE 
The expression for “brassiere”, satʼudzeʼ zí̲s ̲(lit. my breast’s skin) consists 
of two polysemous items. Besides “skin/hide”, the term satʼudzeʼ  has more than 
one meaning: “my breast”, but also “my milk” is included. Similarly, in 
combination with the indefinite possessive prefix (atʼudzeʼ), the form refers to 
“its (an animal’s) udder” and “its (an animal’s) milk”. “My breast” and “its 
udder” respectively, are defined as the basic meanings here, and “milk” as the 
non-basic or transferred sense. This form represents a more complex 
conceptualization than the terms discussed until now, since two alternative 
realizations appear. “Brassiere” does not refer to a typical ‘bag’, but additionally 
includes a less prototypical idea related to e.g. backing or a holder. The literal 
meaning is given as “(my) breast bag”, referring to the basic meaning of 
satʼudzeʼ, and the non-basic meaning of -ẕis as “bag”. Therefore, the usage of 
the body part term concentrates on the conceptual functional aspect 
CONTAINER of “skin/hide”. 
Additionally, this expression is also translated and explained as “cover of 
my breast”. Here, the processed transfer of the basic meaning “skin/hide” to 
“brassiere” takes place via the conceptual aspect COVER (which itself has its 
starting point in the concept MATERIAL) similar to the usage of “canvas (lit. its 
skin/hide)”, “eyelid (lit. skin/hide of my eye)” and “earmuffs (lit. my ear 
skin/hide)”. In fact, Beaver speakers translate this form alternatively by directly 
referring to the aspect of covering. 
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Furthermore, one speaker gave an alternative expression for “brassiere”: 
satʼudzeʼ éhdakáádi with the literal meaning “my breast, it covers it” 
(clothing_lex001). Asked if satʼudzeʼ zí̲s ̲is the right term for “brassiere” – which 
she verifies – she voluntarily gives this second term and an approximation to its 
literal meaning: “Yeah, that’s ‘cover my breast’ or something.” (clothing_lex001). 
5.1.4. -zí̲s ̲AS CONTAINER 
In this section, the conceptualization of -zí̲s ̲ “skin/hide” as CONTAINER 
will be described. There are several terms including the lexical form, some of 
which are not concrete (see 5.1.4.4. & 5.1.4.5.) 
5.1.4.1. BAGS 
The literal meanings of the forms which denote some kind of bag or vessel 
are explained by translating -zí̲s ̲as “bag”, and not as “skin/hide”. The forms are 
repeated here: 
 
(35) tyúú-zí̲s ̲   “amnion” (lit. water bag) 
 water-skin 
(36) saladzeʼ -zí̲s ̲  “bladder” (lit. my urine bag) 
 1sg.poss.-urine-skin 
(37) bwil -zí̲s ̲   “sleepyhead, late riser” (lit. sleep bag) 
 sleep -skin 
(38) xwei -zí̲s ̲   “backpack, bag” (lit. carry bag) 
 carry -skin 
(39) tyúú-zí̲s ̲   “water bag” (lit. water bag) 
 water-skin 
(40) lidyíí -zí̲s ̲   “tea bag” (lit. tea bag) 
 tea -skin 
(41) éhtʼoo -zí̲s ̲   “shellbag” (lit. shell bag) 
 shell -skin 
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(42) kú -zí̲s ̲   “tobacco pouch” (lit. fire skin33) 
 fire -skin 
(43) tlʼǫéédze -zí̲s ̲  “gallon” (lit. onion bag) 
 onion  skin 
(44) súúdagán -zí̲s ̲  “salt shaker” (lit. salt bag) 
 salt  -skin 
(45) ts ̲ʼáátl -zí̲s ̲   “moss diaper” (lit. moss bag) 
 moss -skin 
 
The speakers interpret a form such as xweizí̲s ̲ (lit. carry/pack skin/hide) 
as “packsack, bag, pouch, sack”34. Similarly, súúdagán zí̲s ̲ “salt shaker” is 
analyzed as “salt bag”, and éhtʼoo zí̲s ̲ “shell bag (lit. shell skin/hide)” is 
translated as “shell bag”. 
For “box” and “cage”, the Beaver language exploits different linguistic 
constructions, whereas partially the same linguistic material is included: 
dachįxeel “box (lit. wood pack)” contains the element found in xweizí̲s ̲
“packsack, bag, pouch, sack (lit. carry/pack skin/hide)”. dachįxoileʼ éétyʼi “cage 
(lit. it is like a box (lit. wood pack))”35 conceptually and linguistically refers to 
“box (lit. wood pack)”, and not to “bag” as derived from the conceptual feature 
CONTAINER of -zí̲s ̲“skin/hide”. 
In the Beaver language, the concept of CONTAINER includes rigid as well 
as flexible forms and mirrors the idea of a cover that buttresses or supports 
                                               
33 The notion of “skin“ refers to the explanations of the Beaver speakers: for ‘tobacco pouch’ 
the literal meaning is given as “fire skin” and not as “fire bag”. 
34  The speakers do not access the prefix in this construction, which originates in a verb stem 
with the meaning “carry (on your back)”, and is therefore not transparent for the consultants in the 
case of xweizí̲s.̲ 
35 This form might be an ad hoc creation of one speaker (Schwiertz, personal 
communication). 
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something in a three-dimensional way.36 Since the form used for these senses 
actually denotes “skin” that covers a living body in a three-dimensional way, 
such conceptualizations inherited these aspects. As a result, in the network of 
the term -zí̲s ̲ “skin/hide” several senses show exactly these correspondences, 
concentrating on similarity to the conceptual characteristic of “skin” as an all-
around container. Other aspects like ‘body part of a living creature’, are ignored 
in such senses. 
If one detaches oneself from one’s own language and concepts, the 
concept of our skin as a container, vessel or cover appears to be intuitively 
comprehensible: it focuses on one aspect of skin, besides aspects like skin as 
MATERIAL (see next paragraph), BODY PART, or outer part of a (living) creature37. 
The translation of -zí̲s ̲ as “bag” is done by Beaver speakers without an 
indication of the conceptual idea of highlighting the aspect CONTAINER of the 
basic concept of the BODY PART “skin/hide”. This means, the relation between 
CONTAINER and “skin/hide” is not consciously embedded in the processing of 
these terms. When the situational and thematic contexts of the corresponding 
sessions facilitate discussions on such conceptual transfers, the basic meaning -
zí̲s ̲ “skin/hide” is mentioned. On the other hand, the links existing in the 
                                               
36 In English, “bag” today is linked to any containers without further specification. 
Furthermore, the adjective “baggy” may refer to e.g. ‘puffed out, loosely hanging clothes’, making 
clear the connection to older forms of bags like “pack, bundle, sack”. In the German concept of 
“bag”, the notion of a flexible container immediately comes up, due to the fact that a hardcover 
container is linguistically separated as Koffer (“case”), and that “bag” often is used to mean Tüte which 
is made up of thin plastic or cloth. The Beaver terms for “brassiere” (lit. breast bag), and “shell bag” 
(lit. shell bag) are therefore easily comprehensible for German native speakers in their 
conceptualizations. “Salt shaker”, on the other hand, is not as intuitively understood by Germans, 
since the literal meaning (salt bag) is more suggestive of a bigger sack of salt, and not of the often 
little, and non-flexible box or container meant, i.e. form and flexibility (and size) of a container are 
more relevant aspects in German for the concept of linguistically differentiated containers. 
37  See also above for an etymological description of English “hide” and “skin”. 
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conceptual blending are not accessed. However, this Beaver speakers’ approach 
to the meaning translated as “bag” suits the semantic justification or sanction of 
this expression. The conceptual links between BODY PART and bags or 
CONTAINER are not that obvious or self-explanatory in the default situational 
context of an elicitation session, and a thematic context of manufactured bags. 
Although the linguistic form used is transparently connected to “skin/hide”, the 
availability of this concept is reduced, since the frame BODY PART is not 
necessarily relevant in the case of bags and similar containers. Thus, only parts 
of the network of the polysemous unit -zí̲s ̲ “skin/hide” are focused on in 
explaining the meaning of e.g. xweizí̲s ̲ “packsack, bag, pouch, sack (lit. carry 
hide)” and other terms denoting bags including the lexical item -zí̲s ̲“skin/hide”. 
Furthermore, (figurative) correspondence features – since influenced by 
conventionalized and underlying socio-cultural models – may complicate an ad-
hoc explanation. More sophisticated interpretations of such structures are not 
part of a well-known everyday topic of life for Beaver speakers. This is often 
strengthened by the language documentation situation, where the speakers try to 
meet their status as ‘language teachers’. They avoid discussing aspects of their 
language which are difficult to understand – for them just as for the outsiders – 
and to explain. 
Still, the concept CONTAINMENT must not be categorically realized as 
autonomous or self-standing, the linguistic link to -zí̲s ̲ “skin/hide” as BODY 
PART is not completely erased. Changes in the thematic context and intensive 
discussions of the literal meanings promote the realization of the concept 
“skin/hide” as a whole. 
5.1.4.2. BLADDER 
Another CONTAINER – saladzeʼ zi̲s ̲“bladder (lit. my urine skin)” – refers 
to a body organ which indeed can be defined as a container for urine. In 
metalinguistic discussions, speakers do not mention “skin/hide” – or the 
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prototypical conceptual aspect BODY (PART). Rather, “bag” – as CONTAINER – is 
the aspect highlighted and given as translation. Although the mappings between 
‘skin as body part’ and ‘bladder as body part (and container for body fluid)’ seem 
intuitively comprehensive, since both show similarities in belonging to the same 
semantic/thematic domain BODY, they are not activated. The conceptualization 
of “skin/hide” as CONTAINER  prevails in the polysemous network of -zí̲s ̲
“skin/hide” over the notion of BODY PART. So the correspondence between 
BODY PART and CONTAINER seems not to be as prominent as suggested above. 
Furthermore, it constitutes the basis for “bladder” in the Beaver language, as the 
focus on the notion of “bag” in metalinguistic discussions reveals. 
Concerning the degree of figurativity of this form, this expression is 
descriptive and non-figurative. It characterizes the body organ ‘bladder’ as a 
container for urine, which it is, with no additional specification concerning its 
(further) functions, form or position. 
5.1.4.3. AMNION / WATER BAG, SHELL BAG, TEA BAG 
Besides xweizí̲s ̲ “packsack, bag, pouch, sack (lit. carry/pack skin/hide)”, 
there are several linguistic expressions including -zi̲s ̲ to denote bags. Among 
others:  
 
(46) tyúú zí̲s ̲  “water bag (lit. water skin/hide)” 
(47) tyúú zí̲s ̲  “amnion (lit. water skin/hide)” 
(48) éhtʼoo zí̲s ̲ “shell bag (lit. shell skin/hide)” 
(49) lidyíí zí̲s ̲  “tea bag (lit. tea skin/hide)” 
(50) xwei zí̲s ̲  “backpack, bag” (lit. carry bag) 
 
These expressions all refer to containers, and in all instances, -zi̲s ̲ is 
translated as “bag”. In the first case (tyuu zí̲s ̲“water bag”), there is not only the 
conceptual connection between the referent and the notion of “skin/hide” via 
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the CONTAINER aspect, but also an experiential one. It originates in the usage of 
hide in traditional life of the Beaver people for containing and transporting 
water, therefore causing the conceptualization of containers in relation to 
“skin/hide”. 
In Beaver, the same construction is used to refer to “amnion”. The 
alternative English term is “bag of waters”, also linguistically including the highly 
relevant fluid as the functional part of this organ. Depending on the speaker 
asked and the thematic context, the first association and meaning given is either 
“water bag” as a CONTAINER for water, or “amnion” as BODY PART. In the 
corpus, a male speaker – who used to hunt and disembowel game – mentions 
“(moose) amnion” first when asked for the meaning of tyuu zí̲s ̲ “water bag / 
amnion (lit. water skin/hide)”. Other speakers, on the other hand, come up with 
the manufactured container “water bag”. They concentrate on objects appearing 
more often in their daily life, because they lack first-hand experience in hunting 
and intensive exploitation of game terminology.39 
Many of the BAG constructions in this network are endocentric noun-noun 
compounds, the first noun constituting the modification or specification of the 
head, the second noun: tyúú zí̲s ̲“amnion / water bag (lit. water bag)”, saladzeʼ  
zí̲s ̲“bladder (lit. my urine bag)”, lidyíí zí̲s ̲  “tea bag (lit. tea bag)”, éhtʼoo zí̲s ̲
“shellbag (lit. shell bag)”, súúdagán  zí̲s ̲“salt shaker (lit. salt bag)”. 
Most of these examples do not show figurative aspects in their meaning as 
compounds: when the polysemous noun -zí̲s ̲ “skin/hide” is used in its sense 
CONTAINER / BAG. This is also verified by metalinguistic discussions. 
Accordingly, the compounds are descriptive in using the referents in question 
for the denotation, e.g. water-bag, shell-bag, etc. 
                                               
39  Traditionally, hunters used to disembowel big game where they killed it, whereas the 
women cut the big pieces into smaller ones, and also prepared fowl and smaller animals. 
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On the other hand, the following forms denoting containment referents 
show figurative transfers: kúẕís ̱ “tobacco pouch (lit. fire skin/hide)”, and 
tlʼǫéédze zí̲s ̲ “gallon (lit. onion skin/hide)”. Here, the modification nouns do 
not exclusively refer to the content of the respective container. Instead, they 
apply conjunctive figurative metonymy and metaphor to express the intended 
meaning. 
In the case of kúẕís ̱ “tobacco pouch (lit. fire skin/hide)”, kun “fire” is 
linguistically included in the construction, since the conceptual relation of 
association between fire, making fire, the equipment for making fire as well as 
smoking cigarettes is applied. Additionally, the fact that such tobacco pouches 
indeed often include matches or a lighter, intensifies this link. The lexical form 
kun “fire” occurs in verbs meaning “to dry”(ashkún ‘I am drying it’) and “to be 
hot” (tįkun ‘it is hot’). Meanings like “to smoke” and “to burn” are expressed 
with different, etymologically unrelated forms (kʼadasłiit ‘it burns, it smokes’, 
dakʼús ̱ ‘it smokes’, dayúús ‘it burns’). The distance between the concept FIRE 
linguistically included in the denotation and the real content of a “tobacco 
pouch” (i.e. fire equipment, cigarettes or tobacco and lighter) is not be wide 
enough to evoke figurativity. However, in combination with the aspect of 
concreteness (fire cannot be contained in a container), figurativity is evoked. 
Note the non-prototypical arrangement of concrete target (smoking requisites) 
and abstract source (fire) (see also ch. 6.3.).  
5.1.4.4. GALLON 
In the case of tlʼǫéédze ẕís ̱ “gallon (lit. onion skin/hide)”, two meanings 
are expressed via this form: the concrete container as well as the abstract unit of 
measurement. The conceptual and linguistic link to “onions” seems more 
difficult, and is related to socio-cultural practices and experiences idiosyncratic 
for Beaver history and living conditions: 
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Researcher: Is there a word for a “gallon”? 
Consultant202: įłáádyí tlʼǫéédze ẕís ̱ (“one gallon (lit. onion (lit. like a rope) 
skin/hide”). I donʼt know how they call tlʼǫéédze ẕís ̱ (“one gallon (lit. 
onion (lit. like a rope) skin/hide”), but maybe there was onions in it. […] 
Well, you see like uh- one guy says something, the other guys follow him, 
they say the same thing, but itʼs- hundreds of them-, say the same- 
        (measures001) 
 
The form and size of this sort of container suits the Beaver concept of 
bags or sacks traditionally used to transport or store onions, so that this parallel 
in form is conventionalized in the concept of this container. Therefore, the 
usage and content of a specific container – which as CONTAINER is already 
linked in the Beaver language to the concept of -ẕís ̱“skin/hide” – is employed 
to denote this object. 
In the second part of the statement, the speaker gives a striking and 
sophisticated explanation for establishing such linguistic constructions, which 
constitutes a folk-model definition of conventionalization. The underlying socio-
culturally colored conceptualization of non-literal meanings is not described or 
justified as comprehensive or obligatory. Rather, the linguistic manifestations are 
seen as embedded in communication and everyday life which cause 
subconsciously processed custom and agreement.  
An abstract understanding or conceptualization of CONTAINER is found in 
the second meaning of tlʼǫéédze ẕís ̱ “gallon (lit. onion skin/hide)”. Here, it 
denotes the unit of measure and not a concrete entity for containment. The 
conceptual transfer of -ẕís ̱ from “skin/hide” in the abstract notion of a 
standardized measure takes place via the concrete, physical object “gallon”. The 
concept CONTAINMENT – which in turn, due to experience, has its starting point 
in the highlighted conceptual aspect MATERIAL– is applied as the departing point 
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for the usage of -ẕís ̱“skin/hide” in the sense of “bag”. In an additional step – 
and in analogy to the English conventionalization of “gallon” to “gallon” as 
measure – this form is understood and realized as the abstract measure of 
capacity. 
5.1.4.5. SLEEPYHEAD 
In the case of bwilzí̲s ̲ “sleepyhead, late riser (lit. sleep skin/hide)”, the 
abstract image-schema of “skin/hide” as CONTAINER itself took some steps of 
emergence. Intuitively (although as an outsider), the linking aspect “skin/hide” 
referring to humans seems useful, because in this case only one step of 
abstraction would suit the idea of efficiency and economy of language. Thus, 
“skin/hide” is understood not only as containing the physical human, but the 
psychological or mental parts with human characteristics we have as social 
beings. Nevertheless, due to the metalinguistic statements, the conceptualization 
of this term evolved differently:  
 
Consultant505: And then old ladies, they get mad at you if you sleep long time, 
and when you’re younger- xáá bwilzí̲s ̲nííʼííya! (“sleepyhead / late riser (lit. 
sleep bag), get up!”) They say that to you. What does that mean,- bwilzí̲s ̲
(“sleepyhead / late riser (lit. sleep bag”) “Sleep bag”, “sleep bag”. […] “You 
sleep bag, get up!” [[Laughter]] That’s what they say to you. 
Researcher: Go to sleep? Ah, “sleep bag”! [[Laughter]] 
Consultant505: bwilzi̲s ̲nííʼííya! (“sleepyhead / late riser (lit. sleep bag), get up!”) 
You know that means “You sleep bag, get up!” [[Laughter]] That’s kinda 
comical but that’s how old ladies call you. [[Laughter]]   
      (paradigm_sleep002) 
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The literal meaning of bwilzí̲s ̲ “sleepyhead, late riser” is not given with 
reference to human skin, but explained as the idea of a person as a container or 
bag full of sleep, and therefore not willing or able to get up (early): 
5.1.5. SUMMARY OF NETWORK -zí̲s ̲“SKIN/HIDE” 
-zí̲s ̲ “skin/hide” comprises a complex semantic and conceptual network 
with numerous meanings, usages and corresponding domains. The conceptual 
aspects extracted and focused on for further elaborations are BODY PART, 
MATERIAL, COVER and CONTAINER. These notions are partially reflected in the 
speakers’ metalinguistic statements where -zí̲s ̲ is translated as “hide”41, “cover” 
and “bag” respectively. In appropriate thematic contexts, the prototypical 
meaning “skin/hide” is processed and available, indicating the existing relations 
which hold between the different senses and usages in this network: 
                                               
41 “Hide” is used to refer to the concept BODY PART, but also to highlight the 
conceptualization of hide as MATERIAL, i.e. to refer to this conceptual aspect also included in the 
prototypical meaning of the lexeme. 
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Figure 5.1.: Conceptual Network of -zí̲s ̲“skin/hide” 
  151 
Due to the conceptual aspects constituting parts of the basic meaning, the 
senses do not show metaphorical or transferred conceptualizations. Rather, 
conceptual metonymic phenomena are observed: a specific conceptual ‘part’ of -
zí̲s ̲“skin/hide” is processed and highlighted in the usage of this linguistic item 
(PART FOR WHOLE / CONCEPTUAL ASPECT FOR CONCEPT). 
Consequently, the concept of -zí̲s ̲ “skin/hide” includes characteristics which 
allude to MATERIAL, COVER, CONTAINER, and MEASURE besides the notion of 
BODY PART. The way of conceptualization reflects that several meaning aspects 
are used as points of departure for other additional usages. Thus, the conceptual 
aspect MATERIAL developed from the prototypical usage of -zí̲s ̲ “skin/hide” as 
BODY PART. COVER and CONTAINER, on the other hand, both have their points 
of departure in the derived aspect MATERIAL. MEASURE arouse from the aspect 
CONTAINER, the usage of -zí̲s ̲ “skin/hide” in this sense occurs in the meaning 
“gallon (container)” which is again extended to the abstract meaning of 
MEASUREMENT: 
 
 
Figure 5.2.: Conceptual aspects in the network of -zí̲s ̲“skin/hide” 
The polysemous form tlʼǫéédze ẕís ̱“gallon (lit. onion skin/hide)” reflects 
both meanings – the concrete container and the abstract unit of measurement. 
Therefore, it highlights the two conceptual aspects of -zí̲s ̲ “skin/hide”, 
CONTAINER and MEASURE respectively. Evans refers to similar 
conceptualizations as “situated inferences” (Evans 2006: 17), since they are 
established in specific contexts in which an additional aspects is focused on. The 
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usage of the body part term as MATERIAL finally lead to a shift in meaning of -
zí̲s.̲  
Despite the conceptualization chain just described, -zí̲s ̲“skin/hide” evokes 
the prototypical meaning aspect BODY PART in addition to the aspect directly 
used in the respective usage in metalinguistic discussions. The chain is not 
directly accessed and mentioned by the speakers. Therefore, the corresponding 
metonymies are defined here as SKIN FOR MATERIAL, SKIN FOR COVER, 
SKIN FOR CONTAINER. In the case of MEASURE, SKIN FOR MEASURE 
and CONTAINER FOR MEASURE are established. The BODY PART aspect 
appears where “skin/hide” is indeed processed as “skin/hide” and specified via, 
for example, sadeeʼ “my eye”, as in sadeeʼ zí̲s ̲“eyelid (lit. my eyes’ skin)”. 
5.2. EMOTIONS AND BODY PARTS 
Like in many languages around the world, in Beaver, body part terms play 
an important role in expressing emotions, and personality traits. In the corpus, 
more than 60% of all terms denoting emotion include a body part or organ. The 
external and internal body parts frequently referred to are the following: 
 
(51) sadzé̲éʼ  “my heart”  (-dzé̲é  “heart”) 
(52) satsí̱íʼ   “my head”  (-tsí̱í   “head”) 
(53) sįįdyííʼ  “my mind”  (-įįdyíí  “mind”) 
(54) saẕááʼ   “my mouth”  (-ẕááʼ   “mouth”) 
(55) sadziiʼ   “my inner ear” (-dzii   “inner ear”) 
 
The term -įįdyíí “mind” constitutes a special instance of the “body parts” 
discussed here. Although not a real, physical body part, this classification is 
cross-linguistically supported by the fact that the concept and usage of this entity 
is not distinguished from ‘real’ body parts in many languages of the world. A 
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concept is created and conventionalized in order to be able to talk about and to 
refer to significant abstract phenomena of thought, mind, intellect, reason, and 
soul. The Beaver lexeme -įįdyíí “mind” is syntactically as well as semantically 
embedded in the body part terms’ paradigm. It shows the same linguistic 
behavior as the other body parts used in expressions of emotion and personality 
traits (e.g. inalienability). Furthermore, speakers comment on this noun without 
any difference to real body parts also utilized in emotion expressions. (see also 
ch. 5.4.). 
For all of the body parts given above, the networks show more than one 
basic concept leading to transfer of meanings and usages. Prototypical body 
parts afford two or more conceptual features which are applied as starting 
points. This does not hold for “mind”. In this case, the conceptual aspect SEAT 
OF EMOTION is the main departing point for further uses of the lexical item 
sįįdyííʼ  “my mind”. This is not surprising, since “mind” does not represent a 
physiological BODY PART that can be touched or seen. Nevertheless, it is 
comprehensively included in the concept of a complete human. The holistic 
conception of humans as a combination of body and soul does not divide into 
the two classes of body parts and mental parts. When taking into account the 
more abstract conceptualization of body parts as SEATS OF EMOTION, it 
becomes clear that these ‘parts’ can be placed on different ends of a continuum, 
rather than to two completely different, clearly separated and oppositional 
classes.  
5.3. -ẕáá “MOUTH” 
As will be described in the following paragraphs, the semantic and 
conceptual network of -ẕáá “mouth” includes two conceptual aspects 
highlighted in the diverse senses and usages, BODY PART and SEAT OF EMOTION. 
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The domains included here are religion42 and language, where language is 
directly linked to personality traits like “be talkative” or “chatterbox”: 
The constructions referring to language specify various forms of speech or 
speech behavior, indicating intentions, but also personality traits linked to and 
expressed in ways of talking: 
 
(56) nazá̲áʼ łídi ̨í ̨́ʼa   “shut up” 
     lit. close your mouth! 
(57) súúga sazá̲áʼ ǫláʼ “sweet talk, persuade s.o.” 
lit. they put sugar in my mouth 
(58) sazááʼ ghǫtlʼǫ   “chatterbox / gossip” 
     lit. lots of my mouth(s) 
(59) saẕááʼ nadyuéʼ   “be silent, non-talkative” 
     lit. my mouth is not there 
(60) saẕááʼ wudyééne  “talk smart” 
     lit. my mouth is sharp 
(61) sazááʼ keetsʼééle   “swear” 
     lit. my mouth is evil 
(62) sazááʼ nááwutsat   “persuade” 
     lit. my mouth is hard/strong 
 
For nazá̲áʼ łídi ̨í ̨́ʼa “shut up! (lit. close your mouth!)” and súúga sazááʼ ǫláʼ 
“sweet-talk (lit. they put sugar in my mouth)”, -zá̲á “mouth” as BODY PART is 
directly meant and referred to, as is the case in the two instances for kaẕááʼ 
tsʼaʼáhi “host (lit. they put it in somebody’s mouth)” and xáálo saẕááʼ tsʼaʼáhe 
“first communion (lit. first time they put it in my mouth)”. The metonymy 
INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION comprises the underlying conceptualization of 
                                               
42 Here, religion refers to proselytization and not to traditional beliefs. 
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these forms (see below). -zá̲á “mouth” as concrete instrument is linguistically 
manifested and evokes the intended abstract activities, so that the specific 
metonymy is MOUTH FOR SPEECH. 
In the other constructions we find several figurative instances and 
conceptual aspects not suiting a concrete body part. These transferred figurative 
meanings are not evoked by the concept of the body part term -zá̲á “mouth” 
alone nor by the relations between “mouth” and ‘ways of talking’. This is also 
observed in constructions where ANGER or SADNESS are expressed by 
containing -dzé̲é “heart”. This body part is not directly or perceivably related to 
these emotions, as the relations are primarily socio-culturally established (see ch. 
5.7.3.). In the forms discussed here, the attributes ascribed to –zá̲á “mouth” via 
conventionalized linguistic and semantic patterns result in figurativity, while 
“mouth” is realized as BODY PART. Conceptual metonymy constitutes the main 
phenomenon here. In addition to the BODY PART aspect, the conceptualization 
as SEAT OF EMOTION is included and highlighted. In the meanings of these 
idiomatic forms, the instrument is tightly linked to specific speech behaviors and 
therefore to personality traits like “be a chatterbox” or “be non-talkative”. This 
means that these terms are not only describing how persons talk, but the form 
refers to the personality traits and attitudes interrelated with such behavior. As a 
consequence, -zá̲á “mouth” semantically and conceptually contains and evokes 
more than the mere concrete body part. 
5.3.1. -ẕáá “MOUTH” AS BODY PART 
5.3.1.1. SHUT UP 
The form nazá̲áʼ łídi ̨í ̨́ʼa “shut up (lit. close your mouth)” utilizes the body 
part as instrument for speech. The verb łí-dy-ʼa “quit-handle/close” does not 
evoke any transferred meaning, and is also said, for example, by a doctor after 
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examination of the oral cavity. Alternatively, Beaver speakers use the form 
adyuu wunadyih “stop talking! (lit. don’t talk!)”. 
5.3.1.2. SWEET-TALK / PERSUADE / BRIBE SOMEONE 
The form súúga sazá̲áʼ ǫláʼ “sweet-talk (lit. s/he puts sugar in my mouth)” 
involves the meanings PERSUADE and BRIBE, so in both concepts sweet-talking 
to achieve one’s goals is included. “Mouth” refers to the prototypical meaning 
BODY PART, while the idiom figuratively utilizes food vocabulary to bring up 
shared structure and induce the concepts of PERSUASION and SWEET-TALK. This 
is linked to socio-culturally based concepts of BRIBE and CONVICTION: the 
‘Indian way’ is to give somebody food to achieve and ensure cooperation. 
A metonymic chain combines the conceptual aspects APPEALING, 
PLEASING of súúga “sugar” with the notion of PERSUASION as cause for the 
action to get the intended result, i.e. to have one’s own way: 
 
Consultant101: [...] Like I- lot of times I heard somebody saying, you know, 
“Oh, they want this and the-, tell you this a-”: súúga sazá̲áʼ ǫláʼ (“s/he is 
sweet talking (lit. s/he puts sugar in my mouth)”). They say, “they put sugar 
in my mouth”. Just so you could, you know, do what they- what they want 
you to do. súúga sazá̲áʼ ǫláʼ (“s/he is sweet talking (lit. s/he puts sugar in 
my mouth)”). That’s what- I hear that, too. I used to wonder what they 
mean, now I found out later. That’s sweet talk, sweet talk.  
        (metaphors001) 
5.3.1.3. RELIGIOUS TERMS 
The expressions linked to religion are the following: 
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(63) xáálo saẕááʼ tsʼaʼáhe  “first communion” 
lit. first time they put it in my mouth 
(64) kaẕááʼ tsʼaʼáhi  “host” 
lit. they put it in somebody’s mouth 
 
The linguistic expressions referring to “first communion” and “host” do 
not show any spiritual aspects mirroring FAITH, or the catholic idea of 
communion as sharing Jesus’ body. Instead, only the concrete act of putting a 
concrete edible object in one’s mouth is expressed in a descriptive realization. 
No transferred feature or link to the intended abstract meaning and significance 
of this act is included. 
 
Researcher: Is there a word for the “first communion”? Do you remember how 
they called that? 
Consultant101: xáálo mazá̲áʼ tsʼįʼǫ (“1st communion (lit. they put something in 
his/her mouth)”). xáátse or xáálo mazá̲áʼ tsʼįʼǫ “They put something in his 
mouth”, that’s what it means. “First time they put something in the 
mouth.”. [...] Doesn’t matter which. xáátse and xáálǫ. Means the same. 
mazá̲áʼ tsʼįʼǫ, “They put something in the mouth”. (metaphors002) 
 
Concerning -zá̲á “mouth”, the metonymy INSTRUMENT FOR 
ACTION is realized, i.e. MOUTH as eating instrument for the act of eating. In a 
further step, eating as concrete activity is realized for the more abstract religious 
act. The metonymy PART FOR WHOLE constitutes the underlying 
phenomenon for the whole idiomatic construction: the physical act as the (only) 
concrete part of the rite is expressed to refer to the spiritual whole without 
including or utilizing figurativity. 
  158 
The expressions discussed here perfectly suit the conventionalized 
linguistic patterns found for traditional as well as modern and forced 
terminology and underlying concepts in Beaver. For example, many professions 
but also household items are expressed via this metonymic pattern employed for 
“first communion” and “host”, for example: 
 
dane ghaawudyíhe “translator” (lit. s/he talks for the 
people) 
dane aadyi ́h̨i ̨ ́ “priest” (lit. he talks to the people) 
náátyįį “prophet/dreamer” (lit. s/he dreams) 
makʼéhʼetsʼehdii “table” (lit. you eat on it) 
Table 5.2.: Examples of descriptive terms 
Another reason for this lack of emotional or spiritual aspects could be the 
fact that the Beaver people were proselytized, and did not decide to become 
Catholic on their own. Instead, they were forced to convert and to adopt the 
western tradition of religious behavior (Goddard 1917, Mills 1986, Goddard 
1996). Under such circumstances, it is comprehensible that there is no 
linguistically manifested spiritual or transcended aspect.  
In accordance with the tendency toward the descriptive terms and non-
figurative metonymic chains identified above, there is no need to directly include 
references to the negative context of religion or Catholicism. Such a conscious 
expression of conceptual baggage via linguistic structure is not observed. 
5.3.2. -ẕáá “MOUTH” AS SEAT OF EMOTION 
The following constructions still refer to the concrete body part, but at the 
same time activate the conceptual feature SEAT OF EMOTION. 
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5.3.2.1. BE NON-TALKATIVE 
The idiom sazá̲áʼ ghǫdyuéʼ  “be non-talkative (lit. my mouth is not there)” 
is one of the instances of the often applied pattern [NO BODY PART / SEAT OF 
EMOTION] identified in chapter 6.4. Meanings like disability, bodily 
characteristics and personality traits are subsumed in this pattern. To “be non-
talkative” relies on the metonymic conceptualization INSTRUMENT FOR 
ACTION: the body part term -zá̲á “mouth” is linguistically expressed to be 
non-existent in order to signify that the activity of talking as tightly linked to 
MOUTH is not carried out: 
 
Researcher: What if a person is very silent, and doesn’t talk lots at all? 
Consultant101: mazá̲áʼ ghǫdyuéʼ (“s/he is not talkative (lit. s/he has no 
mouth)”) [...] He’s a person that’s quiet, don’t talk about anything, that’s 
what they mean. He’s got no mouth, but it’s still there, but he’s very quiet, 
don’t talk about- doesn’t open his mouth, that’s what it means. mazá̲áʼ 
ghǫdyuéʼ (“s/he is not talkative (lit. s/he has no mouth)”). Just like nazá̲áʼ 
ghǫtlʼǫ (“s/he worries (lit. s/he has many mouths)”), just like you’re- “he’s 
got lots of mouths”.     (metaphors001) 
 
The speaker explicitly mentions the realized figurative moment of a 
missing body part. Hence, the conceptualization as SEAT OF EMOTION is 
indirectly included, while the literal meaning is qualified (“[…] got no mouth, 
but it’s still there […]” (metaphors001)) in respect of the intended meaning 
(“[…] he’s very quiet, don’t talk about- doesn’t open his mouth, that’s what it 
means.” (metaphors001)). Additionally, the relation between “be non-talkative” 
as personality trait and the concrete body part constitutes one part of the 
concept of -zá̲á “mouth” as SEAT OF EMOTION. 
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Note that the form for “be mute” is realized via this pattern, too, yet 
linguistically manifesting sakʼáseʼ “my throat / voice” instead of saẕááʼ “my 
mouth”: sakʼáseʼ nadyuéʼ “I am mute (lit. my throat is not there)”43. 
Furthermore, the polysemous concept of saẕéégeʼ “my throat / voice” again 
reflects the usage of INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION metonymy, i.e. VOICE is 
an additional sense of the body part term “throat” without any supplemental 
linguistic material.44 
5.3.2.2. SWEAR 
This construction sazáá ketsʼééle “I swear (lit. my mouth is evil)” again 
applies the metonymy INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION, the “bad words”, as 
described by the speakers, are linguistically realized by the inclusion of the term  
-ẕáá “mouth”. 
 
Researcher: Um, are there other things you can say about someone’s mouth? 
When they - I don’t know, when they say bad things to other people-? 
Consultant101: nazá̲áʼ keets̲ʼééle (“you swear (lit. your mouth is evil)”). Means 
you’re swearing too much. [...] You say bad words, or you’re swearing, that’s 
what it means.      (metaphors001) 
 
The chain includes a third step, since actually not only the words, i.e. the 
verbal output, are evil, but also the meanings or contents and therefore the 
                                               
43 There is another form with the meaning “be mute”: adyuu wudyih, lit. “s/he doesn’t talk”, 
utilizing the metonymy EFFECT FOR CAUSE. 
44 “Throat” is also realized in two other body part terms: saẕéégeʼ, and sakʼus.̱ The latter 
form means “my neck”, but is also used to refer to “throat”. Accordingly, this form is found in 
expressions for kʼóh̨sadle sakʼus ̱ghadaléʼ “necklace (lit. beads are hanging around my neck)”, and 
sakʼusk̲áléʼ “collar (lit. it is on my neck)”. 
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thoughts or opinion. Accordingly, the following metonymic chains are 
identified: MOUTH – SPEECH – THOUGHT or INSTRUMENT FOR 
VERBAL ACTION FOR MENTAL ACTION. 
This construction is also used to imply “shut up, stop talking”, in 
situations where people are rude or gossiping. This pragmatically based 
implication is communicated by defining the content of the utterance as evil. 
Linguistically, this is manifested in the metonymic fashion just mentioned, and – 
in the right situational context – understood as a request or call to stop talking. 
5.3.2.3. BOTHER / PERSUADE SOMEBODY 
Another Beaver form referring to persuasion in a more negatively 
connoted way is sazá̲áʼ nááwuts̲at “to bother / persuade s.o. (lit. my mouth is 
hard/strong)”. Here, the stative verb -ts̲at “be hard/strong” describes the force 
and perseverance of the person persuading: 
 
Researcher: Is there something you could say- “you’re- you’re tongue is sharp”? 
[…] 
Consultant101: nazá̲áʼ na- nazúúdi nááwuts̲at, nazá̲áʼ nááwuts̲at; means “you 
got a strong mouth”. [...] I hear that quite a bit. 
Researcher: So, when would you say that? 
Consultant101: Ma- it- like- they’re talking, they- they’re- just like [community 
member]. Everybody says nazá̲áʼ nááwuts̲at, you know. They say that to 
[community member] because he asks, and asks and asks and asks over and 
over till he got his way, hu?    (metaphors001) 
 
The metonymy INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION is combined with the 
concept of STRENGTH: verbally bothering is linguistically conceptualized as 
acting in a hard/strong way. The stative verb -ts̲at “be hard/strong” shows high 
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frequency in the expressions discussed here. Most often, it reflects the 
conceptual similarity between concrete and mental or psychological 
DETERMINEDNESS meant in constructions like sazá̲áʼ nááwuts̲at “to bother / 
persuade s.o. (lit. my mouth is hard/strong)”. 
5.3.2.4. CHATTERBOX / GOSSIP 
This construction sazá̲áʼ ghǫtlʼǫ “I am a chatterbox / I gossip (lit. lots of 
my mouth(s)” refers to the idea of increase and combines two ways of verbal 
behavior which are rather negatively connoted in the Beaver culture: 
 
Consultant101: nazá̲áʼ ghǫtlʼǫ (“you are a chatterbox / you gossip (lit. lots of 
your mouth(s))”). Just like you’re- you’re telling them you got “lots of 
mouths”. nazá̲áʼ ghǫtlʼǫ (“you are a chatterbox / you gossip (lit. lots of your 
mouth(s))”). That means you’re yapping too much. […] 
Researcher: Is there a word for “gossip”? Someone gossiping? 
Consultant101: mazá̲áʼ ghǫtlʼǫ (“s/he a chatterbox / s/he gossips (lit. lots of 
his/her mouth(s))”), that’s what it is. Yeah.  (metaphors001) 
 
The linguistic pattern applied here, [LOTS OF BODY PART / SEAT OF 
EMOTION] (cf. ch. 6.4.), is also used for “worry”, -įįdyííʼ “mind” is linguistically 
manifested to express “increase in thinking”: sįįdyi ̨í ̨́ʼ natlǫ “worry (lit. lots of 
minds)”. The body part -zá̲á “mouth” stands for speech behavior, and the 
concept of increase of verbal output is linguistically manifested by increase of 
the concrete instrument instead of the intended verbal output. This 
conceptualization goes with people talking much, i.e. indeed producing lots of 
words or verbal output. On the other hand, for the sense GOSSIP, not only the 
real amount of talk or speech is counted, but what is said is classified as 
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redundant, and dispensable, and therefore too much, regardless of the actual 
amount. 
5.3.3. SUMMARY OF NETWORK -ẔÁÁ “MOUTH” 
The semantic and conceptual network of the body part term -zá̲á “mouth” 
is summed up in figure 5.3.: 
Figure 5.3.: Network of -zá̲á “mouth”. 
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Two conceptual aspects BODY PART and SEAT OF EMOTION are extracted 
and used for further senses of -zá̲á “mouth”. However, these two facets are not 
completely divided in the linguistic expressions, the SEAT OF EMOTION branch 
also includes the BODY PART sense. Both are simultaneously available in these 
forms and are processed in order to comprehend the intended meanings. The 
concept SEAT OF EMOTION is based on physiological relations between the body 
part and the verbal behavior linked to specific personality traits.  
5.4. -įįdyíí “MIND” 
This term constitutes a special instance of the BODY PARTS discussed here. 
Although not a real, physical body part, in many languages of the world a 
conception of some kind of entity is created and conventionalized in order to be 
able to talk about and to refer to thoughts, mind, spirit, intellect, psyche, reason, 
and soul. It reflects the significance of mental states, intellect and emotions as 
well as the need to realize and communicate these abstract ideas, cross-
linguistically and cross-culturally. EMOTIONS are not the only concepts linked to 
mind: often INTELLIGENCE, KNOWLEDGE, OPINION, but also CHARACTER and 
THOUGHT in all its diversity – from INSANITY to WORRIES – are tightly related to 
“mind”.45 
In Beaver, this term shows the same linguistic behavior as the other body 
part terms used in expressions of emotion and personality traits. It is construed 
as an inalienable noun obligatorily combined with a possessor, and appears in 
the linguistic patterns identified for emotions and personality traits (cf. ch. 6.4.). 
                                               
45 In most languages there is never only one term to cover all facets of this concept – rather, 
several terms overlap each other – nor is it possible to simply translate one term or usage with 
another in different languages, nor do the terms etymologically originate in identical 
conceptualizations. 
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Furthermore, the verb stem -tyʼį “think” is related to the form sįįdyi ̨í ̨́ʼ “my 
mind”. This considerably enlarges the conceptual network concerning linguistic 
manifestations as well as conceptual domains embedded in this polysemous 
linguistic item. 
Due to the character of the entity -įįdyíí “mind”, only one departure point 
is identified for the idiomatic expressions described in the next sections. BODY 
PART is not explicitly evoked by any of the meanings; instead the conceptual 
aspect SEAT OF EMOTION is highlighted in the constructions because of the 
intrinsic abstractness of the concept. 
5.4.1. BE STUPID / CRAZY 
As already discussed for saẕááʼ nadyuéʼ “be non-talkative (lit. my mouth is 
not there)”, the form sįįdyíí nadyuéʼ “be crazy, stupid (lit. my mind is not 
there)” applies the metonymy INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION. Mind is realized 
as SEAT OF EMOTION tightly linked to INTELLIGENCE and THOUGHTS, and is 
linguistically manifested to refer to the absence of the activities of the mind, i.e. 
THINKING. 
 
Researcher: I think you told me before that you can say mįįdyííʼ dyuéʼ, (“s/he is 
crazy, stupid (lit. her/his mind is not there)”) or- 
Consultant101: He don’t think right, his- he lost his memory or something, 
that’s what it means. He lost his memory. […] “he’s got no mind”. He can’t 
think right. Everything is a mixture in- that’s what- for him, for that person. 
Just not thinking right, I guess.   (metaphor100) 
 
The translation and associations to MEMORY and the ability of THINKING 
chain the concept of “mind” to these mental activities. There is another token of 
this pattern [NO BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION] also denoting lack of 
  166 
intelligence or insanity: satsí̱íduéʼ “be stupid, crazy (lit. my head is not there)”46. 
In combination with sįįdyííʼ nadyuéʼ “lit. my mind is not there”, the metonymic 
chain HEAD (– BRAIN) – MIND – INTELLIGENCE – THOUGHTS – 
THINKING (– WORRY)47 can be identified. It allows the near synonymic 
usage of these two idiomatic constructions, and the processing or availability of 
both body parts terms conceptualizing their referents as SEATS OF EMOTIONS 
when insanity or stupidity is discussed: 
 
Researcher: Could you say something about a person’s head? When they’re 
when they don’t understand easily? You know, when a person is a little bit 
slower? 
Consultant101: mįįdyííʼ dyuéʼ “s/he is stupid (lit. s/he has no mind)” Means 
“no brain”, “no brain”, mįįdyííʼ means “mind”. “He’s got no mind.” [...] 
“No mind.” 
Researcher: That means they are stupid? 
Consultant101: Mhm. mįįdyííʼ means “his mind”.  (metaphors001) 
 
Although asked for “head” in relation to INTELLIGENCE, the first Beaver 
form given is mįįdyííʼ dyuéʼ “her/his mind is not there”. Additionally, “brain”  
(-ts ̱ʼ iighǫ́ʼ ) is evoked, before “mind” is translated and further explained. 
                                               
46 Additionally, the form adyuu dane éétyʼe “be crazy (lit. s/he is not like a person)” is 
available. 
47 This chain reflects all parts as found in the various Beaver conceptualizations of the body 
part terms included here. Not all of these are relevant in the specific forms. Note also that 
INTELLIGENCE stands for MISSING INTELLIGENCE and INSANITY, too. 
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5.4.2. BE POWERFUL / BE DETERMINED / DESIRE 
The concept of -ts̲at “be hard/strong” is not only combined with sadz̲é̲éʼ  
“my heart”, sazá̲áʼ “my mouth” and satsí̱íʼ  “my head”, but also with sįįdyííʼ  
“my mind” to refer to several and to some degree different personality traits and 
emotions. There are various conceptual aspects highlighted in the different 
usages of the subpattern [BODY PART IS HARD/STRONG] in combination with -
įįdyíí “mind”. 
For “desire”, the idea of APPETENCE and LONGING is linked to MIND. 
Simultaneously, this ‘body part’ is detached from the person in the sense that the 
individual does not have full control over her/his desires, i.e. s/he does not 
voluntarily decide or act in an unsolicited fashion. 
 
Researcher: Could I say mįįdyííʼ na- natsat? 
Consultant303: mįįdyííʼ náátsat (“s/he wants something very hard (lit. his/her 
mind is hard/strong)”) What that means? It means something anyway. Oh 
yeah. mįįdyííʼ náátsat, you want something very hard. You want that, you 
want this. 
Consultant202: You want a woman too much? gáá mįįdyííʼ náátsat (“s/he 
wants something very hard (lit. his/her mind is hard/strong)”) 
Consultant303: It’s like you want something, hu? With his mind, but he can’t get 
it.       (metaphor110) 
 
The conceptual aspect of FORCE is highlighted in this notion of DESIRE, 
and expressed by means of the stative verb “be hard/strong”. Here, the 
metonymy SEAT OF EMOTION FOR PERSON is not applied, rather, 
“mind” is realized as an opponent of the person experiencing DESIRE. Following 
this analysis, the aspect of POWERLESSNESS of the individual experiencing the 
mental state of LONGING is also included via the usage of -ts̲at “be 
  168 
hard/strong”. It focuses on the consequences for experiencers of the 
accompanying features of strong or hard entities: LACK OF SOFTNESS and 
FLEXIBILITY, REFRACTIVENESS of the entity, here “mind”, and LACK OF 
INTERFERENCE or PERSUADABILITY on the part of the experiencing person. 
 
The other meaning of sįįdyííʼ náátsat (lit. my mind is hard/strong) is “be 
powerful / determined”. In the first elicitation example given below, an 
alternative form including dane “person, man, human” is given, probably due to 
the nature of the researcher’s question: 
 
Researcher: How would you say “he is very powerful”, someone? Like “he’s 
powerful, he’s powerful person”? 
Consultant404: You could put it dane mįįdyííʼ náátsat (“s/he is powerful (lit. 
the person’s mind is hard/strong)”). 
Researcher: So that means “he has power”? “he has power”? “he has a strong 
mind”? 
Consultant404: Yeah. “He’s got a strong mind”. 
Researcher: Does that mean “he is stubborn” or what does that mean? 
Consultant404: No, “his mind is strong”. 
Researcher: Like he is smart, or he is a wise person? 
Consultant404: Oh yeah, he is strong, and he is- you could- just for everything, 
“strong mind”.     (metaphor120) 
 
Researcher: Could I say something about the mind of a person? Could I say 
mįįdyííʼ náátsat? 
Consultant101: Yeah. 
Researcher: What does that mean? 
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Consultant101: He’s got a strong mind. 
Researcher: Does that mean he is smart? 
Consultant101: You got a strong mind. You ask to do something, and his mind 
is very strong to do it. 
Researcher: Oh, like he is determined to do something? 
Consultant101: Yeah, yeah.     (metaphor100) 
 
This usage does not concentrate on the conceptual features discussed 
above for DESIRE, despite the identical linguistic construction. Instead, the 
conceptual aspects of PENETRABILITY and RESISTIBILITY of the concept of 
HARDNESS are utilized, referring to the character of the powerful or determined 
person. Powerful people are constant and indestructible, i.e. they know what 
they want and what to do, and are therefore stable, withstanding influences from 
the outside, paralleling e.g. rocks48 via the linguistic material included. 
The conceptual metonymy INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION underlies 
both meanings of this idiomatic construction, but only “be powerful / 
determined” also manifests SEAT OF EMOTION FOR PERSON. 
5.4.3. BE NOT DETERMINED 
The negative form of this idiomatic expression refers to the opposite 
characteristic of sįįdyííʼ náátsat “be determined (lit. my mind is hard/strong)”: 
an unassertive, unstable person who does not know what she wants or how to 
deal with certain situations. The other meaning of the affirmative form, “desire”, 
is not evoked by this construction: 
 
                                               
48 Besides the similar English idiom, note the German expression ein Fels in der Brandung sein 
“firm as a rock (lit. be a rock in the breakers)” used to refer to a person one can rely on. 
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Researcher: How about- what else can you say about the mind, mįįdyííʼ. 
Consultant101: mįįdyííʼ adyuu náátsat (“s/he is not determined (his/her mind 
is not hard/strong)”) See? You’re- his mind is not strong enough to go 
ahead to do something. Like if a young kid wants- you ask him to do it, and 
he kind of wipe out, you know, and he just think ‘what I should do’. That’s 
when you say [mįįdyííʼ adyuu náátsat, I hear that lots from old people.
        (metaphor100) 
 
Researcher: Could you say “his mind is slow”? Like somebody’s slow- 
Consultant101: mįįdyííʼ adyuu náátsat (“s/he not determined (lit. his/her mind 
is not hard/strong)”). “Their mind is not strong” That’s what it means, it’s 
slow, and their mind is not strong. And it’s slow, that’s what it is. 
Researcher: Could you say [*your big mind]? 
Consultant101: No. Just strong, that’s all-   (metaphor100) 
 
Many antonymic relations are realized via an affirmative and a negated 
form, as opposed to, for example, many English expression pairs standing in an 
antonymic relation (see also ch. 5.7.3.3.). 
5.4.4. BAD MOOD 
The combination of the SEAT OF EMOTION -įįdyíí “mind” with the stative 
verb -tsééle “be evil” means “be in a bad mood, be grouchy”. Similarly to sazá̲áʼ 
ketsʼééle, “I swear (lit. my mouth is evil)”, it applies the same metonymy 
INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION. The mind is realized as the SEAT OF BAD 
MOOD and expressed in the construction referring to the negative mental state 
of FRETFULNESS: 
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Researcher: How would I say “he is grumpy”? Like “in a bad mood”? 
“Grouchy”? 
Consultant303: mįįdyíí’ tsééle (“s/he is grouchy, in a bad mood (lit. his/her 
mind is evil)”). “Upset minded” like, “mad” like. “He’s grouchy” like. 
Researcher: So you better don’t talk to him, hu? 
Consultant303: Yeah. mįįdyíí’ tsééle (“s/he is grouchy, in a bad mood (lit. 
his/her mind is evil)”). 
Researcher: That’s like “his mind is mean”, or something, “bad”? 
Consultant303: Yeah. Yeah, “his mind”.   (metaphor110) 
 
The speaker’s statement “he’s grouchy” underlines the metonymic usage 
of SEAT OF EMOTION for the person meant. Moreover, -įįdyíí  “mind” stands 
for the MOOD or the BAD TEMPER, i.e. CONTAINER FOR CONTAINED. 
The stative verb is used in its prototypical meaning describing abstract or mental 
states. 
5.4.5. WORRY 
As already attested for the combination of specific body parts with the 
stative verb -tsʼéél “be evil”, here again, we find the ‘body part’ MIND together 
with the same stative verb -tlǫ “be lots, be many”: sįįdyííʼ natlǫ “I worry (lit. my 
minds are lots)” reflects parts of the metonymic chain HEAD (– BRAIN) – 
MIND – INTELLIGENCE – THOUGHTS – THINKING – WORRY: 
 
Researcher: How do you say “sorrow” in Beaver? “Sorrow”? Like I have lot- or 
“she has lots of sorrows” or “worries”? 
Consultant404: “Worry” means mįįdyííʼ natlǫ (“s/he worries (lit. lots of 
mind)”). “Worried lots.” 
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Researcher: “He worries lots”? 
Consultant404: Yeah. 
Researcher: Does that mean mįįdyííʼ, that’s my- what’s mįįdyííʼ? 
Consultant404: “Mind.” 
Researcher: Like “my mind”? “I’ve lots of mind”? 
Consultant404: Yeah, you’re thinking of all kinds of things in your head. 
Researcher: mįįdyííʼ natlǫ? That’s “he’s worried”? 
Consultant404: Yeah, “he’s worried lots”, and he’s thinking lots, you could put 
it “thinking lots”.    (metaphor120) 
 
Researcher: How would you tell a person “oh, you kind of look worried”? 
Consultant101. nįįdyííʼ natlǫ kʼéyįtyʼis (“you look worried (lit. lots of your 
minds)”). “You’re loo- thinking lots”, that’s what it means. nįįdyííʼ means 
“your mind”. […] “you got a lot in your mind the way you’re looking”. 
That’s what it means. “You got a lot in your mind the way you’re looking.” 
[…] Just like “you got lots in your mind” or “you’re worried”. 
       (metaphor100) 
 
Consultant101: And if you’re sitting there, not even moving, just looking 
around, I’ll ask you: nįįdyííʼ natlǫ laa? (“are you worried? (lit. lots of your 
minds)”) “You got lots in your mind.” nįįdyííʼ natlǫ laa? “Are you worried 
lots?” Or thinking lots, it’s both the same thing. 
Researcher: Could you say about somebody “his mind is closed”? Or he is like 
“he’s open minded”? You could say that in English, if the mind is- 
Consultant101: No, there’s no way to say it. mįįdyííʼ natlǫ (“s/he worries (lit. 
her/his minds are lots)”), you just sit there, and you- just like you’re thinking 
a- you don’t open your mind, you got lots in your mind. That’s what it 
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means. mįįdyííʼ natlǫ. I can’t say “lock your mind”. nįdyįtʼa łidyįdyis 
(“*your mind is closed”), I can’t say that, there’s no word for it. [[laughter]] 
(CHECK VERBSTEM!)   (metaphor100) 
 
When talking about “worry” or “have sorrows”, Beaver speakers often 
explain “worry” as an increase in thinking, for example “you could put it 
‘thinking lots’” (metaphor120). This aspect is not only socio-culturally realized 
and highlighted: someone worrying busies oneself with one’s sorrows over a 
longer period, and the thoughts are rather numerous or repeated and 
recapitulated over and over again. This conceptual aspect of “worry” is focused 
on in the Beaver expression. Linguistically, the instrument is realized via the 
metonymies INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION, and CONTAINER FOR 
CONTAINED. 
Despite the metonymic chain HEAD (– BRAIN) – MIND – 
INTELLIGENCE – THOUGHTS – THINKING (– WORRY), sįįdyííʼ  “my 
mind” in the linguistic form discussed here cannot be replaced by satsí̱íʼ  “my 
head”. Such a form is not accepted, although this body part is linked to the 
concept of MIND and INTELLIGENCE (cf. satsí̱íduéʼ  “be crazy, stupid (lit. my 
head does not exist)”). When asked for an expression for WORRY including the 
term for “head”, -tsí̱í, one speaker supplements the idiomatic expression under 
discussion here with the phrase satsí̱ítʼaa “in my head”: satsí̱tʼaa sįdyi ̨́ʼ natlǫ “I 
have sorrows in my head (lit. in my head lots of my minds)”. 
 
Researcher: Could I say something about my head, when I have lots of worries? 
Like “my head is full”, or my head is- I don’t know what does- 
Consultant404: satsí̲ítʼáá sįįdyííʼ natlǫ (“I worry lots (in my head lots of mind)”) 
Researcher: Would you say that? 
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Consultant404: Yeah. satsíítʼáá sįįdyííʼ natlǫ, “I got lots of things in my mind.” 
        (metaphor120) 
 
Similarly, another speaker laughs about the idea of modifying this idiom 
and replacing the two body parts: 
 
Researcher: When somebody’s worried, could you say something about his 
head? 
Consultant101: No. nįįdyííʼ means “your mind”. You can’t say *natsí̲íʼ natlǫ, 
you can’t say “you got lots of head”. [[laughter]] (metaphor100) 
 
The concept of WORRY is tightly linked to -įįdyíí “mind”, as the linguistic 
construction reveals. Furthermore, the body part term -įįdyíí “mind” is indeed 
combined with the meaning WORRY in the construction satsí̱íʼ nakǫįl “worry (lit. 
my head is heavy)” (see ch. 5.5.4.3.). So it is not the relation between these two 
body part expressions and the mental activity discussed here which blocks a 
connection between HEAD and WORRY. The linguistic construction is fixed – in 
form and in its linguistic ingredients – and does not allow for modification even 
with a body part term metonymically also linked to HEAD and WORRY. The 
statement “you can’t say *natsí̲íʼ natlǫ, you can’t say “you got lots of head”” 
(metaphor100) accompanied with laughter reflects the realized figurativity of 
such constructions on the one hand. On the other, it reveals the inaccessibility 
or at least the restricted availability of such idiomatic forms. The idea of 
“multiplied minds” or “multiplied mouths” as conventionalized in the Beaver 
language is no less strange than “multiplied heads”. Yet missing 
conventionalization emphasizes the literal meanings of the combined lexemes 
and the figurativity which is consequently generated by these meanings. The 
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images evoked are not known or bound to cultural models which license 
established figurative meanings and allow for less challenge. 
This behavior was also discussed in relation to the anger idiom adyuu 
sadz̲é̲éʼ ghǫ́lįį “I am timid / I am heartless (lit. my heart does not exist)”. A 
quite similar (literal) meaning is not accepted by the speakers when realized via 
another pattern, namely *sadz̲é̲éʼ nadyuéʼ (lit. no my heart). Here, speakers also 
laugh about this construction or ask back how this could be (literally) possible, 
although the literal meaning of the conventionalized expression (adyuu sadz̲é̲éʼ 
ghǫ́lįį “I am timid / I am heartless (lit. my heart does not exist)”) is paralleled 
(see ch. 5.7.3.3.). 
5.4.6. SUDDENLY REMEMBER 
In the expression sįįdyííʼ náátlʼa “(suddenly) remember (lit. my mind 
runs)” a motion verb is applied to refer to mental activity. For the meaning 
“suddenly remember”, the aspect of suddenness is identified and linguistically 
realized in this idiomatic form via the verb meaning (“Your man- mind is fast”, 
that’s what it means […]. (metaphor100)). The verb stem -tl’a “run” occurs in 
contexts of (fast) locomotion and is also used for “jump” 49: 
 
Researcher: Or if somebody has a fast, quick mind, like when he- 
Consultant101: mįįdyííʼ náátlʼa (“s/he is smart (lit. his/her mind runs”). That’s 
“run”- you know, you’re thinking all over, you- I hear my grandpa used to 
say: mįįdyííʼ náátlʼa He used to say, “your mind is- runs fast”. If now you- 
and if somebody start telling you about this, ooh, your mind- like my mind 
runs way back, that’s what he meant. I used to do that, them, too, they’re 
                                               
49 Presumably, “dance” is realized with the same verbal stem in combination with the lexical 
preverb dah-. 
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thinking the same way. That was then, long ago, that’s what he meant, my 
grandpa. mįįdyííʼ náátlʼa. 
Researcher: Like it’s all over? 
Consultant101: Not all over, but your mind comes- just snaps right now. If 
somebody’s telling you something somewhere else, right away your mind 
comes back to something […] that’s what I guess my grandpa used to mean, 
“your mind he runs, your mind is fast”. Your mind is fast, that’s what 
náátlʼa means, “it’s fast”. Yeah. […] Right away you think back. That’s what 
he meant. […].      (metaphor100) 
 
The speaker mentions the fact that one’s mind is “fast” and “right away 
[…] comes back” (metaphor100) to known, but previously not available 
memories. The notion of “just snaps” underlines this important semantic aspect 
of -tlʼa “run” in this construction. Additionally, the form allows for the 
identification of autonomy of MIND, i.e. reduced control of the person suddenly 
remembering, similarly to sįįdyííʼ náátsat “desire (lit. my mind is hard/strong)”, 
where a LOSS OF CONTROL over this SEAT OF THOUGHTS is perceived and 
linguistically indicated. 
5.4.1. SUMMARY OF NETWORK -ĮI ̨DYÍÍ “MIND” 
-įįdyíí “mind” as an abstract entity is construed in analogy to the concepts 
of body parts in their roles as SEATS OF EMOTION. In its network, only the 
conceptual aspect SEAT OF EMOTION is used as a starting point for further 
senses and usages. 
The conceptual structure of body part terms as concrete entities is not 
applied here: similar usages only occur where body part terms are realized as 
SEAT OF EMOTION as well. Therefore, this conceptual network does not show 
polysemy in the same way as the other body part terms do. Its conceptualization 
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– i.e. the conceptual facet utilized and highlighted – does not vary in the 
different idiomatic expressions discussed in this chapter. 
 
Figure 5.4.: -įįdyíí “mind” 
5.5. -tsí̱í “HEAD” 
The body part term -tsí̱í “head” is included in several expressions, and – 
unlike the other body parts discussed here – many of the forms denote concrete 
entities as well as abstract spatial concepts. In this network, several conceptual 
aspects are identified as departure points for further usages: besides BODY PART 
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and the transferred and more abstract concept of a SEAT OF EMOTION, -tsí̱í 
“head” is realized and extracted as UPPER and FRONT PART. 
5.5.1. -tsí̱í “HEAD” AS BODY PART 
-tsí̱í “head” is included in several other body part terms which are all 
related to “head”, i.e. the prototypical and ‘over-all’ sense is processed rather 
than a more specific conceptual feature: 
 
(65) satsí̲ít͟sʼanéʼ  “skull, (upper) backbone (lit. my head bone)” 
(66) satsí̱ítʼazi  “nape, back of head (lit. between my head)” 
(67) satsí̲íghááʼ  “hair (lit. my head hair)” 
(68) sats ̱ʼ iighǫ́ʼ  “brain (lit. my head-?50)” 
 
In the expressions satsíít͟sʼanéʼ  “skull, (upper) backbone (lit. my head 
bone)” and satsí̲íghááʼ “hair (lit. my head hair)”, -tsí̱í  “head” constitutes the 
modifier of these endocentric noun-noun compounds and specifies the ‘bone’ or 
‘hair’ referred to accordingly. 
In the following two terms, both denoting artifacts, -tsí̱í  “head” stands 
respectively for ‘hair’ and ‘upper part of the body’ in a metonymic fashion: the 
two opposing metonymies WHOLE FOR PART and PART FOR WHOLE are 
manifested.  
 
(69) wutsíkʼaatsi̲   “comb (lit. it scratches one’s head)” 
(70) t͟sʼíhkʼuł    “parka (lit. head is covered)” 
 
In wutsíkʼaatsi̲ “comb (lit. it scratches one’s head)”, the hair (as part of a 
head) constitutes the intended referent, since the hair is combed and not the 
                                               
5050 The meaning of the second part is not known. 
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complete head. Concerning the clothing term: a “parka” principally covers the 
upper part of the body, while the head is rather additionally covered by the 
hood. 
Likewise, a “bald eagle” is expressed in a descriptive fashion concentrating 
on the appearance of its head: 
 
(71) éhdaa mat͟síí dákʼale “bald eagle (lit. eagle his head is white)” 
 
The prominent coloration of the eagle’s head is explicitly given to lexically 
distinguish the referent from other “eagles”, éhdaa. 
 
The Beaver expression for “nod”, datsí̲ naghehdah (lit. move one’s head), 
constitutes another usage of the body part term discussed here. To express 
“nod” – including more abstract domains like AFFIRMATION / CONFIRMATION / 
CONSENT – and mental-physical states like FEELING OF DIZZINESS, physiological 
parts of the complete concepts are linguistically realized. In the descriptive term 
datsí̲ naghehdah “nod (lit. move one’s head)”, the concrete body part “head” is 
meant. The speaker does not include any notion of AGREEMENT or CONSENT in 
her explanation, neither in the literal meaning nor in her statement about this 
form: 
 
Researcher: Mmh, what you call when someone is nodding? 
Consultant505: […] datsí̲ naghehdah, (“nodding (lit. moving one’s head)”). 
“Moving her head” or “his head”. naghehdah (lit. moving). 
Researcher: And that means “moving one’s head”? So that could be like 
“shaking your head for ‘no’”, would be that, too? 
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Consultant505: naghehdah (“nodding (lit. moving one’s head)”) That’s 
“nodding the head”. Unless you say - but how could we say this. [[laughter]] 
It’s a “no, no, no, no”, [[laughter]] that way. You shake your head lots. 
(misc_verbs001) 
 
Similarly, in satsí̱í naghwút “I’m dizzy (lit. my head is spinning)”, “head” 
stands for the prototypical and basic meaning, concrete BODY PART. 
Additionally, it metonymically refers to the whole body and the mental 
constitution of the person feeling dizzy: 
 
Researcher: Is there a way to say “I’m dizzy”? After I turned around, I’m dizzy? 
Consultant101: satsí̱í naghwút [...] satsí̱í naghwút (“I’m dizzy (lit. my head is 
spinning)”) I’m dizzy, my head is spinning.  (qualities001) 
 
Since humans indeed perceive DIZZINESS as a mental state or physiological 
indisposition primarily in the head, the statement “I am dizzy, my head is 
spinning” (qualities001) includes both, the description of the constitution as well 
as the realization of the metonymic usage of “my head is spinning” for “I am 
dizzy”. 
5.5.2. -tsí̱í “HEAD” AS UPPER PART 
Here, the image-schema of “head” as ‘high, elevated entity’ is abstracted 
away from the body. Conceptualizations of the head of the (human) body as the 
most upper part of another entity are cross-linguistic phenomena, and are based 
on embodiment and the significance of our own physiology. In many languages, 
grammaticalization processes can be observed pertaining to body part terms 
which result in grammatical items with spatial (Heine, Claudi & Hünnemeyer 
1991; Svorou 1993), but also temporal interpretations. 
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In Beaver, -tsí̱í “head” did not undergo large-scale grammaticalization, i.e. 
spatial or directional meanings are not expressed with this item. Still, the concept 
of “head” as UPPER PART is realized and used in the following expressions: 
 
(72) kwę wut͟sʼítʼoi   “roof (lit. on (top of) the house’s head)” 
(73) mat͟sʼítʼoi    “roof (lit. on (top of) its head)” 
 
A third term is provisionally included here: at͟síí yhís ̱ “Buffalo Head 
Mountains (lit. its head mountains)”. It is not known exactly why the mountains 
south of the reserves are called at͟síí yhís ̱ (lit. “its head mountains”) in Beaver. 
Further research is needed to comprehend whether the specific form of this 
landscape is linguistically reflected or whether socio-cultural factors influenced 
the denotation. Accordingly, the classification of -tsí̱í “head” in this part of the 
semantic and conceptual network is not certain. 
The two terms for “roof” differ in the explicit inclusion of kwę “house” 
and in the (absence of the) possessive prefix, wu-. -tsí̱í “head” is not realized as 
grammaticalized item with an abstract spatial meaning in these forms: the 
postposition -tʼoi “on / on top” specifies the location of the house’s upper part, 
i.e. “its head”. 
5.5.3. -tsí̱í “HEAD” AS FRONT PART 
In the following expression alááʼ tsí̲íʼ  “bow, prow (lit. boat’s head)”, a 
conceptual aspect other than UPPER PART is focused on. Here, -tsí̱í “head” is 
applied to refer to the front part of a horizontally aligned entity. The conceptual 
facet of UPPER PART does not come up here due to this orientation of a boat. 
Instead, the specific significance of a boat’s bow as direction setting and heading 
is matched by the literal meaning of the expression. The usage of “head” in the 
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sense of FRONT PART is linked to corresponding experiences and to equivalent 
realizations of the “head” of vertically aligned animals and humans as front. 
5.5.4. -tsí̱í “HEAD” AS SEAT OF EMOTION 
The conceptualization of -tsí̱í  “head” as SEAT OF EMOTION is applied for 
mental states and personality traits. The expressions identified and described 
here exploit the three most often used linguistic patterns for emotions and 
personality traits: [NO BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION], [BODY PART IS 
HARD/STRONG] and [BODY PART IS HEAVY] (see also ch. 6.4.). The SEAT OF 
EMOTION -tsí̱í “head” does not constitute the actual or true instrument of the 
activity meant. Rather, a metonymic chain juxtaposes the relevant concrete and 
abstract parts: HEAD – BRAIN – MIND – VOLITION – INTELLIGENCE 
– THOUGHTS – THINKING – WORRY. 
5.5.4.1. BE CRAZY 
Accordingly, the linguistic form for insanity, satsí̱íduéʼ  “I am crazy, stupid 
(lit. my head is not there)” links “head” to ERRONEOUS or MISSING THINKING, 
which again is closely related to “mind”: 
 
Researcher: Could I also say matsí̲í dyuéʼ? 
Consultant404: Yeah, “he’s got no head”. [[laughter]] 
Researcher: Does that have a meaning? 
Consultant404: Yeah, dane maṯsí̱í dyuéʼ, that means a guy has got no, no mind. 
dane maṯsí̱í dyuéʼ [...] He has got no mind.  (metaphor120) 
 
The last parts of the following statement reveal that this expression also 
refers to pathological psychological states, i.e. to insanity, mental disease – and 
not only to temporary foolish behavior: 
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Consultant101: […] mįįdyíí nadyuéʼ (“s/he is stupid (lit. no mind)”) See? That’s 
another way to say “he’s got no mind”, “he can’t think right”. [… [private 
content]] She went- she lost her mind. And she went in […] hospital. And 
everybody used to say matsí̲í nadyuéʼ áátyʼáʼ (“s/he is crazy (lit. his/her 
head is not there it happened)”), you know, just like she lost- she didn’t 
“lose her head”, but she lost her mind. matsí̲í nadyuéʼ áátyʼáʼ (“s/he is 
crazy (lit. his/her head is not there it happened)”). That’s what they mean. 
Which means she didn’t “lose her head”, you know, but she- they mean she 
lost her mind. That impression people get was that she lost her mind, but in 
our ways to saying it is “she lost her head”. She didn’t lose her head, her 
head is still there.     (metaphor100) 
 
The numerous mentions of -įįdyíí “mind” reflect the contiguity of the 
concepts juxtaposed in the metonymic chain described above. Although -tsí̱í 
“head” is conceptualized as SEAT OF EMOTION in the expressions discussed 
here, the prototypical meaning BODY PART is still available and included in the 
explanations of the speakers. The figurativity aspects evoked by the linguistic 
form – i.e. the literal meaning of a ‘missing head’ – are justified via the 
conceptual chain. MIND is realized in its usage here as LACK OF INTELLIGENCE 
and interpreted as the intended referent. The relation between “head” and 
“mind” is processed via the metonymy CONTAINER FOR CONTAINED. 
5.5.4.2. BE STUBBORN 
For ‘stubbornness’, -tsí̱í “head” is combined with the stative verb -ts̲at “be 
hard/strong”: satsí̲íʼ nááts̲at “I am stubborn (lit. my head is hard/strong)”: 
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Researcher: Could I say satsí̱íʼ náátsat? 
Consultant404: Oh yeah, you could put it- “my head is strong”. 
Researcher: What does that mean? 
Consultant404: “My head is strong.” saṯsí̱íʼ náátsat. (“I am stubborn (lit. my 
head is hard/strong)”) 
Researcher: Does that mean “I’m stubborn”? 
Consultant404: Yeah. 
Researcher: Or what does it mean when you say that? What does a person do 
about who you say that, saṯsí̱íʼ náátsat? 
Consultant404: That guy is- head is strong.   (metaphor120) 
 
The metonymic chain assembling HEAD with abstract concepts like MIND 
and VOLITION leads to an interpretation of the attribute “be hard/strong” as 
concentrating on HARDNESS and IMPENETRABILITY. A stubborn person – 
referred to via SEAT OF EMOTION FOR PERSON in this expression – is not 
influenced from the outside due to a LACK OF PENETRABILITY. The mental 
strength or VOLITION is transferred to the SEAT OF EMOTION -tsí̱í  “head” 
whose conceptualization simultaneously evokes the abstract parts of the chain, 
i.e. mental states. 
 
Researcher: How would I say “he is stubborn”? 
Consultant101: matsí̲íʼ nááts̲at (“he is stubborn (lit. his/her head is 
hard/strong))”. See? “He’s stubborn”: matsí̲íʼ nááts̲at. And if you get mad 
or something and you don’t want to do it: satsí̲íʼ nááts̲adu (“I am stubborn 
(lit. my head is hard/strong) and”), I hear, you know. They say that to them.
        (metaphors001) 
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5.5.4.3. WORRY 
The parallel processing of “mind” can also be observed in the idiomatic 
expression for “worry”: satsí̱íʼ nakǫįl “I worry (lit. my head is heavy)”. Here, 
speakers mention “mind” in their explanations and establish the relationship 
holding between these SEATS OF EMOTIONS: 
 
Researcher: Could I say in Beaver “my head is heavy”? 
Consultant404 saṯsí̱íʼ nakǫíl (“I am worried (my head is heavy)”) 
Researcher: Does that have a meaning? 
Consultant404: “My head is heavy” [[laughter]] 
Researcher: Would that mean something like I’m worried or- I don’t know. 
Consultant404: Yeah, when you’re worried or something like that, everything 
come on your mind, that means “your head is heavy”. saṯsí̱íʼ nakǫíl. 
Researcher: “My head is heavy”, well, but it means “I’m worried” or something. 
Consultant404: Yeah, that means “you’re worried”. When you worry too much, 
your head is heavy.     (metaphor120) 
 
Linguistically, the conceptual metonymy CONTAINER FOR 
CONTAINED (HEAD FOR WORRY) is manifested in the gradual shift from 
concrete to abstract in the metonymic chain. Additionally, this is traceable in the 
concepts of HEAD: in combination with “be heavy”, -tsí̱í “head” does not only 
evoke the conceptual aspect SEAT OF EMOTION, but also the prototypical sense 
BODY PART. The verb used in this idiomatic expression reflects the physiological 
experience of DEPRESSION and BURDEN which are linguistically ascribed to the 
SEAT OF EMOTION via the metonymy SEAT OF EMOTION FOR PERSON. 
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5.5.5. SUMMARY OF NETWORK -tsí̱í “HEAD” 
The network presented in figure 5.5. represents the complex polysemous 
structure of -tsí̱í “head” with several conceptual aspects extracted and 
highlighted in the diverse usages.  
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Figure 5.5.: Network of -tsí̱í “head” 
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The prototypical conceptual feature BODY PART is employed as a starting 
point in terms for other parts of the body (brain, hair, skull / upper backbone, 
nape). Furthermore, it is also used for sensations and movement including the 
feeling of DIZZINESS and NODDING. Moreover, the expressions for “comb” and 
“parka” as artifacts related to “head” (via hair and hood respectively) focus on 
the BODY PART sense of -tsí̱í  “head”.  
As another departure point, the image-schema of “head” as UPPER PART is 
highlighted in the two lexical forms for “roof”. This concept is further 
abstracted in the realization of HEAD as FRONT PART, focusing on the feature 
FOREFRONT. This concept is employed for alááʼ tsí̲íʼ  “bow, prow (lit. head’s 
boat)” and is elaborated from UPPER PART or rather human’s HEAD. 
As SEAT OF EMOTION, -tsí̱í  “head” occurs in three expressions for 
personality traits, including the mental state of WORRY. The metonymy 
CONTAINER FOR CONTAINED is applied for “be crazy, stupid” (satsí̱íduéʼ  
lit. “my head is not there”), while all forms reflect juxtapositions of the concepts 
of HEAD (– BRAIN) – MIND – INTELLIGENCE – THOUGHTS – 
THINKING (– WORRY) in a metonymic chain. Simultaneous processing of 
the conceptual aspects BODY PART and SEAT OF EMOTION is indicated in the 
metalinguistic statements (“[…] her head is still there.” (metaphor100)). 
5.6. -dzii “INNER EAR(S)” AND -dzagé “EAR(S)” 
The Beaver language distinguishes between -dzagé “ear(s)” and -dzii 
“inner ear(s)”. The form -dzii “inner ear(s)” is included in an expression to refer 
to ‘deafness’, while -dzagé “ear(s)” occurs in idiomatic forms for ‘stubbornness’ 
and for “mushrooms” and “dried apple/apricot slices” (both literally “muskeg’s 
ears”). 
The term for “mushrooms” and “dried apple/apricot slices” tsʼíbee dzagéʼ  
(lit. muskeg’s ear(s)) extracts the conceptual aspect SHAPE of -dzagé “ear(s)”. 
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This is done due to a perceived similarity in appearance and shape between the 
referents “ear(s)”, “dried apple/apricot slices” and “mushrooms”. This image-
schematic structure is established and conventionalized via objective similarity, 
but socio-culturally based aspects also play a role in the perceived connections. 
The idiosyncratic combination of “muskeg” and “ears” extends the conceptual 
network of -dzagé  “ear(s)” to additional usages and domains (food, plant and 
mushrooms). 
 
Two expressions employing -dzagé “ear(s)” and -dzii “inner ear(s)” 
conceptualize the body part terms as SEAT OF EMOTION. Both are included in 
expressions of the form [NO BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION]: 
 
(74) sadzagéʼ nadyuéʼ  “be stubborn (lit. my ear(s) are not there)” 
(75) sadziiʼ wǫdyuéʼ  “be deaf (lit. my inner ear(s) are not there)” 
 
The expression referring to STUBBORNNESS applies the INSTRUMENT 
FOR ACTION metonymy, although not in the same way as, for example, 
English. Listening to and obeying instructions is not the main point meant and 
less relevant than in e.g. western traditions of learning and teaching (Mills 1986, 
Goulet 1998). Instead, knowledge is handed down in Beaver via first hand 
reports, often in narrative form, without demanding compliance and obedience 
or allegiance. This means, these narratives are not meant to be instructional and 
consequently to be obeyed. Individuals shall make their own experiences which 
are realized as best practice. Trial-and-error constitutes one significant way of 
learning, while learning from the existing experience and body of knowledge 
available in the community is possible, but not mandatory. Hence, the 
expression sadzagéʼ nadyuéʼ  “be stubborn (lit. my ear(s) are not there)” 
indicates that someone has not listened to the stories or advice of elders, and 
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probably makes unnecessary mistakes. But the form does not focus on 
obedience as understood in other cultures. 
 
Consultant101: nadzagéʼ nadyuéʼ (“you do not listen; you are stubborn (lit. you 
have no ears)”). Means “you got no ears”, ’cause you’re stubborn, don’t 
want to listen. [...] means you’re not listening, just like you got n- you lost 
your ears, you can’t listen. [...]    (metaphors001) 
 
In ch. 5.5.4., another form for stubbornness is discussed: satsíí náátsat “be 
stubborn (lit. my head is hard/strong)”. The stative verb -ts̲at “be strong” often 
utilized in emotion expressions points to the concept of PENETRABILITY, i.e. the 
stubborn person does not receive what might be useful, important and available. 
 
The other form containing -dzii “inner ear(s)” – applying the same pattern 
[NO BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION] – is conventionalized to express DEAFNESS. 
This disability concept also uses the metonymy INSTRUMENT FOR 
ACTION, but here the metonymic chain is shorter, since further steps from 
‘hear’ to ‘listen’ (and ‘assume/adopt’) are not included.
5.6.1. SUMMARY OF NETWORKS -dzagé “EAR(S)” AND -dzii “INNER 
EAR(S)” 
The conceptual aspect SHAPE of the body part(s) -dzagé “ear(s)” is 
focused on in the expression for “mushrooms” and “dried apple/apricot slices”, 
while the prototypical domain BODY PART is not directly evoked or included. 
Although both body part terms -dzagé “ear(s)” and -dzii “inner ear(s)” are 
included in the same pattern, [NO BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION], the meanings 
of the idiomatic expressions differ in their realization and conceptualization of 
the referents: for “be deaf (lit. my inner ears are not there)”, the concrete body 
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part(s) “ear(s)” are focused on, while for “be stubborn (lit. my ears are not 
there)”, a transferred concept is included besides the concrete body part(s). The 
metonymic chain EAR(S) – HEAR – LISTEN concentrates more on the 
abstract conceptions of the activities or abilities of these body parts, i.e. ‘hear’, 
‘listen’, ‘comprehend’. 
 
Figure 5.6.: Networks of -dzagé “ear(s)” and -dzii “inner ear(s)” 
5.7. -dzéé “HEART” 
Another lexical item at the center of a polysemous semantic network in 
Beaver, given its application in several different usages and senses in the 
language, is -dzé̲é “heart”. Heart, as a body part, occurs in cognitive and 
linguistic structures all over the world. The location of this organ in the center of 
the chest (and the whole body), the heart beat and its relation to pulse, makes it 
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essential and above all, eminently perceivable. This characteristic does not apply 
to other organs in similar form, despite their comparable significance and 
functions. 
Cultural models indeed reflect not only a folk conceptualization of body 
functions, but also scientific / medical assumptions and knowledge concerning 
this organ due to its accessibility. This accessibility is linked to the fact that the 
heart is perceivable in a far more intense fashion than other body organs. 
Humans consciously realize the differences in heartbeat and blood pressure in 
physical activities, and also in situations of emotional exposure or stress. When a 
person is nervous, excited, or afraid, the heartbeat increases, and when a person 
sleeps, it decreases, etc. Similarly, when someone runs fast and for a long time 
period, her or his heart beats faster and more intensively and therefore can be 
felt in a more intensive way. 
The heart is also intrinsically related to life and death. A typical practice to 
detect or determine the death of a person is to check his or her heart beat, or 
pulse. Diversely, kidney or liver failure may also lead to loss of life, but access to 
these body organs is very restricted. Nevertheless, these other organs are also 
found across languages for such descriptions. For example, in Chinese, many 
different organs are included in linguistic expressions denoting emotions or 
personality traits. Here, a strong relationship to traditional Chinese medicine can 
be observed (Yu 2009), which constitutes the basis for this elaborate system of 
relationships between emotions and body parts. 
5.7.1. -dzéé “HEART” AS BODY PART 
In Beaver, the lexical item -dzé̲é “heart” is associated with several 
conceptual aspects and frames. The most basic feature BODY PART is essential 
for several uses of the Beaver term -dzé̲é “heart”, and is highlighted in 
expressions dealing with life, survival and death. Additionally, a metonymic 
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expression denoting EXCITEMENT or FEAR displays a similar conceptual 
construction. 
In the corpus, the following fixed expressions highlighting the conceptual 
aspect BODY PART have been identified: 
 
(76) madzé̲éʼ dadyi “heart attack” 
(lit. his/her heart hurts) 
(77) madzé̲éʼ łííníítlʼa “s/he died” 
(lit. his/her heart stopped running) 
(78) madzé̲éʼ daʼatlʼizǫ “s/he is excited / scared” 
(lit. his/her heart is dancing) 
(79) madzé̲éʼ gaakʼa daʼatlʼizǫ “s/he survived, is still alive” 
(lit. his/her heart is still dancing) 
 
These descriptive constructions apply the conceptual feature BODY PART 
of “heart” as essential for life in general and as physiologically perceivable in 
stressful situations, especially in the case of the term for myocardial infarction. 
In this form (madzé̲éʼ dadyi  “heart attack (lit. his/her heart hurts”)), the 
cardinal symptom is employed to refer to the event in consequence of a heart 
disease. Similarly, in the case of EXCITEMENT / FEAR, a consequence or result – 
an increase of heart activity – is linguistically used to express the corresponding 
mental states in a metonymic fashion (EFFECT FOR CAUSE). 
Semantically, these expressions use “heart” in a descriptive manner, while 
the verbs utilized show figurative aspects in relation to the particular functions 
of a body organ. In the construction denoting DEATH of a person, the usage of 
the verb -tʼla “run” is conventionalized, while the SURVIVAL and EXCITEMENT 
expressions include the verb dáh-dlihts “dance”. 
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Madzé̲éʼ łííníítlʼa meaning “to die (lit. his/her heart stopped running)” is a 
metonymy-based construction (EFFECT FOR CAUSE). The underlying 
conceptualization does not only conform to this Beaver interpretation, but also 
allows for implementation and usage in other contexts – as is the case in 
English. In the following discussion, the researcher intended to talk about the 
English expression “my heart (almost) stopped” referring to a frightful situation. 
The Beaver speaker, on the other hand, immediately included this expression in 
the conventionalized Beaver context of death: 
 
Researcher: So there wouldn’t be a word for the pulse? When you feel that? 
Uhm, would you sometimes say “my heart stopped”? 
Consultant101: What you mean? 
Researcher: I don’t know, when you hear some- 
Consultant101: If a person dies you just tell them madzé̲éʼ łííníítlʼa. See? […] 
When a person- after you’re sitting there by the bedside, and he start- he 
stop- breathing? That’s what- It’s “his heart stop running”. That’s what it 
means. “Running”, łííníítlʼa. Yeah. […] See? “His heart quit running”. 
Running and beating, and - they are all the same word.  
        (metaphors001) 
 
The ‘obvious link’ between a heart – as included in the literal meaning – 
and DEATH – the intended meaning – is referred to in the explanation. This 
mirrors the fact that cultural models and conventionalized expressions seem 
self-explanatory for native speakers (Holland & Quinn 1987). The similar notion 
of “breath” as an indicator of life is also mentioned in the statement above. 
 
In the linguistic expression for SURVIVE, the metaphorical usage of dáh-
dlihts “dance” is conceptually combined with the positive experience expressed 
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by this form. In discussions of this term, a speaker gives the following 
statement: 
 
Consultant101: And if somebody falls, and you touch his heart, madzé̲éʼ gaakʼa 
daʼatlʼizǫ, they say. “The heart is still dancing”, or “jumping”. […] They say 
to you, if you fall down and they feel you all over and your heart? That’s 
what they- you hear from them. ‘Cause I heard that lots of times. […] 
“Dancing” is a word for it, for our language.  (metaphors001) 
 
There is an unequivocal reference to the physiological experiences and 
situations in which the heart reveals a person’s condition (“[…] and you touch 
his heart […] they feel you all over and your heart?” (metaphors001)). 
Ideological aspects are also included in the statements: “for our language” 
is used as justification in combination with the ‘conceptual baggage’ of “dance” 
– in particular its positive connotation – highlighted by the speaker. 
Consequences of cultural models like implicitness or ostensible mirroring of 
reality complicate or handicap awareness of figurative constructions as well as of 
(originally/actually) underlying conceptualizations. At the same time they 
constitute an alibi for idiosyncracies, and shield or sustain language-specific 
concepts against influence from outside. Finally, socio-culturally based concepts 
of elders and knowledge dissemination provide evidential structure for the 
correctness and conventionality of such expressions. Beaver speakers often refer 
to former times and ancestors to substantiate their statements (“[...] you hear 
from them. ‘Cause I heard that lots of times.”(metaphors001)). 
5.7.1.1. EXCITEMENT / FEAR  
The other expression in Beaver, combining the notion of “dance” with 
heart is madzé̲éʼ dahʼatlʼis “be excited / scared (lit. his/her heart is dancing)”. 
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Here, no relation to a positive connotation, or to some notion of a folk model is 
explicitly mentioned in metalinguistic explanations. The meaning or usage of this 
expression is context-bound and is not exclusively linked to a positive or 
negative emotion. Instead, the physical effect of an increased heartbeat – as 
mentioned above – is applied in a metonymic fashion (EFFECT FOR CAUSE) 
for at least two emotional or psychological conditions, EXCITEMENT and FEAR: 
 
Researcher: […] So, there is nothing else you can say about your heart? Like 
maybe “it jumps” or “it skips”, when something happens? 
Consultant101: No. No. [[pause]] For somebody that’s heart beats fast. madzé̲éʼ 
daʼatlʼizǫ See? “Your heart is dancing.” That’s what it means. When you 
beating instead- jumping instead of saying jumping, you just say dance. […] 
Researcher: “‘His heart is dancing.’ Does that mean he is excited? Or does that 
mean he is scared?” 
Consultant101: “Either way, ‘scared’ or ... I go like that, when I get really 
excited? I could feel my heart beating fast.  (metaphors001) 
 
The idiom meaning “be scared, be excited” linguistically parallels the 
expression for “be still alive, survive”, the same verb is combined with the 
notion of heart: madzé̲éʼ gáákʼa dahʼatlʼis (lit. his/her heart is still dancing). 
Besides the fact that dáh-dlihts “dance” evokes figurativity in both 
constructions, these metonymy-based constructions madzé̲éʼ gáákʼa dahʼatlʼis 
“be still alive, survive” and madzé̲éʼ dahʼatlʼis “be excited / scared” need not be 
defined as metaphorical conceptualizations. More precisely, the forms allow for 
classification as linguistically manifesting the conjunctive metonymy 
PHYSIOLOGICAL EFFECT FOR CAUSE (Dirven 1985). 
In opposition to expressions for emotion or personality traits 
conceptualizing the “heart” as SEAT OF EMOTION, “heart” is realized as concrete 
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body part here (“I could feel my heart beating fast.”, “… you touch his heart 
…” (metaphors001)). More precisely – but not contradictory to the BODY PART 
concept –, heart takes on the role of an independent, self-governed entity: 
BODY PART IS AUTONOMOUS ENTITY. This is a consequence from 
physiological experiences of EXCITEMENT or FEAR, where the person has no 
control over the bodily reactions linguistically expressed in the form under 
discussion here. 
The explanation of the expression explicitly contains the perception of this 
physiological effect (“for somebody that’s heart beats fast […]” 
(metaphors001)). As will be seen below, this is not the case for usages of “heart” 
as SEAT OF EMOTION (ch. 5.7.3.). Furthermore, the statement explains the 
employed metonymy BODY PART FOR PERSON in explicitly referring to the 
person meant (also “… I go like that, when I get really excited …” 
(metaphors001)). 
When conjuring up the English and German expressions used in situations 
of affright – “my heart stopped”; Mir ist das Herz stehengeblieben “my heart 
stopped” –, we can see that the Beaver expression alludes to a more lasting 
aspect than the English and German forms. “Someone’s heart stopped” out of 
fright only describes a temporally very short moment which is followed by an 
increased heartbeat. It is exactly this state – having a fast-beating heart – that is 
linguistically manifested in the Beaver expression for EXCITEMENT or FEAR51. 
Similarly, DEATH and a missing heartbeat go perfectly together indeed, since 
both concepts define each other.52 
                                               
51  The English expression “heart-stopping” meaning “breath-taking, staggering” refers to a 
similar mental state, which is not exclusively linked to affright. However, this conceptualization is 
also more metaphorical than the Beaver metonymic and descriptive forms. 
52  The metonymy CAUSE FOR EFFECT is difficult to include here. Although an effect of 
death can be the ceased heart beat, it can also be the other way around, i.e. the missing heart beat 
leading to death. 
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The usage of different verbs like English “beat”, German schlagen “bat”, 
rasen “speed”, and Beaver dáh-dlihts “dance”, and -tlʼa “run” constitutes the fact 
that the activity of the muscle “heart” is linguistically expressed via more 
concrete source concepts. Biologically, a heart muscle tenses and relaxes, while 
in most languages transferred meanings are conventionalized, all including 
conceptual aspects suiting the concept of ‘heartbeat’ aimed at. 
When asked for “pulse”, Beaver speakers state that there is no word in 
their language. This ‘lack’ can be linked to a differing medical theory, which does 
not specify this aspect independently of disease contexts. That is, concepts 
including the (missing) heartbeat, like DEATH or SURVIVE indeed linguistically 
refer to the heartbeat. However, the used constructions differ, so that no single 
and uniform or standardized term for “pulse” has been established. 
This does not mean that Beaver entirely lacks the concept of pulse or is 
unable to communicate it. Rather, different conceptual and linguistic strategies 
are linked to specific contexts in which the heartbeat is salient in socio-cultural 
as well as linguistic patterns. The ideological concepts of English and Beaver as 
languages lead to denial or negation of the speakers, stating that there is no word 
for ‘pulse’ in Beaver. Beaver speakers are tempted to deny the existence of 
Beaver “words”, although they express very similar meanings compared to 
English items. This is due to the high status of English in combination with the 
apparently perfect organization and completeness of its lexicon. Furthermore, 
the less fixed and more complex Beaver linguistic patterns strengthen this 
ideological position. 
The Beaver expressions given above are defined as linguistically 
metaphorical as a whole due to the literal meanings of the verbs in combination 
with “heart” as subject. Concerning the concept of heart, no figurative or 
metaphorical transmission takes place. It is the concrete BODY PART referred to 
in these terms, i.e. the prototypical and basic conceptual aspect of the linguistic 
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item -dzé̲é “heart”, while the verbs included are used in non-prototypical 
contexts, and with non-prototypical arguments, evoking figurativity. 
5.7.2. -dzéé “HEART” AS SHAPE  
In the network of HEART, another area concentrates on the conceptual 
aspect SHAPE of a heart in Beaver. Three expressions are conventionalized:  
 
(80) i ̨í ̨d́zá̲ą̨  “strawberries”    lit. its little heart(s) 
(81) adzé̲éʼ  “hearts (in a deck of cards)”  lit. its heart(s) 
(82) dzé̲ékʼazi “spade (in a deck of cards)”  lit. black heart(s) 
5.7.2.1. STRAWBERRIES  
The linguistic form i ̨í ̨d́zá̲ą̨ “strawberries (lit. its little heart(s))” is composed 
of the indefinite possessive prefix i ̨í ̨-́ (‘indef.sg.poss.’), -dzé̲é “heart”, and a 
diminutive marker, realized as áa- along with nasalization of the ultimate vowel 
and falling tone. 
In metalinguistic statements about the usage of “heart” in this denotation, 
Beaver speakers refer to the similar form of this fruit, as well as to its smaller 
size, hence use of the diminutive form.  
Another linguistic item is found in this part of the conceptual network 
HEART: 
 
(85) i ̨í ̨d́zá̲a [nickname] (lit. little strawberry (potentially: little little heart)) 
 
In linguistic terms, an analysis reveals this construction as double-marked 
with two diminutive markers. It therefore offers the literal meaning “little little 
heart”. However, the conceptualization is not directly linked to the body part 
“heart” – as could be assumed in analogy to, for example, English “sweetheart” 
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– but to the concept of “strawberry” as a sweet and red fruit53. Speakers explain 
this expression in relation to characteristics of the strawberry and do not directly 
mention relations to “heart”, e.g. as a term of endearment such as in English. 
Anyhow, the relation to the basic meaning BODY PART is to some degree 
available in an appropriate context: when the literal meaning of “strawberries” is 
discussed, the conceptual aspect BODY PART is mentioned. This justifies the 
inclusion of i ̨í ̨d́zá̲á “[nickname] (lit. little strawberry)” into the HEART network, 
despite the greater conceptual distance to the other meanings and usages. 
5.7.2.2. SPADE 
In the other two terms in this subpart of the lexicon, modern life 
terminology found its way into the Beaver language via expanding the network 
of the polysemous term HEART, more precisely via a correspondence of SHAPE. 
Both terms refer to suits in a deck of cards, repeated here: 
 
(83) adzé̲éʼ  “hearts (in a deck of cards)”  lit. its heart(s) 
(84) dzé̲ékʼazi  “spade (in a deck of cards)”  lit. black heart(s) 
 
The English term ‘spade’ etymologically originates from Italian spade 
“sword, spade”, and therefore – at least linguistically – does not belong to the 
English HEART network, but to the SWORD/SPADE structure. In German, Pik 
“spade” is associated with “pike” or “lance”, whereas a description of the 
referent in a deck of cards often applies the image of an ‘upside-down heart’. 
Accordingly, the domain PIKE is evoked in German via the linguistic expression, 
while explanations rely on a similar concept as that found in Beaver (i.e. with 
reference to an upside-down heart), but which is not linguistically manifested. 
                                               
53 This nickname is particularly – although not exclusively – used for persons with red hair, 
but also for persons often picking berries. 
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The “hearts (in a deck of cards)” construction follows the basic meaning 
of this network, and inherits the inalienability concept, i.e. adzé̲éʼ with the 
indefinite possessive prefix literally means “its heart(s)”. The inalienability 
marking is found in most of the usages of body part terms in the Beaver lexicon, 
although various meanings and usages do not necessarily evoke this concept. 
Access to the obligatory inalienability as a linguistic rule is restricted, especially in 
such transferred meanings. That means, the inalienability of body parts or 
organs is more available and logically more comprehensible than the literal 
meaning “its (little) heart” for, for example, “strawberries”. Several plant part 
terms are also linguistically realized as inalienable entities, since they constitute 
an intrinsic part of a plant, and are therefore conceptualized similarly to body 
parts. For example, kʼat chineʼ “willow branch (lit. willow’s stick/wood/tree 
(stick-POSS))”, and dachį ghaayéʼ “root (lit. stick’s/wood’s/tree’s root (root-
POSS))” refer to the part-whole relation holding between these parts and a 
whole tree or plant. In the case of terms for fruits and berries, on the other 
hand, this pattern is not sustained, i.e. these expressions are alienable terms. 
Although the referents show class membership for at least the two domains 
PLANT and FOOD, the domain FOOD outweighs the domain PLANT. As a 
consequence, for example, “berries” are conceptually detached from being a 
scion: dáhghuẕéʼ “gooseberries, black currants (lit. little thorns)”, máásí̱íluu 
“(highbush) cranberries, mooseberries”. For i ̨í ̨d́zá̲ą̨ “strawberries (lit. its 
heart(s))”, however, the concept of inalienability is linguistically maintained. The 
literal meaning of this item is most often given immediately, i.e. is directly 
available. This indicates that the link to the body part – and therefore 
justification of the notion of inalienability – is to some point accessible. 
Notwithstanding, in the complex HEART concept, the actually obligatory aspect 
of inalienability is not kept throughout the network, as the meaning “spade” 
shows. Strikingly, it constitutes one of the usages found in the corpus without 
this otherwise obligatory feature: dzé̲ékʼazi “spade (in a deck of cards)” is 
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construed and translated as “black heart(s)”, without any statement about the 
missing possessive prefix. Note that for adzé̲éʼ “hearts (in a deck of cards)”, the 
inalienable form is used (see 5.7.2.3. below).  
Several points allow for the hypothesis that the distance in the transfer 
from the BODY PART frame to the CARD SUIT frame causes the loss of this 
mandatory marking. The distance between the suit “spade” and the body organ 
heart is bigger than between “hearts” in a deck of cards and heart as an organ. 
The combination of “heart” with the color ‘black’, and the fact that card suits 
are not a traditional Beaver concept, but were introduced by western traditions, 
also strengthen this effect. Thus, the figurative aspects increase in dzé̲ékʼazi 
“spade (in a deck of cards) (lit. black heart(s))”, and loosen or override the 
inalienability feature elsewhere transferred according to the “Invariance 
Principle” (Lakoff 2006[1993], see also ch.3.1.3.1.). 
5.7.2.3. HEART 
The term for “hearts” in a deck of cards – adzé̲éʼ – is linked via 
resemblance to the real body part – the card suit is meant to refer to the well-
known idealized western image of HEART universally used. However, it is 
primarily related to the organ heart via the fact that the English language – 
second and everyday language for all of the speakers – uses “heart” to denote 
this suit. Still, the possessive prefix is mentioned when asked for the literal 
meaning, related to the obligatory possessive construction of inalienable nouns. 
The referents of the meanings just described belong to modern life 
vocabulary, and were introduced by non-native people decades ago. Although to 
some degree influenced by the English (and French) expressions, these currently 
conventionalized neologisms represent examples of flexibility of the conceptual 
networks found in the mental lexicon. It reflects their ability to cope with new 
concepts via extension. The already polysemous concept of -dzé̲é “heart” is 
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further expanded due to borrowing of the concept, resemblance aspects of the 
referents and the tendency for economic management of the lexicon. 
 
To sum up the organization of the network HEART so far, two conceptual 
aspects were identified as departing points for the eight usages of the linguistic 
form described above: BODY PART for the descriptive expressions “to be still 
alive, survive”, “be excited / scared” “to die”, and “heart attack”, and SHAPE for 
“heart”, “spade”, “strawberries”, and finally, “little strawberry [nickname]” as 
further elaborated from “strawberries”. These conceptual aspects are extracted 
from the prototypical concept of HEART and highlighted in new senses. For 
those expressions, conceptual resemblance – resting on real aspects of similarity 
or relationships between the referents – is identified as the main reason for their 
inclusion in the HEART network. In combination with socio-cultural traditions 
and patterns, these Beaver meanings and conceptualizations are accessible to the 
speakers. The last expression i ̨í ̨d́zá̲a [nickname] (lit. little strawberry) will be 
defined as indirectly linked to the concept of HEART, since the resemblances 
between HEART and STRAWBERRY are not the ones in focus here. Rather, the 
conventionalized association between the fruits and the person denoted by this 
nickname is decisive.  
In the next paragraph, a third conceptual aspect of HEART will be 
investigated and classified as the departing point: SEAT OF EMOTION is applied 
for several expressions of emotions and personality traits. 
5.7.3. -dzéé “HEART”: METAPHORICAL CONCEPTUAL ASPECT 
The next part of the HEART network shows a quite restricted and more 
complicated access concerning the relations between the linguistic terms as well 
as between the underlying conceptual features giving rise to them. At the same 
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time, the constructions are still linguistically overt – in the sense that 
grammaticalization or lexicalization effects do not conceal the lexical inventory. 
In the corpus, several figurative constructions employing -dzé̲é “heart” 
were identified. The express the following emotions and personality traits: 
 
(86) sadzé̲éʼ ghǫ́lįį   “I am brave (lit. my heart exists)” 
(87) sadzé̲éʼ náátsat  “I am flinty, stone-hearted 
(lit. my heart is hard/strong)” 
(88) adyuu sadzé̲éʼ náátsa̲t  “I am soft-hearted  
(lit. my heart is not hard/strong)” 
(89) sadzé̲éʼ xaats ̲ʼat   “I am angry (lit. my heart falls out)” 
(90) sadzé̲éʼ tyíhsa̲ne “I am lonely (lit. my heart is pitiful)” 
(91) sadzé̲éʼ nakǫįl   “I am sad, worry (lit. my heart is heavy)” 
 
(86) to (88) denote emotions, while (89) to (91) refer to personality traits. 
The extensive usage of “heart” to express these and related emotions and mental 
characteristics appears to be striking. 
The idioms under investigation here do not rely on real physical activities 
of a heart as identified in the usages of “heart” in constructions like madze 
łííníítlʼa “to die (lit. his/her heart stopped running)”. In those expressions, the 
typical functions of the organ “heart” are used to refer to the intended 
meanings. In the forms described in this section, socio-culturally established 
relations between conceptual aspects of the body part terms and the emotions 
and personality traits are applied in order to communicate the intended abstract 
concepts. These are not linked to HEART per se as is the case in madz̲é̲é 
dáhʼatlʼis “s/he is excited / scared (lit. his/her heart is dancing)”, utilizing 
increased heartbeat for EXCITEMENT. Yet, “my heart is dancing” cannot be 
defined as a literal expression differing completely from, for example, sadzé̲éʼ 
xaats ̲ʼat “my heart falls out” (literal meaning of “I am angry”). This indicates 
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that there exist different types of non-literal or figurative language. On the one 
hand, there are forms supportively exploited for expressing real, physiological 
experiences conceptualized as effects of an emotion or mental state. On the 
other hand, we find figurative language which creates important additional 
substance for communication. This is done by relating specific body part terms 
as SEATS OF EMOTION to the emotions intended to be expressed. This point will 
be made clear in chapter 6. 
For the idiomatic constructions denoting emotions and personality traits 
and containing body parts or organs, two statements can be made: first, the body 
parts are conceptualized as SEAT OF EMOTION, and secondly, they 
metonymically stand for the whole person: SEAT OF EMOTION FOR 
PERSON. The conventional realization of body parts as closely linked to 
emotions, mental states, and personality traits reflects the interplay of 
embodiment. On the other hand, specific, socio-culturally based relations 
between individual body parts and emotions or personality traits can be 
observed. 
This complex concept constitutes the starting point for the different 
linguistic metaphors and metonymies referring to psychological constitutions, 
mental states and related phenomena. Thus, attributes like “be hard/strong” and 
“be heavy” are not ascribed to the person, but to a specific body part or organ. 
The individual combinations of characteristics and body parts are based on a 
bidirectional mixture of socio-cultural models and physiology or embodied 
experiences, and compensate the less accessible conceptual structure of 
emotions. 
5.7.3.1. HEART AS SEAT OF EMOTION IN BEAVER 
In Beaver, the emotions and personality traits linguistically realized via the 
inclusion of -dzéé “heart” are not restricted to either positive or negative 
concepts – nor are such constructions in other languages and cultures. Although 
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at first sight, HEART evokes positive connotations (e.g. in English “have a heart 
of gold”, “to be dear to one’s heart”, “to lose one’s heart to somebody”), this 
organ is also used to express negative concepts (e.g. in English “to be stone-
hearted”, “to break one’s heart”, “be chicken-hearted”). A more useful 
classification of the usage of “heart” concentrates on the degree of strength or 
intensity: most of the concepts expressed show a high value and significance, be 
it positive or negative. Therefore, intensely experienced events, often with socio-
cultural valence, like LOVE, GRIEF, PAIN, and GOODNESS (or KIND-
HEARTEDNESS) are connected to this organ. 
The emotion and personality trait concepts discussed in the next sections 
(SOFT-/STONE-HEARTEDNESS, BRAVERY / COURAGE; SADNESS, LONELINESS, 
ANGER) are realized by linguistic constructions including -dzé̲é “heart” with 
another conceptualization than in the forms above (ch. 5.7.1. – 5.7.2.). As 
already described (ch. 5.5.1.), the form sadzé̲éʼ dahʼatlʼis “lit. my heart is 
dancing” meaning either EXCITEMENT or FEAR, linguistically depicts the 
relationship of heart with these emotions. Yet, in these meanings, “heart” is 
processed and understood as a concrete BODY PART, and is embedded in this 
descriptive expression with means of the metonymy EFFECT FOR CAUSE. 
Both concepts – EXCITEMENT and FEAR – are related to increased heartbeat, 
since both are connected to agitation, uneasiness or discomposure. EXCITEMENT 
includes both negative as well as positive feelings, whereas FEAR clearly refers to 
a negative emotion. EXCITEMENT is a physiological reaction to harmful or 
generally exciting (i.e. also positive) situations, and is conceptualized via this 
bodily experience. Thus, it is linguistically more linked to body than to mind. 
The similarities of all these linguistic constructions are based on their overall 
figurativity evoked by the inclusion of verbs in non-prototypical usages (dáh-
dlihts “dance” and -tlʼa “run”, see ch. 6). In the conceptualizations and linguistic 
constructions discussed in this part, another understanding and processing of -
dzé̲é “heart” and its relation to physiological effects prevails. 
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Before emotion and personality traits are discussed, two expressions of 
LOVE also employing -dzé̲é “heart” in Beaver are described. These are similar to 
English expressions: sadzé̲éʼéh noasdye “I love you from my heart”; sadzé̲ékʼéh 
sįda “s/he sits in my heart”. LOVE is strongly associated with “heart”, and 
beloved persons or entities, showing increased salience and importance, are 
positioned close to this SEAT OF LOVE. Characteristics of “heart” as a concrete 
body part do not play the most relevant role for this form – the statement given 
does not explicitly refer to the organ or to physiological experiences: 
 
Consultant101: sadzé̲éʼéh noasdye (“I love you with my heart”) means “I love 
you with my heart”. […] sadzé̲ékʼéh sįda (“you sit on/in my heart”) “He’s 
one of them that’s in my heart.” […] That means, you know, your heart 
loves people, he’s one of them that’s in there, in your heart. sadzé̲ékʼéh 
sįda. […] Or “you’re in my heart”. […] You know, “you’re sitting on my 
heart”, that means that person is one of them in your heart. […] So dear to 
you or so- you care for that person so much, you just say that to them. 
You’re one of them in my heart. I’ve said that to a lot of kids.  
        (metaphor100) 
 
In the construction discussed above, “heart” is not only conceptualized as 
SEAT OF EMOTION, but also as a seat for the objects the emotion focuses on. 
The variation in usage of both postpositions -kʼéh “in/on/at” and -tʼáá “in”, as 
well as the statement “it’s still the same thing. So dear to you [...] 
(metaphor100)” strengthens the abstract notion of this expression, and – 
together with the verb stem -da “sit” – comes close to the conceptual aspect of 
“seat surface” in SEAT OF EMOTION. 
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BRAVERY / COURAGE, STONE-HEARTEDNESS and SOFT-HEARTEDNESS as 
personality traits display conceptual similarities via the relation to “heart” as 
SEAT OF EMOTION. Nevertheless, the linguistic and conceptual constructions of 
the individual traits show diversity. 
5.7.3.2. STONE-/SOFT-HEARTEDNESS 
The idioms expressing STONE - and SOFT-HEARTEDNESS are constructed 
as a verb phrase with the stative verb -ts̲at “be hard/strong”. The person 
denoted is not mentioned explicitly, rather, the metonymy SEAT OF 
EMOTION FOR PERSON is applied: sadzé̲éʼ nááts̲at “I am flinty, stone-
hearted (lit. my heart is hard/strong)”. It is not clear how these concepts are 
used, understood and evaluated in the Beaver community. Furthermore, when 
asked if STONE-HEARTEDNESS is a characteristic with a negative connotation, 
the speakers’ answers do not focus on the consequences of this trait for others – 
e.g. that others have to suffer because of unconcerned, cold behavior. Rather, 
they concentrate on the person being stone- or soft-hearted: 
 
Consultant101: madzé̲éʼ nááts̲at (“be flinty, stone-hearted”, lit. his/her heart is 
hard/strong) That’s the person, strong hearted person. […] That’s the e- 
expression you give to when somebody’s that doesn’t cry at- when they lose 
a family member or something. That what people use, that word. madzé̲éʼ 
nááts̲at (“be flinty, stone-hearted”, lit. his/her heart is hard/strong) Because 
they don’t cry. 
Researcher: So, is that a good thing to have a strong heart or is it- 
Consultant101: I don’t know. It hits them later, I guess. I’m very soft hearted, 
me- I can’t stand things like that.   (metaphors001) 
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The situational context mentioned by the speaker (“lose a family 
member”) evokes a situation where the person has to cope with a devastating 
event. The consequences of this personality trait have to be borne by this 
person, and not by others being hit by this flintiness. 
The Beaver concept of persons as being self-governed and not influenced 
by others or controlling the behavior of others, plays an important role in this 
more objective view (Mills 1986). It is not part of the Beaver socio-cultural 
model to judge someone’s behavior in difficult situations such as situations of 
grief and loss. Instead, everyone is free in and responsible for her/his own 
actions and attitude. The statement “it hits them later” (metaphors001) refers to 
the idea that mental states or the mental constitution of a person is something 
different than overt behavior, and inner reactions to events. For the analysis of 
HEART idioms in relation to emotions and personality traits, the concept of 
STONE-HEARTEDNESS will not be clearly defined as a negative or positive trait, 
since unequivocal evidence is lacking. As a whole, the literal meaning 
“someone’s heart is hard/strong” refers to a trait of a person who is flinty, or 
unfeeling in the sense of being stone- or cold-hearted (“That’s the person, 
strong hearted person.” (metaphors001)). Therefore, it does not primarily 
describe social behavior in relation to others, but is related to a personality trait, 
a way to react to the world. 
The negated form of this expression refers to the opposite personality 
trait: adyuu sadzé̲éʼ náátsa̲t “I am soft-hearted (lit. my heart is not 
hard/strong” describes a person who reacts emotionally to events, like crying 
and screaming in grief in an extroverted way: 
 
Consultant101: [...] sadz̲ééʼ nááts̲at (“I am hard-hearted (lit. my heart is 
hard/strong)”). “I got a strong heart.” sadzé̲éʼ adyuu nááts̲at (“I am soft-
hearted (lit. my heart is not hard/strong)”). You know, “you’re sad” […] 
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sadzé̲éʼ adyuu nááts̲at - If I see them, you know. Which means you- if you 
see somebody you just have to cry, “your heart is too soft”. […] adyuu 
madzé̲éʼ nááts̲at (lit her/his heart is not hard/strong) See? That’s the same 
way.     (metaphors001) 
 
5.7.3.3. COURAGE 
In Beaver, inner strength is linked to bravery and to the heart, again 
highlighting the overall value of this organ concerning experiences of one’s own 
body (and mental) reactions. The Beaver COURAGE idiom sadzé̲éʼ ghǫ́lįį (lit. 
“my heart exists”) shows a different figurative transfer and format than the ones 
just discussed. The concept of EXISTENCE is employed to refer to this trait, 
again linguistically focused on the body part term -dzé̲é “heart”: the metonymy 
CONTAINER FOR CONTAINED is applied, so that the existence of -dzé̲é 
“heart” as the container is expressed instead of the content, i.e. COURAGE. 
For TIMIDITY / COWARDICE55 as the antonymic concept of sadzé̲éʼ ghǫ́lįį 
“I am brave (lit. my heart exists)”, the following form is given: adyu sadzé̲éʼ 
ghǫ́lįį “be timid, coward (lit. my heart does not exist)”. Here, the relevance of 
conventionalized linguistic patterns becomes obvious: the form *sadzé̲éʼ 
nadyuéʼ (lit. my heart is not there) is explained as not being a real Beaver idiom, 
although the concept of a missing SEAT OF EMOTION is highlighted in this form, 
too. However, only sadzé̲éʼ adyuu ghǫ́lįį “be timid (lit. my heart does not 
exist)” is referred to by the speakers as a correct form with a ‘real Beaver 
meaning’. Such negated instances of affirmative forms – instead of antonymic 
lexical items – often carry out functions in Beaver executed by antonyms in 
other languages, as for example in English (e.g. “brave” – “timid”, “flinty” – 
“tender-hearted”). 
                                               
55 Note the English body part expression „gutlessness“ as alternative for “cowardice”. 
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In addition, speakers refer to this form in relation to HEARTLESSNESS, 
which is conceptualized similarly in English: 
 
Researcher: Could I also say “he has no heart”? Does that have a meaning, 
when you say about someone “he has no heart”? Or you wouldn’t say that? 
Consultant404: As we say adyuu madzé̲éʼ ǫ́lįį (“s/he is heartless (lit. his/her 
heart does not exist)”). “He’s got no heart.” 
Researcher: When would you say that? 
Consultant404: Well, some people they say he- when you- somebody says 
something, and then- he doesn’t got no- heart for you? 
Researcher: That’s like he doesn’t take pity on other people? 
Consultant404: Yeah, that means all that.   (metaphor120) 
 
This variation in meaning and usage reflects missing contextual clues and 
embededdness in a situation of neither COWARDICE nor HEARTLESSNESS. 
Accordingly, the choice of one meaning is due to chance in an elicitation 
session. Yet, these data do not imply incorrect application or lack of knowledge 
due to the endangered status of the language. Rather, this reflects the varying 
scope of a source domain (see ch. 3.2.2.1.). The underlying concept of a missing 
BODY PART or SEAT OF EMOTION is applied to several target domains on the 
basis of figurative metonymy (INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION), for example in 
sadee nadyuéʼ “be blind (lit. my eyes do not exist)” (see also ch. 6.5.1.). 
A similar conceptual variation occurs cross-linguistically, e.g. in German: 
ich drehe durch (lit. “I rotate/skid”) means “I’m getting angry” and “I’m getting 
crazy/excited”. Here, variation is not due to lack of knowledge or language 
death either. It is the basic concept of a feeling of LOSS OF (SELF-)CONTROL and 
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negative EXCITEMENT which are included in both concepts ANGER and 
INSANITY. 
5.7.3.4. SADNESS / WORRY 
The three emotions included in the BODY PART branch of the network of 
HEART are ANGER, LONELINESS, and SADNESS. The last two are construed in 
combination with stative verbs, tyih-sa̲n “be pitiful” and -koįł “be heavy”, 
respectively. Similarly to sadzé̲éʼ nááts̲at “I am flinty, stone-hearted (lit. my heart 
is hard/strong)”, a typically physical property is applied for sadzé̲éʼ nakǫįl “I am 
sad, I worry (lit. my heart is heavy)”. Here WEIGHT is used to refer to the 
negative emotions. Physiological effects such as reduced erectness are said to 
reflect the feeling of depression, and to give rise to such linguistic manifestations 
expressing HEAVINESS, and meaning SADNESS. The SEAT OF EMOTION is 
characterized as being heavy via the metonymy CONTAINER FOR 
CONTAINED, relating the intended emotion to the concrete state of 
HEAVINESS. “Heart” as SEAT OF EMOTION is not used in consequence of real 
embodied experience – SADNESS is not objectively linked to heart as is, for 
example, to EXCITEMENT via increased heartbeat. Rather, a cultural model 
establishes the relationship between the concept of “heart” as SEAT OF SADNESS 
and this emotion: 
 
Researcher: Or could you say something about your heart when you’re worried? 
I don’t know, “my heart is heavy” or “my heart is sad”. 
Consultant404: sadzé̲éʼ nakǫįl (“I am sad (lit. my heart is heavy)”) 
Researcher: You could say that? 
Consultant404: Yeah, you could say sadzé̲éʼ nakǫįl. 
Researcher: What does that mean? 
Consultant404: “My heart is heavy.” 
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Researcher: That means “it weighs lots”? Or that means “you’re sad”? 
Consultant404: Yeah, “your heart is heavy”, sadzé̲éʼ-, how would I put it. 
sadzé̲éʼ nakǫįl sįįdyííʼ natlǫʼéh (“I am sad, for I worry too much (lit. my 
heart is heavy, lots in my mind)”) 
Researcher: Is that something that people say? 
Consultant404: Yeah. “My heart is heavy for I worry too much.”  
        (metaphor120) 
 
Linguistically, the heart is “heavy”, not the contents of this container or 
SEAT OF EMOTION. This structure evokes the more concrete aspect BODY PART 
instead of directly referring to the abstract idea of SADNESS via “sadness is heavy 
in the (container) heart”. 
In the statement of the speaker just given, the restricted accessibility of 
underlying conceptualizations of such idiomatic expressions is unveiled. The 
somewhat unfavorable question does not ease the revealing of the intended 
meaning, since both – literal and intended – meanings are proposed as 
possibilities on a par. Still, the literal meaning is explained as related to the 
concept of SADNESS. Through the notion of worries, the speaker includes the 
corresponding figurative expression with the literal meaning “my minds are lots” 
(see ch. 5.4.5.), combining these two figurative expressions. 
5.7.3.5. LONELINESS 
The concept of LONELINESS is manifested via another pattern. Here, the 
linguistic item -dzéé “heart” used in the expression is meant to be identified as a 
person or assigned human emotions: sadzé̲éʼ tyíhsa̲ne “I am lonely (lit. my heart 
is pitiful)”. In appropriate contexts, the stative verb is also used to refer to 
persons being pitiful, or unfortunate: sį tsísa̱ne “I am pitiful”.  
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Consequently, and in addition to the metonymy SEAT OF EMOTION 
FOR PERSON, LONELINESS is expressed via personification of the SEAT OF 
EMOTION “heart”. Defining the heart as pathetic is conventionalized as meaning 
that the person possessing the heart is lonely. Correspondingly, the usage of the 
stative verb here is not transferred in the same way as, for example, the usages of 
dáh-dlihts “dance” or -koįł “be heavy” in the constructions discussed earlier. 
The verb tyih-sa̲n “be pitiful” is translated as “weak” by one of the consultants, 
indicating a socio-culturally based etymology of the verb “be pitiful”: 
 
Researcher: Are there other things you can say about your heart? […]56 Like “my 
heart is broken”? 
Consultant303: sadzé̲éʼ tyíhsa̲ne (“I am lonely (lit. my heart is pitiful))”) I guess, 
huh? 
Consultant202: Yeah, I guess, ya. 
Consultant303: wutséésdaneʼeh (“because I am lonely”). “Because I’m 
lonesome.” sadzé̲éʼ tyíhsa̲ne “I am lonesome (lit. my heart is pitiful)”) 
Researcher: That’s “my heart is broken”? 
Consultant202: “Is weak”. 
Researcher: Oh, “my heart is weak”? And that means I’m- 
Consultant202: When you are lonesome, you got a weak heart. That’s what it is. 
sadzé̲éʼ tyíhsa̲ne (“I am lonely (lit. my heart is pitiful)”). (heart001) 
 
This notion of WEAKNESS – as a physical characteristic ‘not strong, fragile’ 
– as explained by the speaker is non-recurring. 
                                               
56 The speakers do not answer the first question. After a while, the researcher asks the second 
question which is immediately answered with the given phrase.  
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The Beaver form “my heart is pitiful” is given in correspondence to the 
English concept of a “broken heart”, while the linguistic manifestation is not 
paralleled. In both languages, cultural models connect the body part term 
“heart” with SADNESS or emotional pain, while different conceptual aspects are 
highlighted via dissimilar linguistic inventories. In the English form, the notion 
of “forceful damage from outside” is focused. This is an aspect not suiting the 
Beaver concept of autonomous individuals who do not govern or manipulate 
others, so that the aspect of violence is not conceptually extracted and explicitly 
mentioned. 
In fact, tyih-sa̲n “be pitiful” is indeed used and meant in its prototypical 
sense. What evokes figurativity is the semantic combination of argument and 
predicate, and the relation to the intended meaning ‘SEAT OF EMOTION being 
pitiful’ used to express the SADNESS of the person the heart belongs to.  
5.7.3.6. ANGER 
ANGER is realized via a linguistic metaphor expressing the idea that the 
heart as SEAT OF EMOTION falls out of the angry person’s body: sadzé̲éʼ xaats ̲ʼat 
“I am angry (lit. my heart falls out)”. This idiom is most often mentioned first by 
the Beaver speakers when asked for “anger”, and it is also found in narratives 
where ANGER is described. Nevertheless, in the corpus, a verb stem for this 
emotion is found: da-łį “be angry, be mad”. This form is not further analyzable, 
the verb root does not consist of multiple morphemes, nor is it used figuratively. 
Although this form occurs quite seldom in the corpus, it cannot be stated that 
the figurative expression applying the body part term “heart” constitutes the 
only form. Rather, it constitutes another linguistic possibility to express ANGER, 
differing from the above mentioned form by the figurative use of its semantic 
input. Additionally, its frequency is far higher than that of the verb just 
mentioned. 
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Speakers react to this form by almost immediately translating the literal 
meaning, and they comment on it with statements like those given below. In 
relation to the literal meaning, the figurativity aspects are consciously available 
for the speakers, while the relation between literal and intended meaning is not 
directly accessible. As a result, speakers do not give a coherent explanation of 
this relationship, but often react with laughter and ideological justifications: 
 
Consultant101: sadzé̲éʼ xááts ̲ʼat - means “my heart fell off”, “my fa- heart fell 
out”. sadzé̲éʼ xááts ̲ʼat. [[laughter]] That’s mean- this is what I mean when I 
say that n- when I - you know, but this sadzé̲éʼ xááts ̲ʼat, how could you- 
that'll happen- your heart can’t fell off. […] [[laughter]] That means “I’m 
mad”.       (metaphors001) 
 
Consultant505: madzé̲éʼ xááts ̲ʼadu abééts (“s/he is angry (lit. her/his heart falls 
out) and s/he boils”) “She is mad and she’s boiling.” [[laughter]] […] Just 
like you- they say in Indian way “your heart is coming out”. sadzé̲éʼ xááts ̲ʼat 
(“s/he is angry (lit. her/his heart falls out).  (paradigm_boil001) 
 
Researcher: How would you say “I’m mad”? “I’m angry”? 
Consultant202: nadzé̲éʼ xááts ̲ʼat (“you are mad (lit. your heart falls out)”) That’s 
“your heart, it come out”. 
Consultant303: “You’re mad.” [[laughter]]. 
Consultant202: Yeah, your heart is not there anymore, it fell off. [[laughter]] 
        (paradigm_be_lonesome001) 
 
Consultant202: “He got mad.” madzé̲éʼ xááts ̲ʼat, “his heart come out”, “he’s 
mad”, huh? It come out, that’s what the Beaver says, when you get mad, 
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your heart come out, you got no more heart, huh? Yeah, that’s what it 
meant.      (littledipper002-transcript) 
 
Consultant606: “He’s really mad.” Yeah. 
Researcher: So, something about his heart? 
Consultant606: Yeah, madzé̲éʼ (“his/her heart”). […] A heart- means madzé̲éʼ 
xááts ̲ʼat (“s/he is angry (lit. his/her heart falls out)”). Out of his body. His 
heart fell out of his body.    (metaphor130) 
 
Consultant101: It’s like that- we always laugh about that, and then we say 
sadzé̲éʼ xááts ̲ʼat. Your heart is- it’s gone, but it’s still in there [[laughter]]. 
Without a heart you can’t live.    (metaphor100) 
 
In the last statement, the speaker’s reference to the prototypical meaning 
of “heart” – BODY PART – becomes evident, as well as context-dependence of 
the sense SEAT OF EMOTION of this linguistic form. In narratives, where ANGER 
is part of the content, but also in elicitation sessions where ANGER is mentioned, 
the form is not justified with expressions like “without a heart you can’t live” 
(metaphor100). Yet, when the literal meaning forms the topic of discussion, 
speakers switch to the basic meaning of -dzéé “heart”, because the conceptual 
aspect SEAT OF EMOTION is not accessible in detail and therefore not 
explainable. 
In discussions about the descriptive terms meaning “to die”, and “to 
survive, to be still alive”, speakers indeed refer to typical functions and activities 
of the heart organ, i.e. beating to keep a person alive. Concerning the figurative 
expressions discussed here, such behavior of this organ is not observed. This 
implies that the relationship between “heart” as SEAT OF EMOTION and ANGER 
is based on a cultural model. 
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The linguistically expressed ejection or dropping of the heart together with 
the consequence – the SEAT OF EMOTION of the angry person is gone – 
manifests the Beaver concept of ANGER by highlighting a specific aspect. It is 
not apparent what underlying structures give rise to this form, potential aspirants 
are physiological effects, but also psychological states of ANGER. The speakers’ 
comments do not unequivocally allocate or explain the relations between this 
linguistic form and one of the concepts. The form can be understood as 
describing an overflow caused by PRESSURE inside the angry person, but further 
evidence for PRESSURE is missing. The notion of a sensed LOSS OF CONTROL or 
SELF-DETERMINATION is presumed here because of the overwhelming impact of 
ANGER as one of the psychological aspects of ANGER. The socio-culturally based 
concept of individual persons being self-determined, independent and free in 
their decision making also influences the conceptualization of this emotion. 
When one gets angry, one’s body reacts to this state as well as one’s mind, and 
one loses part of one’s self-control, an aspect in life very important for the 
Beaver people (Mills 1986). In the Beaver culture, a person does not intervene in 
another person’s decision, you do not give commands or instructions to others. 
Rather, you bequeath your own experience or knowledge, but the other person 
still makes her/his own decisions about how to deal with a situation. In chapter 
6.5.3., this point will be discussed in more detail and in relation to theoretical 
assumptions of ANGER as well as to source domains. 
In the data (session paradigm_boil001), variation concerning linguistic 
realization and conceptualization of ANGER in simultaneous usage is observed. 
Another linguistic metaphor to express ANGER in Beaver (abééts […] “she’s 
boiling”)57 refers to HEAT in an angry person without any inclusion of body 
parts as SEATS OF EMOTIONS. Despite different conceptualizations, this 
idiomatic expression madzé̲éʼ xááts ̲ʼadu abééts (“s/he is angry (lit. her/his heart 
                                               
57 This form is given only once by one speaker, so that a calque can be assumed in this case. 
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falls out) and s/he boils”) (paradigm_boil001) does not clash with the SEAT OF 
EMOTION concept of “heart”. The metonymic idea of HEAT as physiological 
effect of ANGER (HEAT FOR ANGER) is linguistically realized via the 
exaggeration of HEAT by using the verb for “boil”. 
5.7.4. SUMMARY OF NETWORK -dzéé “HEART” 
According to the descriptions of the individual linguistic instances 
including -dzéé  “heart”, the following picture of the conceptual network arises: 
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Figure 5.7.: Network of -dzéé “heart” 
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The basic or prototypical meaning of the linguistic item refers to the 
prototypical meaning BODY PART. The conceptual aspect BODY PART is adopted 
and highlighted to express concepts of LIFE/SURVIVAL, DEATH, EXCITEMENT 
and HEART DISEASE. Focusing on this part, the intended meaning of “heart” as 
part of these idiomatic expressions is communicated in a descriptive fashion, 
employing non-figurative metonymy58: PART FOR WHOLE (heartbeat for life), 
and EFFECT FOR CAUSE (heart pain for disease, increased heart beat for 
EXCITEMENT). Thus, a specification and elaboration of the prototype concept is 
conventionalized to refer to the meanings described, constituting one part of the 
HEART network. The transfer proceeds inside one domain (BODY (PART)), and 
the contiguity of concepts is overt and consciously accessible for the speakers. 
For “hearts (in a deck of cards)”, “spade (in a deck of cards)”, and 
“strawberries” another departing point from the basic meaning of -dzéé “heart” 
is identified. Via abstraction of the BODY PART, an image-schema concentrating 
on the SHAPE is extracted – besides influence from the English language. This 
conceptual aspect is focused in the transfer of “heart” to denote concepts 
showing similarity with respect to their forms. What the image-schema precisely 
looks like is difficult to state, since the traditional western form gained entrance 
into the Beaver culture. The similarity between the organ and strawberries is 
intuitively comprehensible, yet not conventionalized in every language. 
The last conceptual aspect SEAT OF EMOTION is applied in expressions for 
emotions and personality traits. In this part of the network, the target domains 
are all abstract phenomena, while at the same time, the basic and prototypical 
meaning HEART is also available. The metonymic and metaphorical expressions 
all have in common the underlying conceptual aspect of heart as SEAT OF 
EMOTION – i.e. an ‘abstract’ or schematic notion of a container for mental states. 
                                               
58  The metaphorical usage of the verbs -tlʼa “run” and dáh-dlihts “dance” are excluded here, 
since the usage of HEART is described in this part. 
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Furthermore, they share the conceptualization of emotions as linked to this 
SEAT OF EMOTION. In addition, the metonymy SEAT OF EMOTION FOR 
PERSON is included in the linguistic manifestations. Properties or 
characteristics are not imputed to the person experiencing the emotion, but to a 
SEAT OF EMOTION linked to the specific emotion or personality trait. 
The linguistic realizations show – despite their shared cognitive structure – 
salient differences reflecting idiosyncratic conceptualizations of the individual 
emotions and personality traits. Furthermore, the various linguistic patterns 
identified in the general linguistic realization of emotions via inclusion of body 
part terms (including “mind”) play a linking role: they relate all these “heart” 
expressions to the other body part idioms via linguistic and conceptual aspects 
(see ch. 6.4.). 
  223 
6. ANALYSIS OF 
THE BEAVER BODY PART TERMS & 
EXPRESSIONS OF EMOTION 
In this chapter, a classification of the Beaver linguistic forms and their 
underlying conceptualizations will be presented. The figurative linguistic 
realizations will not be exclusively analyzed in terms of conceptual metaphor as 
defined by Lakoff & Johnson (1980), Lakoff (2006[1993]) and Kövecses (2000, 
2010). As was shown in chapter 5, both, conceptual metaphor and metonymy 
allow for similar figurative realizations. Furthermore, conceptual structure is not 
the only phenomenon responsible for figurative expressions. Language use and 
linguistic structure are as relevant as the cognitive level (Evans 2009, 2010a, 
2010b). The prototypical meanings of the linguistic material are not literally 
applicable, rather the conceptual networks are extended and elaborated due to 
specific communicative needs. In a semantic and conceptual network, a 
transition is assumed from basic meanings and usages to non-literal ones on the 
basis of highlighted conceptual aspects. This means that both target and source 
constitute parts of one conceptual structure in the linguistic items discussed here 
(expressions of emotion including body part terms, ch. 6.1.). At the same time, 
the difference between abstract and concrete concepts is acknowledged in the 
definition of “linguistic conceptualization” (6.3.): meanings tightly linked to 
concrete domains comprise conceptual aspects which are also found in the 
conceptual structure of abstract meanings. For example, PRESSURE constitutes a 
conceptual aspect of the meaning of, for example, “burst” or “explode”. At the 
same time, it refers to a physiological effect of abstract concepts like ANGER. 
Therefore, the shared aspects are also linked to networks of abstract meanings 
(for example, emotions), albeit in a different quality and distance to prototypical 
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meanings. Still, they constitute departure points for further senses and usages in 
the networks of lexemes like “explode”. But a transfer of the conceptual 
structure of the prototypical and concrete source domain is not needed in an 
approach which does not only focus on the conceptual part of such phenomena. 
For example, in the case of PRESSURE and “explode” domains like DETONATION 
of concrete objects need not play an essential role for abstract categories like 
ANGER. As a consequence, for the expressions of emotion presented in the 
preceding chapter, metonymy is argued to be the underlying strategy (6.2.). 
Accordingly, effects of the target domains are identified in both, source and 
target. This means, those conceptual aspects of the linguistic material are utilized 
without metaphorical transfer, since they exist in both domains. The figurativity 
of the resulting linguistic expressions is not understood as a consequence of 
metaphorical conceptualization, but as a linguistic phenomenon.  
The Beaver expressions described here illustrate special cases due to their 
complex forms already introduced. The mapping SEAT OF EMOTION IS 
BODY PART is said to use the concept of a BODY PART as source domain. For 
example, the lexeme -dzé̲é “heart” is used as a source for the creation of the 
conceptual structure denoting a seat or container for emotions (Lakoff 
2006[1993], Kövecses 2003). Hence, it enables conceptualization and 
communication of emotions, personality traits and other related phenomena. 
Such a concept represents a special case of target domain: it does not constitute 
the target to be expressed first and foremost as intended meaning. Rather, it is 
used in combination with a predicate to denote another abstract concept. That 
means, the SEAT OF EMOTION aspect – and its image-schematic interpretation as 
a container – is created as an intermediate stage to ultimately express emotions 
or personality traits. To use the formulation of the CMT, the structures are not 
captured by X IS Y, but rather by X IS (Y IS Z): for example, not LOVE IS A 
JOURNEY, but ANGER IS (SEAT OF EMOTION IS HEART). 
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In the following sections, the Beaver emotion expressions described in 
chapter 5 will be classified. This is done first, in relation to the 
conceptualizations of the body part term included in the idiomatic form. Second, 
they are analyzed according to the predicates used and the underlying conceptual 
strategy of the whole construction. Simultaneously, some issues of the CMT 
introduced in chapter 3.4. will be discussed. The most relevant points in relation 
to the data are:  
 
• the identification of conceptual metaphors on the basis of linguistic 
material 
• the classification of the linguistic forms especially against the 
background of conceptual metonymies (ch. 6.1., 6.2.) 
• the hypothesis that the abstract target domains lack available and 
sufficient conceptual structure 
• the specific and rigid structure X IS Y (ch. 6.3., 6.5.) 
 
The linguistic forms are embedded in a broader perspective, i.e. in the 
sections of chapter 6.5., they are arranged in accordance to the linguistic patterns 
identified in the Beaver mental lexicon.  
6.1. SEAT OF EMOTION: 
CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR OR CONCEPTUAL ASPECT? 
This next part will focus on the body part terms and their 
conceptualizations in the emotion expressions. However, to coherently explain 
the concept SEAT OF EMOTION, the complete idiomatic forms are considered at 
some points in the argumentation of section 6.1. In the sections 6.2. – 6.6., these 
complex emotions expressions will be discussed in more detail. 
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The concept of a container-like place for emotions indicates a certain 
method. The need to locate emotions or inner states causes the conception of 
body parts as such seats. Since the emotions are not directly and objectively 
linked to specific body parts, the choice of particular body part terms correlates 
with culture-specific models. Socio-cultural, historical, but also already 
established linguistic patterns influence the choice of body parts, and their 
conceptualization as SEATS OF EMOTIONS as part of the conceptual network. 
The relation blends both concepts (BODY PART and SEAT OF EMOTION) into one 
flexible concept. Depending on the usage in specific emotion expressions, this 
concept allows for simultaneous availability with gradual emphasis. That means: 
first, the relation between SEAT OF EMOTION and BODY PART is not an 
oppositional one, but a continuous one. Both are involved in an overall concept 
of the body part term in question. Second, existing conceptual structure is 
included in the lexical “window” (e.g. -dzé̲é “heart”). It is based on physiological 
or socio-cultural experiences and models and is combined with the lexical form 
in different usages and senses. 
The linguistic conceptualization matches and blends the concept SEAT OF 
EMOTION with predicates which are used non-prototypically in such 
combinations. Specific conceptual aspects of the linguistic material are attributed 
to SEATS OF EMOTIONS as subjects. Together, they metonymically express the 
intended meanings, i.e. an emotion or personality trait. Here, particular 
conceptualization processes occur under the influence of cultural models as well 
as in analogy to concepts with supporting bodily experiences. The abstract 
character of physiological and psychological effects like PRESSURE enforces a 
specific conceptualization of particular body parts. This is needed to locate or 
substantiate these bodily consequences and reactions like PRESSURE, 
DEPRESSION, LACK OF CONTROL, IMPENETRABILITY or RESISTANCE. For 
example, increased heartbeat as a physiological effect of EXCITEMENT 
constitutes an actual, real world connection to the body organ “heart”. This is 
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utilized to express the intended meaning – i.e. EXCITEMENT (and FEAR in 
Beaver). On the other hand, effects like HEAT, PRESSURE or PERCEIVED LOSS OF 
CONTROL are not directly bound to specific body parts. Therefore, they display 
more abstract or imprecise features, a fact which is compensated via the 
identification of certain body parts as SEAT OF EMOTION. The elaboration of the 
concepts of body parts is not applied to create sufficient conceptual structure for 
emotions and personality traits. Instead, it establishes a domain capable of 
classifying abstract mental states and of providing linguistic material for 
communication of these states. This parallels conceptual metaphor to some 
degree, but differs in the assumption of a seamless transition. 
The definition of the concept SEAT OF EMOTION relies on the structures 
found in the mental lexicon as a whole. This means, it is based on the systematic 
usage of body parts in expressions for emotions, personality traits and related 
mental states where real physiological experiences constitute the basis. 
Furthermore, the metalinguistic statements of the speakers reveal a concept 
which combines concrete body parts as prototypical meanings of the used 
lexemes with additional structure. It is this combination which is linked to the 
abstract targets.  
 
For the analyses of the Beaver forms, the following consequences arise. 
Instead of applying a rigid definition of the conceptual metaphor SEAT OF 
EMOTION IS BODY PART, a gradual conceptualization is argued for. The 
conceptual metaphor separates the two usages of the lexeme -dzééʼ “heart”, 
while the alternative gradual transition from one sense to the other better suits 
the data and the metalinguistic justifications. No clear cut is assumed between 
BODY PART and SEAT OF EMOTION. Rather, the salience varies according to the 
conceptual aspects focused on in the individual idiomatic expressions. Such an 
analysis is not in (perfect) accordance with the CMT, which hypothesizes the 
obligatory existence of two diverse and clearly divided concepts (Lakoff 
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2006[1993], Kövecses 2006). In this case, SEAT OF EMOTION and BODY PART 
would constitute the two parts of a conceptual metaphor (like e.g. LOVE and 
JOURNEY in LOVE IS A JOURNEY). Here, the alternative description 
formulated also mirrors the relationships holding between the different senses of 
such polysemous items, and their availability to the speakers. The established 
networks are processed in the mental lexicon according to the communicative 
needs. The intended meaning is chosen without being identified as completely 
diverse. Neither is the meaning realized as independent from the existing 
network nor as parasitic on another conceptual structure (as is declared to be the 
case for LOVE and JOURNEY (Kövecses 2006, 2010)). 
In the linguistic manifestations, the body part terms are combined with 
predicates which are compatible with neither BODY PARTS nor SEATS OF 
EMOTIONS in their prototypical, literal meanings. Yet both aspects are available 
and part of the meanings: madzé̲éʼ gaakʼáá dáhʼatlʼis “s/he is still alive / 
survived (lit. his/her heart is still dancing)” is explained by the speakers with 
reference to the concrete BODY PART (“… you touch his heart …” 
(metaphors001)). By contrast, for example, “wheels” in the English expression 
“spinning our wheels” are not part of the LOVE concept, but are used to 
linguistically express the shared conceptual aspect STAGNANCY DESPITE ACTION. 
Therefore, I state that “heart” is realized and used as including both conceptual 
aspects with degrees, its prototypical and basic meaning BODY PART as well as 
the culturally based sense SEAT OF EMOTION. 
The transition from BODY PART to SEAT OF EMOTION just promoted – 
and therefore a mitigation or modification of the strict form X IS Y – allows for 
a gradual inclusion of the idioms on a continuity scale. To give some examples: 
madz̲é̲éʼ dadyi “heart attack (lit. my heart hurts)” is linked closer to the [BODY 
PART] end and shows a greater distance to the [SEAT OF EMOTION] end. In 
madz̲é̲éʼ dáhʼatlʼis “I am excited / scared (lit. my heart is dancing)”, “heart” is 
understood mainly as a body part reacting to physiological effects of 
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EXCITEMENT/FEAR (increased heartbeat). The concept of a SEAT OF EMOTION 
has its starting point in such constructions. The focus of this body part’s 
reaction to EXCITEMENT / FEAR and the linguistic conceptualization – i.e. the 
non-prototypical usage of dáh-dlihts “dance” – indicate modified conceptual 
structure. Accordingly, madz̲é̲éʼ dáhʼatlʼis “I am excited / scared (lit. my heart is 
dancing)” includes both aspects: ([+BODY PART], [+SEAT OF EMOTION]). 
In sadzé̲éʼ xááts ̲ʼat “I am angry (lit. my heart falls out)”, the conceptual 
aspect SEAT OF EMOTION is highlighted. This is particularly the case because of 
the non-physiologically motivated relationship between the potential 
physiological and psychological effects of ANGER (LOSS OF CONTROL / SELF-
DETERMINATION) and the body organ “heart”. This body organ neither reacts in 
a specific way to ANGER nor can it fall out. That means, the predicate (“fall out”) 
alludes to the specific conceptual aspect of heart as SEAT OF EMOTION in the 
linguistic conceptualization, and not to the concrete BODY PART. In a very 
similar fashion sadzé̲éʼ tyíhsa̲ne “I am lonely (lit. my heart is pitiful)” highlights 
the SEAT OF EMOTION aspect, so that both are placed at the other end of the 
scale ([-BODY PART], [+SEAT OF EMOTION]). 
 
– –  – [SEAT OF EMOTION] + ++ 
madzé̲éʼ dadyi  
“heart attack” 
(lit. “his/her heart hurts”) 
madzé̲éʼ daʼatlʼis 
“s/he is excited / scared” 
(lit. his/her heart is 
dancing)” 
sadzééʼ tyíhsa̲ne 
“I am lonely” 
(lit. my heart is pitiful) 
++ + [BODY PART] – – – 
Table 6.1.: Transition of conceptualizations of dzé̲é “heart”.  
Such a description supports Langacker’s (2000) statement that a complete 
network with all senses and domains constitutes the speakers’ knowledge. When 
all these aspects are deeply interlinked and to some point available, the idea of 
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seamless transitions and combined aspects fits well into these cognitive 
structures. The data reinforce gradual continuums instead of distinct cognitive 
and linguistic patterns, as is backed up by metalinguistic discussions (see ch. 5). 
Furthermore, the emotions under discussion exhibit unique structures, 
supported and motivated by physiological experiences, psychological reactions, 
and socio-cultural models. Linguistically, the predicates used are prototypically 
linked to other, concrete entities and events due to their accessibility for all 
community members in a similar way (see ch. 6.3.). This means the forms rely 
on best example vocabulary to express the intended meanings. For example, the 
prototypical vocabulary to express IMPENETRABILITY is “be hard”, which itself 
is prototypically associated with a concrete hard object. Hence, 
IMPENETRABILITY as part of concrete, physical hardness is more prototypical 
than the feeling of IMPENETRABILITY when a person is hard-hearted. 
The scale crosscuts the classification according to patterns (ch. 6.4.) and 
the one according to individual body parts: neither are all body part lexemes 
realized in the same way in one pattern nor are the concepts consistent. That 
means, besides -įįdyíí “mind” none occurs in one and the same conceptual 
quality. Rather, their conceptualizations change focus according to physiological 
or psychological experiences on the one hand, and cultural models on the other. 
Cultural models are applied where physiological or psychological experiences in 
relation to specific body parts are missing. 
įįdyíí “mind” constitutes a special case, since its basic and standard 
meaning is an abstract SEAT OF EMOTION/INTELLIGENCE without any 
elaboration of a real world referent, i.e. a concrete body part. Nevertheless, it is 
not semantically or syntactically marked in the series of body part terms used for 
emotion or personality trait expressions. That means the form does not behave 
differently from body part terms and ranks at the abstract end of the continuum. 
To sum up, I state that the conceptualization of body parts in expressions 
of emotion does not reflect a conceptual metaphor precisely as described by the 
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CMT. Although embodied experience, an abstract target domain (SEAT OF 
EMOTION) and a conceptual pattern like SEAT OF EMOTION IS BODY PART are 
available to some point, the mappings of conceptual metaphor do not take place 
as defined by the CMT. Instead, the relationship between source and target is a 
flexible and gradual one, and the source domain is included in the target to 
diverse degrees, dependent on the specific expression (see fig. 6.1.). 
6.2. METONYMY AS MAIN MECHANISM 
According to the CMT and especially the embodiment hypothesis, we use 
bodily made experiences for conceptualization (Lakoff 2006[1993], Gibbs & 
Colston 1994, 2003, Gibbs & Costa Lima 2004, Kövecses 2010). In case of ‘low 
or missing’ structure of the target as assumed by e.g. Lakoff, conceptual 
metaphor copies and therefore creates conceptual structure. As a result, 
figurativity comes into existence due to transfers between unrelated conceptual 
domains. Similarly, if physiological effects are abstract– i.e. not directly 
accessible and not linked to specific body parts – ‘invented’ connections are 
conceptually established between body parts and emotions. But if physiological 
effects are concrete and available, they are used in concept-supporting fashion. 
They allow for communicating these abstract concepts, typically and in most 
cases via metonymy. In cases where such effects indeed offer sufficient 
structure, for example, PRESSURE as a collateral effect of ANGER should be 
satisfactory for communication purposes (e.g. “I have pressure in me” to 
express ANGER). Yet, many linguistic manifestations do not utilize real 
experiences, but apply linguistic metaphor or (figurative) metonymy as means to 
express these abstract feelings. For example, in English we find expressions like 
“you make my blood boil”, “he exploded”, “she jumped out of her skin”, “my 
heart sank into my boots”. In Beaver, forms like sadzé̲éʼ xááts ̲ʼat “I am angry (lit. 
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my heart falls out)” and sįįdyííʼ náátlʼa “(suddenly) remember (lit. my mind 
runs)” reflect this mechanism. 
Such idiomatic expressions reveal that figurativity and creativity are as 
salient for communication as real physical experiences. Similarity or contiguity is 
needed to make forms comprehensible, but even metonymies are figuratively 
realized although not necessarily needed. When communicating abstract 
concepts or especially inner states, emotions and the like, speakers have to make 
sure that they get across the intended meaning. Therefore, exaggeration (“I 
explode”, “my heart falls out”) or similar forms of figurative meaning are 
realized as pragmatically effective and are (consciously) applied. Such an 
employment of figurativity supports and ensures a comprehensible structure for 
communication. Due to the fact that emotions show a special dimensionality or 
complexity, objectivity, and also (in)accessibility, this is not a mystery for 
cognitive approaches. Still, this aspect must be accounted for in the embodiment 
theory (ch. 3.1.2.). The hypothesis “concrete experiences for abstract 
experiences” (Lakoff & Johnson 1980, Kövecses 2003, 2010) (i.e. emotions, 
feelings, personality traits etc.) needs a modification to include the near-universal 
phenomena of such figurative features mentioned above. For linguistic inclusion 
of body part terms in emotion expressions, the parameters CONCRETENESS and 
AVAILABILITY (or KNOWLEDGE) OF BODY PARTS are not necessarily that 
important. Instead, the folk model of a BODY-SOUL-FUSION in combination 
with a concealed structure of the target domain EMOTION is crucial for these 
concepts. Recent biological and neurological approaches to emotions define 
these as hormonal and neuronal reactions and changes in our biological systems. 
Taking this into account, the BODY PARTS used in emotion expressions may be 
seen as figurative folk model substitutions for the biochemical messages causing 
mental states and changes. 
Furthermore, when looking at occurrences of figurative meanings in all 
domains, Lakoff’s and Johnson’s (1980) statements that metaphor is intrinsic in 
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language in general are supported and verified. But this also means that we find 
linguistic metaphor and figurative metonymy for quite concrete concepts (e.g. 
“have no eyes” for ‘be blind’; “drink the bottle” for ‘drink the (concrete) 
content’; “the waist of my wife is an hourglass” for ‘slim waist’). These concepts 
are not said to ‘lack’ structure, but are very concretely observable. 
For the expressions described here, several conceptual metaphors are 
supposed by the CMT (for example, ANGER IS HEAT, ANGER IS 
PRESSURE). What should be dealt with caution is the fact that metonymic and 
metaphorical conceptualizations are linguistically manifested in quite similar 
ways. The non-ambiguous correspondence between linguistic and cognitive 
structures as presumed by CMT theorists relies solely on the analysis of linguistic 
structure (Glucksberg et al. 1993, Glucksberg et al. 1997, McGlone 2007). 
Following linguistic and metalinguistic evidence, in chapter 5, many of the 
Beaver emotion expressions were assigned to conceptual metonymies. 
Accordingly, additional and metaphorical underlying figures of thought become 
redundant. The metonymic conceptualizations are grounded in physiological 
experiences and linguistically reflect perceived bodily effects. However, two facts 
complicate the situation: first, the usage of body part or organ terms is not only 
based on embodiment, but also on convention and socio-cultural models. 
Consequently, unequivocal domains are not objectively detectable. Second, 
although defined as manifestations of metonymies, some of these forms are 
linguistically figurative and debatable in terms of classification. Still others do 
not allow for clear classifications as embodied experience despite their very 
comparable composition or format. 
The main example in the present work – the conceptualization of BODY 
PARTS as SEATS OF EMOTIONS – differs from the hypothesized target “body” in 
THE BODY IS A CONTAINER FOR THE EMOTIONS (Kövecses 2000, 
2003; Glynn 2000; Niemeier 2000). Here, mental states and events are presumed 
to take place in the body as do physiological effects. Accordingly, expressions 
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used for ANGER in English, such as “get a hernia” (metonymic according to 
Lakoff & Johnson 1980), reflect the same conceptual structure as “explode” 
(metaphoric in Lakoff & Johnson 1980). That means, the physiological effect 
PRESSURE is highlighted and focused on in both. Similarly, both realize the body 
as a container – which it is. Their linguistic conceptualizations differ in the 
distance to real and possible physiological effects of PRESSURE, but not in the 
underlying metonymy EFFECT FOR CAUSE. Economy in combination with 
rhetorical effects and predestination for figurativity backs up the usage of lexical 
items typically used in different linguistic and semantic contexts (Dirven 2003). 
But still, in “get a hernia” the body is conceptualized as the container for 
emotions which reacts in a specific way to the PRESSURE evoked by ANGER. The 
conceptual metaphor proposed by CMT, ANGER IS PRESSURE IN A 
CONTAINER for “I explode” instead of the metonymy PRESSURE FOR 
ANGER underlying “get a hernia” does not detect the decisive point between 
these two linguistic forms: both cognitively focus on the body as a container and 
its reaction to ANGER. PRESSURE is a physiological effect of ANGER (evidenced 
in PRESSURE FOR ANGER) and a human body constitutes a perfect 
container: a closed object with input, openings and clear boundaries. But what is 
metaphorical about pressure in a person then? This rather sudden transition 
from metonymy to metaphor on the cognitive level is only indicated by the 
linguistic manifestation. The justification of the conceptual metaphor – as an “is-
understood-as relationship” as opposed to the “stand-for relationship” 
(Kövecses 2010: 267) of metonymy – is found in the linguistic form. This 
reasoning hardly seems compatible with Lakoff’s focus on cognitive structures 
and statements like “[t]he language is secondary” (1993: 208). Yet, linguistic 
evidence is “treated as both the cause and the effect” (McGlone 2007: 115) for 
conceptual metaphor, resulting in circular reasoning. Note also that the form “to 
get a hernia” evidences the existent and available conceptual structure of ANGER: 
the physiological effect of PRESSURE is used in a metonymic fashion without the 
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need for additional substance from other unrelated concepts. The notion of 
metaphtonymy (Goossens 1990) is also applicable here, since “to get a hernia” 
can potentially occur as physiological effect. However, in the situations where 
this expression is used, it does not refer to an event really happening, but is used 
metonymically to express the cause (i.e. ANGER). In the Beaver forms, we find 
similar combinations: domain matrices and metonymic chains at the conceptual 
level and non-prototypical and figurative vocabulary usage at the linguistic level. 
Therefore, Lakoff’s exposure to linguistic evidence is not followed as sufficient 
evidence for conceptual metaphor in this work. 
For example, in the analysis of sįįdyííʼ natlǫ “I worry (lit. my minds are 
lots)”, the underlying metonymies supersede conceptual metaphors like 
INCREASE IN THINKING IS MULTIPLICATION OF SEAT OF 
EMOTION: INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION and CONTAINER FOR 
CONTAINED already explain the inclusion of the term -įįdyíí “mind” as well 
as the increase of this SEAT OF EMOTION. This is also justified by the speakers’ 
discussions about this construction (see ch. 5.4.). 
Another example is the polysemous network of -ẕis “skin/hide”. The 
metalinguistic statements and linguistic analysis of the different 
conceptualizations and senses of this lexical item reveal strategies similar to 
those just described. The most basic conceptual aspect BODY PART is not 
directly used for the creation of individual transferred meanings. In the case of 
sadee aẕís ̱“eyelid”, there is no transmission, rather, “skin/hide” is specified, but 
still denotes “skin/hide”. Yet, according to the CMT, several hypothesized 
points of departure in this network mirror the following conceptual metaphors: 
MATERIAL IS SKIN (ts ̲ʼ ih zí̲s ̲ “mosquito net”), COVER IS SKIN (satʼúdzéʼ 
zí̲s ̲ “bra, brassiere (my breast cover)59”), SHAPE IS SKIN (azí̲s ̲ xoichʼuge 
                                               
59 The additional forms in parentheses are the literal forms as realized and translated by the 
speakers. 
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“tepee (its skin/hide it is pointy)”), and CONTAINER IS SKIN (tyúú zí̲s ̲
“water bag”). Now, this is neither necessary nor practical, since a contiguity 
chain is visible – finally, all targets are conceptual aspects of “skin/hide” 
embedded in the conceptual network of -ẕis. Hence, the following conceptual 
metonymic processes are identified: SKIN FOR MATERIAL, SKIN FOR 
COVER, SKIN FOR SHAPE, SKIN FOR CONTAINER. The network is 
escalated by the further usage of the lexical ‘window’ in remote domains. Since 
they are not actually evoked by the basic meaning “skin/hide”, they do not 
belong to the central part of the conceptual domain (matrix), for example, ts ̲ʼ ih 
zí̲s ̲“mosquito net (lit. mosquito skin/hide)”. In the CMT tradition, this suffices 
to declare conceptual metaphor. Yet here, a continuity view is adopted due to 
the gradual departures of the various senses from the basic meaning and the 
distinction between cognitive and linguistic conceptualization. The linguistic 
metaphors are not assumed as sufficient support for determination of 
conceptual metaphor as defined by Lakoff & Johson (1980), Lakoff (2006[1993]) 
or Kövecses (2010). Rather, the linguistic and metalinguistic data suits the 
suggested metonymic structures as well as the complex semantic and conceptual 
networks assumed.  
For the part of the network of -dzé̲é “heart” focusing on SHAPE, no 
necessity or requirement for a conceptual structure like X IS Y is identified 
either. The form of i ̨í ̨d́zá̲ą̨ “strawberries (lit. little. hearts)” or dzé̲ékʼazi “spades 
in a deck of cards (lit. black hearts)” is bound to the concept of the organ term -
dzé̲é “heart” via linguistic conceptualization: a specific conceptual aspect of 
similarity which all referents show is applied, in this case SHAPE. The literal 
meanings are available and explainable for the speakers, and the linking form is 
realized (HEART FOR SHAPE). But it will not be stated here that both, “spade 
as card suit” and “strawberries”, lack concrete concepts, and therefore copy or 
absorb the HEART concept. Also, “hearts” as card suit is linked to HEART as a 
body organ, and indeed origins in the notion of HEART especially concerning the 
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(idealized) form and color. Yet, only similar aspects are realized via the use of 
the lexeme -dzé̲é “heart”, while the card suit contains its own conceptual 
structure. This structure additionally consists of aspects not mapping any 
features of the concept of the body organ HEART. 
6.3. LINGUISTIC CONCEPTUALIZATION 
In this subchapter, “linguistic conceptualization” is defined. It is 
elaborated to explain the linguistic and conceptual structures found in the 
Beaver data. 
Concrete experience or concepts are more easily accessible and often ready 
for communication in another way than abstract concepts are. Still, the linguistic 
manifestations so far only support the hypothesis that we analyze or extract the 
knowledge of the use of linguistic material more bound to concrete concepts. 
We talk in terms of concrete ideas about less concrete ones, because the former 
are linguistically more prototypical instances of the underlying conceptual 
aspects utilized for both (McGlone 1996, 2007; Glucksberg & McGlone 1999). 
This is captured in the notion of “linguistic conceptualization” in this work.  
“Linguistic conceptualization” (see ch. 6.3.) is defined as an intermediate 
step between linguistic forms and cognitive structures. It captures the following 
point: to ensure and support communication of abstract and not objectively 
perceivable concepts, speakers resort to linguistic vocabulary tightly linked to 
concrete and therefore well-known domains. The usage of this vocabulary 
results in transferred meanings and thus linguistic metaphors. Glucksberg et al. 
(1997), Radden (2003) and others (e.g. McGlone 2007) rightly propose the 
notion of category inclusion. They refer to relations between categories and 
members of these categories which are highly relevant for metonymy, 
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metonymy-based meaning shift, and transferred concepts.60 For example, the 
category “impenetrable entities” includes ‘stone’ as well as ‘hard-hearted person’ 
(as defined in the Beaver model). This allows for describing and explaining 
relations between conceptual structure and linguistic manifestation. 
Abstract concepts like emotions and personality traits are considered 
highly individual – there is no experiential basis that can be objectively observed 
by outsiders. Therefore, in combination with economy, analogies to concrete 
entities are identified. These are linguistically applied via usage of vocabulary 
prototypically linked to such easily perceivable and sharable concepts. This 
“linguistic conceptualization” is based on similarities in conceptual structure, not 
on the lack of it. 
In the present work, the conceptual structure of abstract concepts is 
presumed to exist, elaborated on the basis of psychological and physiological 
effects. At the level of linguistic realization an economic and stylistic strategy is 
identified to ensure communication: perceived similarities in conceptual 
structures lead to extractions of the respective features in existing linguistic 
forms. The difference between concrete and abstract concepts is their 
concreteness and their relation to linguistic material: concrete concepts show a 
richer lexical ‘stock’, i.e. vocabulary prototypically associated with them. These 
corresponding lexemes which prototypically belong to the concrete domains 
experienced in an objective way, are utilized in non-prototypical meanings.  
This issue is similar to the distinction between thinking and speaking about 
ideas. For example, knowledge or comprehension of “violin music”, which 
people are often familiar with but only rarely speak of, nevertheless exists 
despite missing lexical conceptualization. Specialists – i.e. a ‘speech community’ 
                                               
60 This also implies that theoretically there is an unlimited number of potential categories, 
since schematic decomposition admits correspondences at smallest levels. Practically, this is indeed 
cross-linguistically reflected in non-literal and figurative meanings employing various concepts on the 
basis of realized and conventionalized similarities in structure. 
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or ‘community of practice’ (musicians) with the need to express this conceptual 
structure – establish the corresponding vocabulary. The elaborated part of the 
lexicon does not include a completely new set of lexemes. Rather, existing 
semantic structures are extended and used in non-prototypical ways, allowing for 
communication of the specific domain at hand. 
The issue of structure adoption as presumed by the CMT is also discussed 
by Croft & Cruse (2004). They question the pertinence of conceptual metaphors 
in connection with the Invariance Principle: if there is target structure eliding 
source structure due to mismatches, then “why do they [conceptual metaphors, 
CP] exist in the first place?” (2004: 201). Furthermore, they raise the issue of 
highly schematic and abstract structures of some conceptual metaphors, 
questioning the following parts of CM theorists’ argumentation: first, the need 
for conceptual metaphors to enable treatment of abstract targets and second, the 
adoption of source structure by the target domain. The schematic character of 
conceptual metaphors promotes the alternative view proposed here and also by 
Glucksberg (2001) and Jackendoff & Aaron (1991). It is not a takeover that is 
taking place, but rather an implementation of a higher level category containing 
both domains included in the mappings. For example, ANGER and 
DETONATIONS are both included in a category of phenomena which cause 
PRESSURE. Lakoff and Johnson’s refutation of this kind of criticism focuses on 
the unidirectional forms of conceptual metaphors. We only find the existing 
targets expressed in terms of the sources (Croft & Cruse 2004: 202), but not the 
other way round. In the example just given, ANGER is described in terms of 
DETONATIONS, while DETONATIONS do not utilize ANGER terms. Note that the 
argumentation again highlights linguistic and not conceptual structure. This 
asymmetry is accommodated by the notion of “linguistic conceptualization” in 
the analysis proposed here. The accessibility of concrete concepts is accounted 
for in the usage of linguistic material prototypically related to these. In the 
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abstract context, the shared conceptual aspects – taken from a higher-level 
category (Glucksberg et al. 1997) – are the relevant and decisive ones:  
Figure 6.1.: Mappings in CMT 
 
Figure 6.2.: Category inclusion as alternative organization of abstract and 
concrete domains 
 
The existence of structure in abstract target domains is strengthened by 
the fact that there exists more than one source domain for e.g. LOVE or IDEAS 
(in English). The hypothesis that native speakers are, for example, unable to 
think of LOVE without thinking of JOURNEYS in English, finds a counterexample 
in the usage of other source domains of LOVE. When applying another 
conceptual structure like NUTRIENT (LOVE IS A NUTRIENT (Kövecses 
2010)) or RAPTURE, JOURNEY is not included in the processing of LOVE. Due to 
the fact that love relationships share aspects with journeys – that is, both 
conceptual structures include similar features –, we adopt linguistic structure of 
the more concrete phenomena to ensure understanding and communication. 
When English native speakers think and speak of LOVE as a NUTRIENT, they do 
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not use the JOURNEY concept. The domains JOURNEY and NUTRIENT are not 
combinable without LOVE as the point of connection. Rather, both sources 
show conceptual alliances to LOVE in different aspects (“he hungered for her 
love” vs. “we’ve come a long way”). They reflect structures of family 
resemblance as known from prototype theory (Rosch & Mervis 1975): LOVE 
overlaps in conceptual structure with each of the sources only in some specific 
points the sources do not share. The structure of LOVE is abstract, but still, there 
is structure we can use to realize or create correspondences. The linguistic 
material reflects and refers to conceptual components (Langacker 1987, 2000) 
found in both domains, and expresses these already existing image-schematic 
aspects of the target domain (Glucksberg et al. 1997). As a result, many 
correspondences are realized and reflected by usage of linguistic material 
prototypically linked to the concrete domain (e.g. in English for IDEAS ARE 
FOOD: “swallow”, “raw facts”, “half-baked idea”, “warmed-over theories”, 
“devour a book”). To communicate these topics, “linguistic conceptualization” 
accesses linguistic material from sources like FOOD or JOURNEY which show 
similarities in specific aspects.  
The “linguistic conceptualization” of target meanings evokes figurativity 
due to the non-prototypical usage of linguistic material, i.e. abstract concepts are 
supported via the adoption of lexemes, not via adoption of conceptual structure. 
This view is not considered by CM theorists, as McGlone rightly remarks: 
“Lakoff couples this hyper-literal model of metaphor understanding to a hyper-
metaphoric construal of literal language” (2007: 123), i.e. he states that language 
is extremely metaphorical while the analysis of conceptual structures strictly 
concentrates on the prototypical literal meanings of the linguistic material. This 
leaves no space for an adequate conception of polysemy, vagueness, conscious 
distinctions between language and thought and continuity of concrete and 
abstract concepts. Although focused on linguistic forms, these are only analyzed 
  242 
as pure products and mirrors of cognitive structure without taking into account 
an intermediate level argued for in this work. 
For example, PRESSURE as a conceptual component is found in the 
conceptual structure of DETONATIONS as well as in the structure of ANGER (“he 
exploded”). This means, for figurative use, the corresponding feature basing on 
perceived similarity between the concepts relates two domains. For example, the 
English lexical item “explode” and the concept of ANGER are related via the 
conceptual aspect PRESSURE. This aspect is expressed via best example 
vocabulary like “explode”. Similarly, EXCITING, SCARY SITUATION is not only 
part of the conceptual structure of the lexical form “rollercoaster ride”, but may 
also be found in the structure of MARRIAGE (McGlone 2007: 116). The results 
are complex and systematic arrangements of networks which reveal the 
conceptual aspects extracted in the diverse usages of these lexical items. The 
aspects are chosen61 according to relevance and need: the aspect of PRESSURE of 
the network structure of the category “explosion/denotation” is extracted and 
focused on for ANGER. For “detonation sensor”, on the other hand, the features 
VIBRATION / SOUND are highlighted. 
At the level of “linguistic conceptualization” figurativity and metaphor is 
applied, but this level is not equated with conceptualization proper. That means 
the usage of linguistic metaphor is not sufficient to presume conceptual 
metaphors as defined by Lakoff (2006[1993]) and others (e.g. Lakoff & Johson 
1980, Kövecses 2010). “Linguistic conceptualization” is consulted as the 
intermediate level between conceptual structure and linguistic structure: 
meanings of the vocabulary utilized are processed in a decompositional way. 
Accordingly, image-schematic conceptual aspects also included in the target 
concept are extracted and focused on in the transferred usages of the lexemes. 
                                               
61 ‘Conceptual aspects are chosen’ does not mean that speakers make conscious choices. 
Rather, the factors arbitrariness, motivation and conventionalization are involved, leading to cross-
linguistic variation in conceptual and linguistic structure. 
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This level allows for a gradual transfer of conceptual understanding and 
simultaneous availability of source and target. Consequently, the asymmetrical 
form X IS Y is modified, so that the missing target structure is not focused on 
by using linguistic structure of the source. Rather, both domains are processed 
as mating and matching due to the same conceptual aspects in their structures. 
The term ‘asymmetrical’ refers to the theoretical postulate of presumed 
supremacy and domination of one – the more concrete – domain over the other. 
This was already questioned by Jackendoff (1983) with regard to spatial and 
temporal relations (see also ch. 3.2.1.2.). The alternative analysis allows for an 
inclusion of existing conceptual structures of abstract phenomena utilizing 
lexemes of prototypically concrete domains. This also means that not only 
conceptual structures are taken into account when analyzing both conceptual 
and linguistic structures. Evans (2006, 2010a; see also ch. 3.4.1.) explicitly 
focuses on linguistic structures and language in use as essentially affecting 
conceptual networks and figurative meanings therein.  
In the following paragraphs, some Beaver constructions will be discussed 
in relation to “linguistic conceptualization”. First, the forms discussed in chapter 
5 are again presented, now according to their semantic patterns.  
6.4. LINGUISTIC PATTERNS OF BODY PART EXPRESSIONS 
The idiomatic constructions discussed in chapter 5 constitute an important 
means for expressing emotions and personality traits as well as disabilities like 
blindness or deafness. The Beaver language intensively exploits socio-culturally 
and physiologically based relations between specific body parts with particular 
properties or activities and physical and mental states. In addition, concepts of 
life and death are also included in these patterns. The results are complex 
expressions comprising body part terms. These can be subsumed and classified 
in linguistic patterns when emphasizing the ascribed characteristics and 
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attributes, and not focusing on or dividing the forms according to the individual 
body parts included. 
Taking into account all expressions found in the corpus and described in 
the previous chapters, the following five patterns are identified: 
 
(I.) [NO BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION] 
 
(II.1) [BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION SHOWS PROPERTY] 
(II.2) [BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION DOES NOT SHOW PROPERTY] 
 
(III.) [BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION  
PERFORMS (UNCONTROLLED/SUDDEN) MOTION] 
 
(IV.) [LOTS OF BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION] 
 
(V.1) [BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION EXISTS] 
(V.2) [BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION DOES NOT EXIST] 
 
In table 6.2., the tokens62 are organized according to these patterns: 
 
pattern 
no. 
pattern form body parts meaning Beaver form 
I.a NO BODY PART / 
SEAT OF EMOTION 
head crazy, stupid satsí̱íduéʼ 
mind stupid, crazy mįįdyi ̨í ̨ ́dyuéʼ 
mouth non-talkative sazááʼ ghǫdyuéʼ 
ears stubborn sadzagéʼ nadyuéʼ 
(brain) (talk) stupid(ly) natsʼíghǫ́ʼ nadyuéʼ 
                                               
62 Two expressions are not included in this list: sįįdyííʼ táádyée’ǫ “lose my mind” (see ch. 
5.4.7.) and súúga sazá̲áʼ ǫláʼ “sweet-talk (lit. s/he puts sugar in my mouth)” (see ch.5.3.1.2.).  
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I.b NO BODY PART eyes be blind sadee nadyuéʼ 
inner ears be deaf sadzii wǫdyuéʼ 
throat be mute, dumb sakʼáze nadyuéʼ 
flesh be skinny satsá̱n náádyuéʼ 
penis gelding malįįdyuéʼ 
  II.1.a BODY PART / 
SEAT OF EMOTION 
SHOWS 
PROPERTY: 
“hard/strong” 
Heart be flinty, 
hard-hearted 
sadzé̲éʼ nááts̲at 
Head be stubborn satsíí nááts̲at 
Mind be powerful, 
determined 
sįįdyi ̨í ̨́ʼ nááts̲at 
Mind desire sįįdyi ̨í ̨́ʼ nááts̲at 
Mouth persuade, bother sazáa nááwuts̲at 
II.2.a63 BODY PART / 
SEAT OF EMOTION 
DOES NOT SHOW 
PROPERTY: 
“hard/strong” 
Heart soft-hearted sadzé̲éʼ adyuu nááts̲at 
Mind not determined, 
stupid 
sįįdyi ̨í ̨́ʼ adyuu nááts̲at 
II.b BODY PART / 
SEAT OF EMOTION 
SHOWS 
PROPERTY: 
“heavy” 
Heart be sad, worry sadzé̲éʼ nakǫįl 
Head worry satsí̱í nakǫįl 
II.c BODY PART / 
SEAT OF EMOTION 
SHOWS 
PROPERTY: “evil” 
mouth swear sazáá ketsʼééle 
mind be grouchy, be 
in a bad mood 
sįįdyé’ tsééle 
II.d BODY PART / 
SEAT OF EMOTION 
SHOWS 
PROPERTY: 
“pitiful” 
heart be lonely sadzé̲éʼ tyíhsa̲ne 
  
                                               
63 II.2.a is the negated form of the pattern II.1.a. 
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III.a BODY PART / 
SEAT OF EMOTION 
PERFORMS 
(UNCONTROLLED 
/ SUDDEN) 
MOTION: 
“fall out” 
heart be angry sadzé̲éʼ xaats ̲ʼat 
III.b BODY PART / 
SEAT OF EMOTION 
PERFORMS 
(UNCONTROLLED 
/ SUDDEN) 
MOTION: 
“run” 
heart die madz̲é̲éʼ łííníítlʼa 
mind (suddenly) 
remember 
sįįdyi ̨í ̨́ʼ náátlʼa 
III.c BODY PART / 
SEAT OF EMOTION 
PERFORMS 
(UNCONTROLLED 
/ SUDDEN) 
MOTION: 
“spin” 
head be dizzy satsí̱í naghwút 
III.d BODY PART / 
SEAT OF EMOTION 
PERFORMS 
MOTION: “dance” 
heart survive / live sadz̲é̲éʼ gáákʼáá dahʼatlʼis 
III.e BODY PART / 
SEAT OF EMOTION 
PERFORMS 
MOTION: “dance” 
heart be excited / 
scared 
sadz̲é̲éʼ dahʼatlʼis 
  IV LOTS OF BODY 
PART / SEAT OF 
EMOTION 
mind worry sįįdyi ̨í ̨́ʼ natlǫ 
mouth be a chatterbox sazááʼ ghǫtlʼǫ 
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V.a BODY PART / 
SEAT OF EMOTION 
EXISTS 
heart be brave sadz̲é̲éʼ ghǫ́lįį 
V.b BODY PART / 
SEAT OF EMOTION 
DOES NOT EXIST 
heart be timid adyuu sadz̲é̲éʼ ghǫ́lįį 
heart be heartless adyuu sadz̲é̲éʼ ghǫ́lįį 
Table 6.2.: Beaver linguistic patterns for emotion and personality trait 
expressions including body part terms 
In these patterns, the idiomatic expressions reveal rich and elaborated 
conceptualizations of the body part terms included. Additionally, the gradual 
shifts in focus concerning the conceptual aspects of these complex semantic 
networks are comprehensible. Both conceptual features – BODY PART and SEAT 
OF EMOTION – are included in the overall meanings to different degrees and 
with varying emphases. This is verified by the meanings of the forms and the 
metalinguistic statements of the speakers (see chapter 5). 
6.5. STRUCTURE OF BEAVER CONCEPTUALIZATIONS & 
EXPRESSIONS OF EMOTION 
In this section, the linguistic patterns introduced in chapter 6.4. will be 
described and discussed in detail. It will be shown that “linguistic 
conceptualization” offers a coherent explanation of the Beaver forms.  
Following the guidelines of the CMT, the first pattern ([NO BODY PART / 
SEAT OF EMOTION]) would reflect conceptual metaphors like NEGATIVE 
MENTAL CONSTITUTION IS A MISSING SEAT OF EMOTION, 
DISABILITY IS A MISSING BODY PART. However, we will see in the 
following parts that the form of conceptual metaphors – X IS Y – is neither 
necessarily needed nor conductive to coherently interpreting the Beaver data. 
Further abstraction of the conceptual structures is suggested. Their more 
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schematic and generic equivalent at a higher level – NEGATIVE 
CONSTITUTION IS LACK / LOSS – indicates the dissenting account 
proposed here: the two meanings do not display clearly separable and unrelated 
domains. They differ in their concreteness, but are not opposed to each other. 
Rather, they can be subsumed in a higher level category (Glucksberg et al. 1997).  
I propose a continuity view of such structures and concentrate on the 
shared conceptual parts of these structures – for example, of NEGATIVE 
CONSTITUTION and LACK / LOSS – without highlighting the differences in 
domain membership. Instead of disconnecting and keeping apart the concepts 
included in the Beaver forms, I presume the relation between both concrete 
source and abstract target domain to rely on shared conceptual aspects. 
Linguistically, these aspects are realized by lexemes prototypical for the concrete 
domain. As a result, the conceptual form X AND Y 
SHARE/SHOW/INCLUDE ‘Zxy’ is argued for. Here, X and Y are linguistic 
forms and ‘Zxy’ the shared conceptual aspect which is linguistically manifested by 
Z. Z is typically and conventionally linked to a concrete domain, and additionally 
used in the second, abstract frame. The concrete meaning – the usage of Z in 
concrete contexts – is a prototypical or best and best known example, but the 
common conceptual aspect does not originate in the concrete domain. This view 
also confirms the attributed conceptual metonymies which underlie most of the 
non-literal and figurative manifestations (except the descriptive forms saladzeʼ 
zi̲s ̲ “bladder (lit. my urine skin)”, satsá̱n náájue “I am skinny (lit. my flesh / 
body is not there)”). Thus, the hypothesized cognitive structure X IS Y is not 
strictly adopted. Rather, I concentrate on the notion of conceptual aspects found 
in both source and target domain, i.e. X AND Y SHOW Zxy. The patterns and 
idiomatic tokens constitute supporting evidence for this alternative analysis. As 
was already described in chapter 5, besides embodiment and linguistic structures, 
socio-culturally based models also play a role in linguistic conceptualizations, i.e. 
in the choice of conceptual aspects extracted for linguistic manifestation. Such 
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mechanisms are also described for the realization of body parts as SEATS OF 
EMOTIONS (see ch. 6.1.). In the following subsections (ch. 6.5.1 – 6.5.6.), specific 
examples will be used to validate this hypothesis. 
6.5.1. PATTERN I [NO BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION] 
For the first pattern in table 6.2., [NO BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION], the 
following conceptual metonymies are identified as conceptual strategies: 
(MISSING) BODY PART FOR (MISSING) SENSE and (MISSING) SEAT 
OF EMOTION FOR (NEGATIVE) PERSONALITY TRAIT. In their 
negative forms, they constitute specific instances of the higher level metonymy 
(MISSING) INSTRUMENT FOR (MISSING / NEGATIVE) ACTION. The 
conceptual correspondences suit the tokens found. This means that, for 
example, (MISSING) SEAT OF EMOTION / BODY PART (at a higher level 
simply LACK / LOSS) as source domain does not impose rigid, complex 
structures on the targets, but rather refers to an aspect found in the concepts of 
the intended meanings.  
This first pattern is most often applied and used in the Beaver language. It 
occurs not only in relation to mental states, but is also utilized to linguistically 
realize concepts of disabilities: sadee nadyuéʼ “be blind (lit. my eyes are not 
there)”, sadzii wǫjuéʼ “be deaf (lit. my inner ears are not there)”, sazéége 
nadyuéʼ  “be mute (lit. my throat is not there)”. For all instances, the conceptual 
metonymy (MISSING) INSTRUMENT FOR (MISSING / NEGATIVE) 
ACTION represents the underlying strategy, whereas the body part terms reflect 
a conceptual transition in focus from BODY PART to SEAT OF EMOTION, so that 
in some expressions the body part is highlighted while others focus on the more 
abstract conceptual aspect, yet without completely ignoring the concrete 
prototypical meaning (see chapter 6.1.). 
  250 
The disabilities concentrating on sensory perception, i.e. the inability to see 
and hear, refer to the most basic forms of experience. Although they constitute 
abstract concepts, they do not parallel emotions or inner states not collectively 
or ‘objectively’ perceivable and hard to communicate. Rather, they constitute the 
most important ways of perceiving and understanding the world around and 
they allow for access to essential and generalized experiences. Therefore, they 
are defined as the foundation of our worldviews according to the embodiment 
hypothesis (Lakoff 2006[1993], Evans & Green 2006). Due to their modeling, 
they have a special place in cognitive theories, since they are in some sense 
abstract, but also tangible and objective. Thus, they are also defined as concrete: 
everyone is equipped with the same senses and reacts to stimuli, i.e. light as a 
visible stimulus is seen, sound as an acoustic stimulus is heard, and so on. 
Every language enables speakers to express the ideas of seeing, hearing, 
smelling, touching and tasting as fundamental and salient abilities. Disability, on 
the other hand, is not always literally construed, as the Beaver cases show. This 
is the case despite the fact that Beaver often exploits affirmative and negative 
construction pairs instead of two distinct lexemes or constructions for concepts 
in antonymic relation. This means that “to not (be able to) see” would match the 
Beaver style. Additionally, there is a high number of descriptive terms ‘simply’ 
depicting their referents (e.g. makʼéhtsʼééstyį “bed (lit. you sleep on it)”; 
meeyáhjize “ball (lit. you push it)”), again offering non-figurative patterns. 
However, we find the figurative metonymic constructions. They result in 
linguistic manifestations which focus on the body parts and define them as non-
existent to implicitly express that their functions, senses are missing. For 
muteness – speech does not belong to sensory perception proper – the body 
part as instrument (sazéége “my throat”) is also expressed, substituting the 
action or function. 
Although the absence of body parts is as non-objective or incongruent 
with reality as the idea that an organ falls out of the body (i.e. ANGER in Beaver), 
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the conceptual mapping is more available, because the correspondence seems 
more intuitive. For example, when you close, cover, or even lose your eyes, you 
cannot see. Hence, the metonymy at work here is a specialization of the 
intended meaning or concept, but less detached from reality than a heart that 
has been dropped (see ch. 6.5.3.). More precisely, a metonymic chain is applied 
in such forms, juxtaposing the concepts of eyes and visual perception. 
Accordingly, speakers use this shorter conceptual distance as well as the 
metonymic contiguity between literal and intended or communicated meaning 
for explanation. In contrast, the missing link to reality in the case of a heart that 
has fallen out because of ANGER seems to be restraining the Beaver speakers in 
justification.64 
To express “gelding” and “be skinny”, this pattern is similarly used. For 
“be skinny”, the term for “my body / flesh” is included: satsá̱n náájue “I am 
skinny (lit. my flesh / body is not there)”. Hence, the focus lies on the missing 
mass, and not on aspects of “skin”, as it the case in the English expression. 
Here, the metonymy INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION is not applicable. Rather, 
the meaning is construed in a purely descriptive form. For malįįdyue “gelding”, 
the established metonymy is again at work, the more prominent body part 
“penis” is realized, and not the removed testicles65. 
The personality traits expressed via this pattern refer mostly to intelligence. 
No proper emotions are subsumed in this pattern. Parallel to the disabilities 
discussed above, the meanings apply conceptual metonymy; missing body parts 
                                               
64 This can also be observed for well-known, conventionalized, and traditionally called “dead 
metaphors” such as ‘table leg’ or German Tischbein “table leg”, where speakers do not hesitate to 
refer to the body part ‘leg’, while expressions like ‘learn by heart’ or German verrückt werden “become 
crazy (lit. become disarranged, relocated)” are often dispatched by statements like “that’s the way” or 
German das sagt man so, etc. 
65 Probably, the function “reproduction” (with “erection”) of ‘penis’ is highlighted here. 
Furthermore, “penis” is predestined according to figurativity and effect (Dirven 2003). 
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are linguistically realized to refer to negative (or missing) mental constitutions. 
For example, (a missing) mind or head is realized as an instrument for thought 
and is included in a metonymic chain (HEAD (– BRAIN) – MIND – 
INTELLIGENCE – THOUGHTS – THINKING (– WORRY)). For detailed 
descriptions, see the corresponding subchapters (ch.5). The tokens of this 
pattern are all analyzable via metonymic figures of thought (INSTRUMENT 
FOR ACTION). The focus on the conceptual aspect SEAT OF EMOTION of the 
conceptual network for the body part term follows the conceptual strategy of 
disability. Relationships between culturally based instruments or containers for 
emotions and the emotions or personality traits as contents are conceptualized 
similarly to the relations between sense organs and senses. Consequently, no 
additional metaphorical structures are needed to describe the cognitive as well as 
linguistic structures. 
6.5.2. PATTERN II  
[BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION IS STRONG/HARD / HEAVY] 
The second pattern in table 6.2. is divided according to the specific 
properties attributed to body parts as SEATS OF EMOTIONS. The types most 
often used are [BODY PART IS HARD/STRONG] and [BODY PART IS HEAVY]. 
[BODY PART IS HARD/STRONG] occurs with HEART, HEAD, MIND, and 
MOUTH. This pattern using -ts̲at “hard/strong” is not primarily utilized to 
express emotions (only “desire” is included here), rather, diverse personality 
traits (e.g. STUBBORNNESS, FLINTINESS, DETERMINATENESS) are expressed. The 
stative verb -ts̲at means “strong”, “hard” and “tough”, and is used for both 
concrete and abstract senses (in combination with “ground”, “meat”, “smell”, 
“person”).66 The conceptual metaphor PHYSICAL HARDNESS IS MENTAL 
HARDNESS is not assumed here. Instead of such a borrowing of structure 
                                               
66 For “hard”, two other verb stems are found in the corpus: -géét and -tlʼa.  
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from the concept of a hard object, the view taken here assigns the described 
features of HARDNESS to personality traits as their intrinsic conceptual aspects. 
The “linguistic conceptualization” promotes the usage of the lexical item -ts̲at 
“be hard/strong” to express these aspects. The specific semantic components 
included in the basic meaning of something hard (as well as something 
soft/weak) are: IMPENETRABILITY, WEIGHT (CRUELTY), DENSITY, 
CONTINUANCE, CONSISTENCY, RESISTIBILITY, but also 
RESILIANCE/TOUGHNESS. They are not taken from the source and mapped onto 
the abstract target, but are intrinsically included in the concept of FLINTINESS, in 
Beaver especially IMPENETRABILITY and RESISTIBILITY. A hard object is 
impenetrable, tight, and not flexible, parallel to persons being hard-hearted, i.e. 
less vulnerable.  
Our limited physiological capabilities cause such realizations. These, in 
turn promote the accessibility of correspondences to experiences with and 
conceptualizations of concrete entities and events67. The parallel aspect of 
IMPENETRABILITY is found in both concepts, in HARD-HEARTEDNESS as well as 
in concepts of concrete objects like rocks. The fact that rocks are impervious, or 
resist impact from outside is something easy to understand and communicate. 
Emotions, on the other hand, are so deeply embedded in oneself that it is not 
self-explanatory or experienced in an objective way via sensory perception. The 
Beaver concept of HARD-HEARTEDNESS as primarily affecting the hard-hearted 
person, and not other persons suffering from the ‘cold’ behavior, suits the idea 
of IMPENETRABILITY: the hard-hearted person does not (immediately and 
explicitly) react to events which evoke certain emotions (see ch. 5.7.3.2.). 
 
                                               
67 It is important to note that the limitations of our physiology also guide and restrict 
comprehension of concrete experiences – we conceptualize gravity, density and similar phenomena 
according to cultural models about the world. This becomes visible in comparison to scientific 
explanations and definitions of such physical facts. 
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The concept of HEAVINESS includes the aspects WEIGHT, LOAD, 
PRESSURE/BURDEN and DEPRESSION. In combination with mental states, some 
of these facets are not metaphorically transferred for concept creation, but are 
real and objective effects of SADNESS and SORROW or WORRY (Ungerer 1995, 
Kövecses, Palmer & Dirven 2003). Physiologically, the body reacts to such 
emotions with a feeling of being over-loaded, and there is an interrelated 
downward tendency due to DEPRESSION.68 Consequently, there is no need for 
transfer of any other conceptual structures concretely representing WEIGHT or 
DEPRESSION. Instead, linguistic conceptualization resorts to the lexical item -kǫįl 
“be heavy” as linguistic material more tightly linked to concrete entities with 
similar features. In chapter 5.7.3.4., the Beaver construction sadzé̲éʼ nakǫįl “I 
am sad, I worry (lit. my heart is heavy)” is described as realizing metonymic 
structures in relation to physiological effects of SADNESS. Analogously, satsí̱íʼ 
nakǫįl “I worry (lit my head is heavy)” manifests the EFFECT FOR CAUSE 
metonymy and additionally reflects the metonymic chain HEAD (– BRAIN) – 
MIND – INTELLIGENCE – THOUGHTS – THINKING (– WORRY). The 
conceptual metaphor PHYSICAL WEIGHT IS MENTAL WEIGHT assumed 
by the CMT overstates the transfer of structure to establish or strengthen the 
concept of the emotion and mental state, for SADNESS and WORRY respectively 
(Lakoff & Johnson 1980, Kövecses 2000, 2010). In the alternative description of 
the data, the physiological experiences are assumed to be focused on. 
Additionally, they are supported by the choice of linguistic material actually 
connected to concrete entities. Hence, semantic and conceptual aspects included 
in “be heavy” already constitute part of the structure of SADNESS. This further 
justifies the usage of this stative verb instead of creating and establishing 
completely new lexical items.  
                                               
68 The German idiomatic form niedergedrückt sein „feel sad (lit. depressed)“ expresses exactly 
the same conceptual aspect. 
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In table 6.3., the conceptual aspects extracted from the basic meanings of 
“be strong/hard” and “be heavy” are subsumed: 
 
HARD-HEARTEDNESS (heart) is hard/strong IMPENETRABILITY 
STUBBORNNESS (head) is hard/strong RESISTANCE, 
IMPENETRABILITY 
BE POWERFUL / 
DETERMINED 
(mind) is hard/strong RESILIANCE/TOUGHNESS 
PERSUADE, BOTHER (mouth) is hard/strong PENETRABILITY, 
INSISTENCE 
DESIRE (mind) is hard/strong RESISTANCE / FORCE69 
SADNESS / WORRY (heart) is heavy WEIGHT, DEPRESSION 
WORRY (head) is heavy WEIGHT, DEPRESSION 
Table 6.3.: conceptual aspects used in pattern II 
In a network visualization, the conceptual aspects are arranged in the 
following form: 
                                               
69 Here, the experiencer has no control over his will, i.e. her/his mind acts uncontrollably. 
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Figure 6.3.: Conceptual network of –tsat “be strong/hard” 
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6.5.3. PATTERN III [BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION FALLS OUT] 
In the third pattern in table 6.2., specific activities of body parts are 
expressed, correlating with an emphasis on the conceptual aspect SEAT OF 
EMOTION of the terms. While all verbs in their prototypical meanings represent 
activities not able to be performed by body parts (nor by SEATS OF EMOTIONS), 
the conceptual aspects included in their networks reveal an additional category 
or domain which includes both senses, both its prototypical meaning and senses 
in abstract usages (i.e. X AND Y SHOW Zxy).  
Thus, in the case of emotions or mental states including aspects like (LOSS 
OF) SELF-DETERMINATION – e.g. in ANGER, (SUDDENLY) REMEMBER, DESIRE, 
BE DIZZY, but also DIE – this feature is linguistically implicated in the forms due 
to the significance of self-control for self-conception and other Beaver cultural 
models.  
The verbs used include these relevant aspects in their structures (see also 
ch. 6.5.2. and 6.5.3.): 
 
ANGER (heart) 
falls out 
SUDDEN MOTION (UNCONTROLLED) 
REMEMBER (mind) 
runs 
SUDDEN MOTION/CHANGE OF STATE 
(UNCONTROLLED) 
DIE (heart) 
stops run 
PHYSIOLOGICAL EFFECT / SUDDEN 
MOTION/CHANGE OF STATE (UNCONTROLLED) 
BE DIZZY (head) is 
spinning 
LOSS OF ORIENTATION (UNCONTROLLED) 
Table 6.4.: Conceptual aspects used for pattern III 
The constructions all reflect physiological or psychological effects of the 
meaning or concept meant and utilize these for linguistic manifestations.  
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The identified linguistic and structural subpattern [BODY PART FALLS OUT] 
used to express ANGER constitutes a case including the objective physiological 
effect of pressure as a potential candidate for underlying metonymic 
conceptualization. On the other hand, the form does not allow for an 
unequivocal indication of PRESSURE, as will be discussed in the next part. 
ANGER seems not to be conveyed by the simple absence of the organ. In 
this case, the first pattern suits the idea and is available, but not applied for this 
emotion: [NO BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION] is one of the most productive 
paradigms (see also ch. 6.5.6.). It highlights the lack of a body part to express 
disabilities and personality traits like sadzii wǫdyuéʼ “be deaf (my ears do not 
exist)” or sadee nadyuéʼ “be blind (lit. my eyes do not exist)” via the metonymic 
structure INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION. Here, even more obvious than in the 
case of the patterns [BODY PART PERFORMS UNCONTROLLED/SUDDEN MOTION] 
assigned to ANGER, no causation is directly included in the semantic structure. 
Rather, absence is the idea focused on and the crucial aspect – expressed in an 
image-schematic style – to arrive at the intended meanings. Speakers explain 
these idioms with a metonymic link between the body part or instrument and 
the action performed via these instruments. This form can also be accounted for 
without relation to a conceptual metaphor, so that no copy of structure need to 
be assumed. The conceptual aspect INCOMPLETENESS / LACK or FAILURE / 
MALFUNCTION works for both domains or concepts.  
According to recent literature and hypotheses of the CMT, the Beaver 
ANGER idiom would allow an analysis that classifies this expression as a 
manifestation of the conceptual metaphor ANGER IS PRESSURE IN A 
CONTAINER. The physiological effect of perceived PRESSURE when getting 
angry is linked via embodiment to this conceptual metaphor. Consequently, the 
linguistically expressed ejection or dropping of the heart is understood as an 
overflow caused by this PRESSURE built up inside the angry person and as a copy 
of the concrete domain’s structure, i.e. PHYSICAL PRESSURE. Concerning the 
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Beaver data, besides this theoretical assumption, there is no further evidence for 
this conceptual metaphor to be included in the linguistic expression: neither a 
semantic analysis of this idiom and other related ones indicates pressure, nor any 
of the statements given by the speakers. Instead, there are other candidates 
allowing for a coherent explanation of this construction. SELF-DETERMINATION 
and INDEPENDENCE are already alluded to in chapter 5.7.3. These conceptual 
features are highly relevant for the Beaver people and might lead to the choice 
of vocabulary including notions of control. 
The act of falling out is an uncontrolled motion, a movement whose single 
components are not executable individually. Furthermore, an object falling out is 
more likely to be a passive object, and not a subject with self-control consciously 
and willingly falling out. Thus, “fall out” in combination with heart as SEAT OF 
EMOTION reflects and highlights the aspects of SUDDEN MOTION and a MENTAL 
CHANGE OF STATE which cannot be fully controlled or manipulated by the 
subject. The Beaver concept of persons as being self-governed, not influenced 
by others or controlling the behavior of others, plays an important role in many 
models, and is tightly linked to the concept of self-control (Mills 1986, Goulet 
1998). Similarly, statements about instances of intellectual events like “(suddenly) 
remember” are mostly based on the unexpected advent of knowledge or 
memories themselves, as well as the notion of suddenness. 
The pattern comprising the ANGER idiom is analyzed as being based on 
the language-specific concept [BODY PART PERFORMS UNCONTROLLED/SUDDEN 
MOTION] (cf. table 6.4.). The other figurative expressions included here are 
sįįdyííʼ náátlʼa “to (suddenly) remember (lit. my mind runs)”, and madzééʼ 
łííníítlʼa “to die (lit. his/her heart stopped running)” (see also 6.5.4. below). Both 
utilize a metaphorical motion of the body parts included, i.e. mind (see ch. 5.4.) 
and heart. For “die”, on the other hand, there exists an indication of well-known 
physiological effects. “(Suddenly) remember” and the ANGER idiom linguistically 
manifest SUDDEN MOTION / CHANGE OF STATE, probably combined with lack 
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of control, or powerlessness, since the activities of the SEAT OF EMOTION are 
not capable of being influenced by the experiencer. The conceptual difference 
between the two forms is that sįįdyííʼ náátlʼa “(suddenly) remember (lit. my 
mind runs)” does not involve any physiological effects. In the case of ANGER, 
there indeed exist complementary physiological experiences. These are not as 
concrete and classifiable as, for example, increased heartbeat in EXCITEMENT. 
Still, pressure, increase in body temperature, etc. are objective and perceivable 
effects. The question is if these are also conceptualized and linguistically 
manifested. The alternative description using the formula X AND Y SHOW Zxy 
seems more evident: sadzé̲éʼ xaats ̲ʼat “I am angry (lit. my heart falls out)” suits 
and highlights experienced loss of or reduced (self-)control when a person gets 
angry, and is combined with the idea of absence of heart as SEAT OF (SELF-) 
CONTROL. This is an aspect worthy of conceptualization and linguistic 
realization, in conformance with the essentialness of self-control and individual 
freedom for the Beaver people. 
6.5.4. PATTERN III [BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION IS RUNNING] 
In the case of sįįdyi ̨í ̨́ʼ náátlʼa “(suddenly) remember (lit. my mind runs)”, 
the metalinguistic statements reveal that one characteristic of this mental activity 
is LACK OF CONTROL over what you remember, how and when. Here, this 
reduced self-control is not really negative – so “suddenly remember” does not 
have a bad connotation, nor is it necessarily another person that influences the 
one remembering. What is experienced, is a change in mental state, which 
overwhelms the experiencer70: 
 
                                               
70 Note the similar construction in German: über jemanden kommen “overcome”, übermannen 
“overwhelm, overcome (lit. to over-man)”. 
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Consultant101: mįdyį náátlʼe (“s/he (suddenly) remembers (lit. his/her mind 
runs (uncontr.)”). That’s run- you know, you’re thinking all over, you- I hear 
my grandpa used to say: mįdyį náátlʼe He used to say, “your mind is- runs 
fast”. If now you- and if somebody start telling you about this, ooh, your 
mind- like my mind runs way back, that’s what he meant. I used to do that, 
them, too, they’re thinking the same way. That was then, long ago, that’s 
what he meant, my grandpa. mįdyį náátlʼe. 
Researcher: Like “it’s all over”? [researcher understood natlǫ́ “be lots”, CP] 
Consultant101: Not all over, but your mind comes- just snaps right now. If 
somebody’s telling you something somewhere else, right away your mind 
comes back to something. Tell me something like- oh, yeah, that time, too, 
they used to do this, my grandpa he tell me. And that’s why my grandpa- I 
guess he’s- that’s what I guess my grandpa used to mean, your mind he 
runs, your mind is fast. Your mind is fast, that’s what náátlʼe means, “it’s 
fast”. Yeah. […] Right away you think back. That’s what he meant. I used to 
wonder what he means, and now I know what he means, as I get older. 
Their mind works fast, that’s what it means, their mind works fast. 
        (metaphor100) 
 
So, although it is the person remembering, her/his mind’s activity includes 
fast and uncontrolled aspects reflecting part of the conceptual structure of 
“(suddenly) remember”. 
The verb contained in the idiom sįįdyííʼ náátlʼa “(suddenly) remember”, -
tlʼa “run”, does not evoke the concept of a running animal or stumbling person, 
Therefore, it is not necessarily an adoption of this conceptual structure. Rather, 
there exists a similarity between the two forms of a fast and SUDDEN MOTION 
and CHANGE OF STATE, with the main difference situated on the abstract-
concrete continuum. The fast motion or change of state instance clearly 
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observable in the case of body motion is more available and therefore easier to 
communicate, but “suddenly remember” also includes this aspect in its structure. 
Accordingly, “linguistic conceptualization” is at work: there is a tendency to 
adopt linguistic terminology from the best or prototypical example of FAST and 
SUDDEN MOTION or CHANGE OF STATE – e.g. “run”, or “fall (out)”. 
The pattern applied for sįdyi ̨́ʼ náátlʼa “suddenly remember (lit. my mind 
runs)” is also found combining the body part “heart” with the verb stem tl’a 
“run” to refer to death: madzééʼ łííníítlʼa “s/he died (lit. her/his heart stopped 
running)”. For both meanings, “die” as well as “suddenly remember”, the aspect 
of SUDDENNESS is identified and linguistically realized in the expressions via the 
verb meaning (“Your man- mind is fast”, that’s what it means […]. 
(metaphor100)). Both linguistically manifest sudden movements of the SEAT OF 
EMOTION, which also implies that the activities of the SEATS OF EMOTIONS are 
not capable of being controlled by the experiencer. 
 
EXCITEMENT theoretically would also suit this pattern, since the increased 
heartbeat as a physiological effect of EXCITEMENT is verbalized, and also 
includes the aspect of LACK OF CONTROL – an excited or even scared person 
does not have full control, neither over her/himself nor over the situation at 
hand. Yet, this aspect is not highlighted or used to linguistically express this 
emotion or mental state. Instead, usage of the verb dáh-dlihts “dance” focuses 
more on the MARKED RHYTHMIC MOTION the heart performs in such situations.  
 
sįįdyi ̨í ̨́ʼ nááts̲at “desire (my mind is hard/strong)” is a similar case, 
concentrating on the feature of LACK OF CONTROL. The subject is obsessed by 
this emotion and not self-determined anymore, because DESIRE is a strong force 
reducing the power of oneself or one’s mind. For sadzé̲éʼ tyíhsa̲ne “I am lonely 
(lit. my heart is pitiful)”, the concept of PITY is used to express this emotion 
which the experiencing person cannot manage in a conscious way. Complete 
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control is indeed not available for emotions or personality traits in general, but 
for such negative feelings, this aspect is particularly noticeable. And similarly, 
when one feels dizzy, one loses orientation and control over one’s behaviour or 
one’s situation or condition. 
madz̲é̲éʼ łííníítlʼa “die (lit. his/her heart stopped running)” or DEATH is 
self-explanatory concerning control or determination, a dying person does not 
play an active part. For madz̲é̲éʼ łííníítlʼa “die (lit. his/her heart stopped 
running)”, the concepts of SUDDEN CHANGE OF STATE and LACK OF CONTROL 
are applied. The abstract concept of DEATH already contains characteristics 
suiting the concrete concept of (LOCO)MOTION (here, the cessation of motion). 
Additionally, the linguistic expressions of this concept ((LOCO)MOTION) refer to 
a prototypical activity experienced by every person or member of the speech 
community71. They are copied for verbal manifestation and communication of 
the intended meaning, namely the abstract event of DEATH. 
6.5.5. PATTERN III [BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION IS DANCING] 
In the constructions with -dzé̲é “heart” conceptualized as BODY PART, 
figurativity is caused by the non-prototypical usages of dáh-dlihts “dance” and -
tlʼa “run”. Accordingly, the constructions for “death” (madzé̲éʼ łííníítlʼa lit. 
‘his/her heart stopped running’) and “survive” (madzé̲éʼ daʼatlʼizǫ lit. ‘my heart 
is still dancing’) are figurative linguistic forms. These verbs are transferred from 
their prototypical domain LOCOMOTION to describe the tense and relax activities 
of heart as a muscle: for “death”, the end of (LOCO)MOTION is linguistically 
realized, while “survive / be still alive” refers to the continuation of 
                                               
71 The concept reflected by the linguistic form and especially by the verb with its semantic 
structure explicitly including the aspect of lack of control requires speakers and hearers to be familiar 
with this way of linguistic manifestation, foreigners may not be able to get the whole intended 
message. 
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(LOCO)MOTION. The mentioned activities of the “heart” can be defined as 
agitation or motion – and therefore similar to LOCOMOTION, sharing specific 
conceptual aspects. 
These transfers are analyzed as using the “linguistic conceptualizations” of 
the specific conceptual aspects included in both source and target concepts. The 
forms in question are defined as utilizing the conceptual components found in, 
for example, the verb “dance”, i.e. MARKED RHYTHMIC MOTION. This aspect is 
focused on when employing the idiom for madz̲é̲é gáákʼáá dáhʼatlʼis “survive 
(lit. his/her heart is still dancing)”: it is paralleled in the domain of DANCE as 
‘artificial human behavior’, and in the domain of life and body function, as 
heartbeat. This metonymic chain from life to function of the organ “heart” is 
non-figurative, but the usage of “dance” evokes figurativity to some degree. This 
is due to the fact that this lexeme is tightly linked to other contexts, subjects and 
usages. Additionally, other aspects from the DANCE domain are available, such 
as the positive connotation or context of DANCE. In the case of “survive, be still 
alive”, this conceptual baggage (see also ch. 2.2.2.1.) of the linguistic item is used 
to further support the intended meaning. This means that, linguistically, the 
concrete activity expressed via the verb “dance” is used to express the less 
known activity of the heart to refer to the abstract domain SURVIVE. This is 
done via the shared aspect MARKED RHYTHMIC MOTION. The DANCE concept is 
more available, since it is concrete and experienced by all members of the speech 
community in the same fashion. The conventionalized conceptualization of 
DANCE is defined and established by the cultural models of the community. On 
the other hand, the function of “heart” is neither well-known nor (ad hoc) 
explainable. 
For EXCITEMENT / FEAR (madzé̲éʼ dahʼatlʼis “s/he is excited / scared (lit. 
his/her heart is dancing)”) the same linguistic conceptualization is employed. 
However, for this emotion speakers no longer refer to the positive connotation 
of DANCE, i.e. the conceptual baggage is at least not consciously employed. This 
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suits the fact that EXCITEMENT may be a positive, but also a negative mental 
state. Still, the same conceptual aspect MARKED RHYTHMIC MOTION perfectly 
fits the need to express an increased heartbeat as an effect of EXCITEMENT. This 
is done without consequently evoking concepts of DANCE in its full structure. 
Merely the parallel characteristic of both concepts EXCITEMENT and DANCE is 
linguistically expressed via the lexical item dáh-dlihts “dance”. 
6.5.6. PATTERN V [HEART DOES NOT EXIST] 
-dzé̲é “heart” is not included as SEAT OF EMOTION in the realization of the 
pattern [NO BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION] (ch. 6.5.1). Instead, it is found in a 
separate but similar pattern ([BODY PART DOES NOT EXIST]): adyuu sadzé̲éʼ 
ghǫ́lįį “be timid, coward / be heartless”. This form constitutes the only token 
identified so far in the corpus.75 The form is polysemous, referring to TIMIDNESS 
/ RECREANCE as well as HEARTLESSNESS in appropriate contexts. Concerning 
the meaning TIMIDNESS / RECREANCE, this expression forms the negative 
equivalent to sadzé̲éʼ ghǫ́lįį “be brave (lit. my heart exists)”, constituing the only 
token found for the affirmative structure [BODY PART EXISTS]. These 
constructions emphasize the unique status of the body part term “heart” in the 
class of body parts realized in the described patterns to express emotions and 
personality traits.  
TIMIDNESS / RECREANCE as an antonymic concept of sadzé̲éʼ ghǫ́lįį “I am 
brave (lit. my heart exists)” is translated as adyuu sadzé̲éʼ ghǫ́lįį “be timid, 
cowardly (lit. my heart does not exist)”. It is construed via negation of the 
bravery idiom, i.e. no antonymic lexical item is applied. Speakers also refer to 
this form in relation to HEARTLESSNESS as similarly conceptualized in English: 
 
                                               
75 The notion of pattern is used here despite the fact that only one token is defined so far, 
qualifying its status. 
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researcher: Could I also say “he has no heart”? Does that have a meaning, when 
you say about someone “he has no heart”? Or you wouldn’t say that? 
Consultant404: As we say adyuu sadzé̲éʼ ghǫ́lįį (“s/he is heartless (lit. his/her 
heart does not exist)”). “He’s got no heart.” 
researcher: When would you say that? […] That’s like he doesn’t take pity on 
other people? 
Consultant404: Yeah, that means all that.   (metaphors003) 
 
This variation in meaning and usage reflects missing contextual clues and 
embeddedness in a situation of neither COWARDICE nor HEARTLESSNESS. 
Consequently, the choice of one meaning over another is due to chance in an 
elicitation session. Yet, these data do not imply a lack of knowledge due to the 
endangered status of the language or the limited competence of speakers. This is 
also confirmed by variation in such forms found cross-linguistically. Rather, this 
reflects the varying scope of a source domain (Kövecses 2006) (see also ch. 
3.2.2.1.). The Beaver form mįįdyííʼ náátsat literally meaning “my mind is 
hard/strong” of pattern II (see ch. 5.4.2. and ch. 6.5.2) also reflects this context-
dependent variation: the form expresses DETERMINACY, POWER and DESIRE. 
6.5.7. LINGUISTIC PATTERNS & VARIATION 
The patterns I and V described in the preceding paragraphs (6.4. & 6.5.) 
do not necessarily allow for similar combinations or usages of body parts and 
properties due to analogous conceptual meanings, nor are they substitutable 
among each other. For example, when asked for *sadzé̲éʼ nadyuéʼ (lit. “my heart 
does not exist”), speakers deny this form and reject it as unknown, in form as 
well as in meaning (see ch. 6.5.7.). Thus, although very similar underlying 
concepts are evoked, the conventional linguistic constructions block other forms 
despite appropriate conceptualizations. This reveals the strong conceptual 
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relations holding between the underlying concepts used to refer to emotions or 
personality traits, and the linguistic patterns applied. Although a missing or lost 
heart constitutes the meaning of adyuu sadzé̲éʼ ghǫ́lįį “be timid / heartless (lit. 
my heart does not exist)”, and therefore shows quite similar semantic aspects to 
*sadzé̲éʼ nadyuéʼ  (lit. “my heart does not exist”), the latter is not accepted.  
This again substantiates the relevance of conventionalized linguistic 
patterns and language use (Evans 2010a): it is not only conceptual structure 
generating and governing figurative language. Influence of the identified 
linguistic patterns (chapter 6.4.) seems to play a role as determining as the usage 
of non-linguistic aspects like physical experiences for conceptualizations of 
emotions, and disability. Once a pattern like [NO BODY PART / SEAT OF 
EMOTION] is conventionalized in a speech community, efficiency and economy 
promote their usage. At the same time a decrease in the transparency of 
semantic and conceptual aspects of the linguistic forms as tokens is observed. 
Furthermore, linguistic metaphors strengthen the status of linguistic patterns via 
the strategies applied in “linguistic conceptualization”: established patterns 
constitute secured methods for new expressions of abstract concepts lacking a 
substantiated linguistic structure – but not lacking conceptual structure. 
Concepts whose physiological effects allow for the employment of concept-
supporting metonymy or metonymy-based metaphor use conventionalized 
linguistic ways for communication of intended meanings. 
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7. CONCLUSION & OUTLOOK 
The present work presents a description of linguistic and conceptual 
structures of polysemous body part terms in Beaver. It aims at presenting the 
language- and culture-specific conceptualizations of this essential part of the 
mental lexicon, and shows that body parts constitute a complex field of 
conceptual and linguistic patterns. Furthermore, emotion expressions 
comprising body part terms are analyzed with respect to their underlying 
conceptualizations. The interplay between embodiment, cultural models and 
linguistic patterns is identified as essential for the linguistic manifestations. This 
work is also a contribution to cognitive linguistics in that it comprises new 
evidence to critically discuss theoretical assumptions concerning the relationship 
between language and thought. More precisely, the specific part terms in the 
Beaver mental lexicon are examined against the background of conceptual 
network and conceptual metaphor approaches (Langacker 1987, 2000, Lakoff & 
Johnson 1980, Lakoff 2006[1993], Kövecses 2007, Kövecses & Csábi 2009) in 
order to understand the mechanisms underlying non-literal and figurative 
language use. The analyses of the data reveal that the relations between cognitive 
and linguistic structure are highly complex and bound to diverse factors 
influencing the processing and understanding of linguistic structures. 
Consequently, embodiment and cultural models, linguistic patterns and 
conventionalization, conceptual correspondences and linguistic manifestations 
have to be carefully integrated into descriptions of idiomatic expressions. To 
sum up briefly: 
 
• the semantic networks of body part terms show gradual transitions 
between the conceptual aspects BODY PART and SEAT OF EMOTION 
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• the figurative expressions are based on conceptual metonymy; 
• at the same time, conceptual metaphor and metonymy do not 
suffice to grasp the conceptual networks of the polysemous body 
part lexemes 
• cognitive, but also linguistic mechanisms determine the distinct 
meanings and usages: the notion of “linguistic conceptualization” 
allows for a coherent description of the emotion expressions 
 
In the next paragraphs, results as well as aspects for further research will 
be presented. First, there is a brief recapitulation of the linguistic and conceptual 
patterns of the Beaver data, followed by a discussion of the notion of “linguistic 
conceptualization” introduced to capture the coherence and processing of 
linguistic material. Thereafter, the theoretical aspects focused on in this thesis – 
especially the relevance and status of conceptual and linguistic structures for 
figurative meanings – will be revisited. They will also be associated with 
phenomena like cultural models and linguistic economy which are equally 
relevant for the understanding of language-specific forms. 
7.1. BEAVER METONYMIES AND PATTERNS 
Concerning the Beaver body part terms, the conceptualization SEAT OF 
EMOTION is identified as part of a structure similar to a conceptual metaphor 
(SEAT OF EMOTION IS BODY PART). This is based on the realization of 
the body part terms found in numerous expressions linking emotions, 
personality traits and mental states to specific body parts. Furthermore, the 
corresponding metalinguistic statements affirm this additional conceptual aspect 
for specific body parts. ‘Similar to’ means that this conceptual structure does not 
conform to the definition of conceptual metaphor. Rather, a seamless transition 
from source to target concept and the availability of both in the usages of the 
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terms are presumed, i.e. both belong to one conceptual network. Accepting this 
conception of the body part terms, in chapters 5 and 6 it was shown that the 
main conceptual strategy used is metonymy. Independent of the focused 
conceptual aspect of the body part term (i.e. BODY PART or SEAT OF EMOTION) 
we find several specifications of the general metonymy INSTRUMENT FOR 
ACTION for the body part term (not for the whole idiomatic construction). To 
give two examples: MOUTH FOR TALK in (92) and HEAD FOR WORRY in 
(93): 
 
(92) sazááʼ ghǫdyuéʼ   “I am not talkative (lit. my mouth is not there)” 
(93) satsí̱íʼ nakǫįl   “I worry (lit. my head is heavy)” 
 
The conceptual network of zí̲s ̲ “skin/hide” is the only body term 
described in this thesis which is not used in expressions of emotion. Here, the 
points of departure for the derived senses and usages constitute examples of the 
metonymy WHOLE FOR PART, more specific SKIN FOR MATERIAL in 
(94) and SKIN FOR CONTAINER in (95), to give two examples: 
 
(94) azí̲s ̲   “canvas (lit. its skin/hide)” 
(95) súúdagán zí̲s ̲  “salt shaker (lit. salt skin/hide)” 
 
Looking at the meanings of the whole idiomatic constructions, the 
metonymy BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION FOR PERSON is often 
consulted for expressions of emotion (but also disability): 
 
(96) sadzé̲éʼ tyíhsa̲ne  “I am lonely (lit. my heart is pitiful)” 
 
Furthermore, CONTAINER FOR CONTAINED is applied in the following 
examples: 
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(97) sadz̲é̲éʼ ghǫ́lįį   “I am brave (lit. my heart exists)” 
(98) sįįdyííʼ natlǫ   “I worry (lit. my minds are lots)” 
 
EFFECT FOR CAUSE with the specific instances HEARTBEAT FOR LIFE 
as in (99) and HEARTBEAT FOR EXCITEMENT / FEAR as in (100) 
constitutes figures of thought regularly found in the Beaver expressions for 
emotions and personality traits: 
 
(99) madz̲é̲é gáákʼáá dahʼatlʼis  “s/he is still alive” 
(lit. his/her heart is still dancing)” 
(100) madz̲é̲é dahʼatlʼis   “s/he is excited / scared” 
(lit. his/her heart is dancing)” 
 
Another point reflected by the various meanings of the Beaver body part 
expressions is that identical constructions do not automatically manifest the 
same underlying conceptual strategies. Rather, metonymic chains, non-literal and 
figurative structures are all identified for different tokens of the same linguistic 
pattern. It was shown that expressions equally constituting tokens of the same 
pattern either rely on figurative metonymic chains or alternatively show only 
descriptive structures. 
Similarly, conceptualizations of the Beaver body part terms in one pattern 
vary from basic, literal meanings (i.e. concrete BODY PART senses) to SEAT OF 
EMOTION senses with a gradual mixing of the BODY PART and SEAT OF 
EMOTION senses in between. For example, sats̲ííʼ nááts̲at “be stubborn (lit. my 
head is hard/strong)” as a token of the pattern II [BODY PART IS 
HARD/STRONG] relies on a metonymic chain founded on embodiment: the 
personality traits are linked to psychological states taking place in the head and 
therefore connected the expressed body part. On the other hand, sadzé̲éʼ 
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nááts̲at “be flinty, hard-hearted (lit. my heart is hard/strong)” focuses on the 
SEAT OF EMOTION concept of “heart”. Hence, it reflects a socio-culturally 
created and conventionalized relationship between the personality trait indicated 
(FLINTINESS / HARD-HEARTEDNESS) and the body part. FLINTINESS is linked to 
the heart not only via embodiment as in the form above, but also via a 
combination of embodied experiences with cultural models. In the case of the 
first pattern, [NO BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION], the descriptive meaning of 
satsá̱n náádyuéʼ “be skinny (lit. my flesh is not there)” depicts the missing 
substance to express THINNESS. On the other hand, sats̲ííduéʼ “be crazy (lit. my 
head is not there)” applies figurative metonymy, and reflects the metonymic 
chain HEAD (– BRAIN) – MIND – INTELLIGENCE – THOUGHTS – 
THINKING (– WORRY). Here, the pattern does not refer to the real absence 
of “head”, while for “be skinny” a more literal interpretation is available. Rather, 
the body part term -ts̲íí “head” stands for the abstract target concept INSANITY 
via the metonymy INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION. This form is figuratively 
and semantically construed differently than satsá̱n náádyuéʼ “be skinny (lit. my 
flesh is not there)”, although both linguistic structures and the lexical items 
included (body part terms) show some similarity. Gradual shifts and the 
availability of both conceptual aspects in one linguistic form are found in many 
Beaver forms. 
The data also discloses the danger in cognitive linguistics of explaining 
cognitive structures on the basis of linguistic forms. Although Lakoff and others 
explicitly state a clear distinction between linguistic and conceptual structures, 
evidence for conceptual mechanisms most often consists of linguistic forms. 
This – of course – is owing to the problem of investigating indirectly accessible 
conceptual structure, but regardless, this does not justify the overuse of linguistic 
evidence. 
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7.2. “LINGUISTIC CONCEPTUALIZATION” 
As an attempt to resolve the problematic relationship between linguistic 
and conceptual metaphor, the distinction between cognitive and linguistic 
conceptualization is included and elaborated in the analysis in this work. This is 
done in order to get reliable results about the relationship between cognitive 
processes and linguistic manifestations thereof. According to the data, these two 
interrelated sub-areas in semantic and conceptual structure allow for a more 
objective analysis of the linguistic structure, without reading conceptual structure 
into the forms. For the Beaver data, linguistic conceptualization is presumed to 
extract conceptual aspects of lexemes prototypically found in collocations with 
vocabulary expressing concrete meanings. This makes further adoption of 
conceptual structure of an unrelated concrete source domain redundant. 
Consequently, conceptual metaphor is not included in the analyses of the 
figurative constructions. For example, the usage of the verb of (loco)motion 
“run” in sįįdyííʼ náátlʼa “(suddenly) remember (lit. my mind runs)” is not 
defined as including the conceptual domain of LOCOMOTION in the domain of 
REMEMBER. Rather, the conceptual aspect (SUDDEN) MOTION / CHANGE OF 
STATE – already included in the existing conceptual structure of REMEMBER – is 
highlighted and extracted in this usage of the verb. Therefore, the form X AND 
Y SHARE ZXY is suggested instead of the rigid form X IS Y of the CMT for 
complex structures like expressions of emotion utilizing body part terms with 
specific conceptualizations. 
7.3. ABSTRACT DOMAINS AND  
CONCEPTUAL METAPHORS 
The notion of “linguistic conceptualization” touches on another 
assumption in the CMT: the status of abstract conceptual structure. One aspect 
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of the reasoning for conceptual metaphor is the assumed insufficiency or even 
lack of structure on the part of abstract targets. Abstract domains – and 
abstraction in general – are said to be in need of substance taken from concrete 
concepts. This is questioned here in two ways: first, it is shown that abstract 
domains like emotions, personality traits etc. do have conceptual structure, but 
use existing lexical structure to be expressed. Second, if abstract notions have to 
be substantiated and filled up via structure of concrete concepts, basic 
conceptual metaphors lose their foundation or means of existence, since they 
also constitute quite abstract concepts. Although most of the Beaver 
constructions are described without the inclusion of numerous conceptual 
metaphors, this thesis certainly does not aim at completely abandoning the 
concept or the theory. Rather, the data point out that modification of the 
assumptions about cognitive mechanisms and the relationships between 
linguistic and conceptual structures must be taken into account.  
7.4. STRUCTURAL AND METHODOLOGICAL VARIETY 
For this purpose, more cross-linguistic studies and data are needed to 
verify theoretical hypotheses about the influence of cognitive processes on 
linguistic structures. Furthermore, this cannot be done in isolation. Other well-
known linguistic phenomena like lexicalization, ambiguity and polysemy, analogy 
in form and meaning as well as conventionalization play their roles in such 
complex structures as semantic and conceptual networks. The section of the 
mental lexicon described in this thesis – i.e. body part terms in basic and derived 
senses and usages – mirrors the complexity of non-literal structures. The forms 
and meanings cannot be explained only on the basis of the conceptual metaphor 
X IS Y and the idea of concrete source and abstract target domains. 
Furthermore, the expressions require careful and distinct analyses due to their 
complexity at the linguistic and the conceptual level: the idioms contain various 
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body part terms with different BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION 
conceptualizations to express emotions and personality traits. Furthermore, the 
conceptualizations of the body part terms differ in their meanings and 
figurativity from the meaning constructions found on the level of the complete 
idiomatic expressions.  
In addition, the notion of creativity and the linguistic principle of 
economy, favoring polysemy and vagueness, cannot be excluded from the 
description of the mental lexicon. As a communication tool, language offers 
nearly perfect tools for the comprehension of ambiguous expressions: context 
and conventionalized patterns and rules allow for arriving at the intended 
meanings created via elaboration of existing linguistic material. Although these 
are not consciously available processes, speakers have subtle access to such 
structures and offer relevant contributions to linguistic and cognitive 
investigations. 
7.5. THE RELEVANCE OF METALINGUISTICS AND 
THE AVAILABILITY OF  
NON-LITERAL AND FIGURATIVE MEANINGS 
The inclusion of metalinguistic statements – where available – clearly 
enriches the database and gives relevant insights into the mental lexicon. For the 
investigation of the conceptualizations of body part terms in this work, fruitful 
comments illuminated the subtle differences and intersections between the 
different conceptual aspects highlighted in the various usages. No metalinguistic 
statements were accessible for meanings of the whole idiomatic expressions and 
the postulated components of the attributes included in source and target 
domains (e.g. SELF-DETERMINATION in the case of “fall out” and MARKED 
RHYTHMIC MOTION in the case of “dance”). For further research, carefully 
elaborated questions and discussion stimuli for additional metalinguistic material 
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must be devised, since helpful hints and explanations can be expected for these 
forms as well. 
This is also assumed for senses with several consecutively ranked 
derivations. For example, it seems revealing to further analyze the literal 
meaning of tlʼǫéédze “onion (lit. like a rope)” in constructions like tlʼǫéédze zí̲s ̲
“gallon (lit. onion skin/hide)”. tlʼǫéédze “onion” literally means “like a rope” 
and refers to the idea of highlighting or focusing on the long end of this 
cultivated plant76. Therefore, the conceptual aspect SHAPE of a “rope” is used to 
refer to the real plant referent. While this relation to “rope” is given by the 
speakers in discussions dealing with the plant “onion”, it is hardly accessed while 
talking about the container or measure “gallon”. Such ‘two or more steps back’ 
conceptualization or comprehension is also found to be restricted for the 
meaning of i ̨í ̨d́zá̲a “[nickname] (lit. little strawberry (potentially: little little 
heart))”, where the notion of “heart” is not present ad hoc in the speakers’ 
realization of the linguistic form. Phenomena like lexicalization, fossilization and 
the traditional notion of “dead metaphors” will benefit from metalinguistic 
statements in cross-linguistic studies. 
Finally, a classification of figurative and non-prototypical meanings would 
be useful for drawing lines between differently caused, differently influenced, 
and differently processed aspects used in the various senses – especially in the 
context of speakers’ consciousness. For further descriptions of the structures of 
a mental lexicon, the following classification of what is and is not available for 
speakers might be elaborated: what deliberately makes sense in the underlying 
cultural or folk model(s), and what is not the object of any expedient, sensible 
and intellectual consideration due to the fact that the pivotal point is not 
available for speakers’ awareness and knowledge. According to metalinguistic 
                                               
76  Without any socio-culturally embedded knowledge of the conceptualization, the term 
could also be translated as “onion skin”, which in English refers to the paring of an onion, or – 
metaphorically transferred to – “flimsy paper”. 
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statements and reasoning, a distinction between transferred or non-prototypical 
meanings in terms of their accessibility might be established including the 
following three categories: 
 
1. Conceptual meanings which are accessible as well as explainable, and 
show availability of the relationships between literal and intended 
meanings. For example, for English “table leg”, the realization of a table 
consisting of parts in analogy to a body and the relation to the concept of 
the body part ‘leg’ as a limb of an entity are accessed. For the Beaver 
expression atsʼǫ́tsʼadéʼ “chokecherries (lit. somebody’s excrement is 
hard)” the literal meaning AND the relation to the intended sense are 
accessible and explained (“because your shit is hard when you eat 
them”). Similarly, sazáa ghǫtlʼǫ “chatterbox (lit. my mouths are lots)”, 
adzeeʼ “hearts (card suit)” and many of the descriptive terms found in 
the Beaver lexicon are described in detail concerning their literal 
meanings and the relations holding between the senses. Examples are 
makʼéhʼetsʼehdii “table (lit. on it you eat)”, makʼéhtsʼééstyį “bed (lit. on it 
you sleep/lie)” and dane kweléhe “policeman (lit. person who puts 
people in house”. 
 
2. Meanings which are only to some degree accessible. Here, the literal 
meanings are accessible and are explained by speakers, but their relations 
to the concepts of the prototypical meanings of the parts used are not 
explainable (in detail). The Beaver terms náábee “otter (lit. it swims 
lots)”), sadzééʼ xaatsʼat “I am angry (lit. my heart falls out)”, but also the 
container senses and usages of -zí̲s ̲ “skin/hide” are good candidates: 
their relations to the basic meanings are to some degree mentioned, but 
they are not explainable ad hoc. 
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3. Meanings which are neither comprehensible nor accessible, and reacted 
to similarly to lexical roots that are not further analyzable (for example, 
monomorphemic verb stems cannot be further explained; asking for the 
literal meaning of such items is therefore futile). In Beaver, some cases 
seem predestined for further investigation, for example, sįdyíge ghǫ́lįį “I 
am happy” might have the literal meaning “I am up”. This form is not 
the topic of any unsolicited metalinguistic discussion and the Beaver 
speakers do not access the potential underlying orientational conceptual 
metaphor GOOD IS UP. In some discussions, they reject any 
orientational literal meaning and any link to dimensional qualities. Still, 
carefully prepared questions and stimuli might lead to elucidating 
statements. 
 
To avoid any speculative analysis, careful descriptions and discussions with 
native speakers are needed to shed light on and understand the processes 
underlying such constructions and their underlying patterns of 
conceptualization. 
Another aspect which comes up in the Beaver data is the investigation of 
influence of bilingualism and especially of the dominant language, here English. 
This language is used as metalanguage and communication tool in all sessions, 
accordingly, inferences are expected and constitute another area to be 
investigated in future. 
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